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## A1 (Panel) - Concept, Freedom, Necessity: Morality between Adorno and Levinas

Adorno and Levinas are post-Holocaust thinkers famed for their work in moral philosophy. Surprisingly, relatively little has been written on the relationship between them. The aim of this panel is to initiate a more thorough dialogue between Adornian and Levinasian ethics. Firstly, we will argue that non-conceptual experience is the bedrock of both Adorno's and Levinas's account of morality; secondly, we will contrast the notions of moral necessity and freedom employed by Adorno and Levinas, respectively, with respect to their accounts of the non-conceptual experience.

1. James Lewis, (University of Sheffield) - Unmediated Interpersonal Experience
2. Jakub Kowalewski (University of Essex) - Moral Necessity and the (im)possibility of Freedom in Adorno and Levinas
3. Dr. Simon Thornton (Independent) Freedom in Levinas and Adorno

## A2 - Pedagogy 1

Dominic Smith (University of Dundee) - Spirit and Letter: Engaging Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of Material Culture

In 1932, Walter Benjamin opened a radio address to German children with the claim 'today we know what technology is'. His title: 'The Railway Disaster at the Firth of Tay'. This paper focuses on the transcript of 'Railway Disaster' to draw out and develop an approach to teaching philosophy that is, I claim, at the core of Benjamin's work: through fragmentary and marginal instances of material culture, Benjamin sought to provide open and democratic focal points for philosophical understanding. Part one contextualises 'Railway Disaster' in terms of the argument of a book I will publish this year: *Exceptional Technologies*. Today, I argue, 'Railway Disaster's' opening claim requires modification: what is pervasive across diverse contemporary cultures is a *pretence* to knowledge about technology that masks how specialised, complex and market-driven interactions with technologies have become. For this reason, 'Railway Disaster's' approach to teaching philosophy has, however, become correlatively more important: the focus of the address is a failed and ghostly bridge; instead of confirming pretensions concerning 'what technology is', it is sufficiently strange to deflate them and act as a focal point for shared philosophical understanding. Part two shows how this argument is consistent with an open and democratic approach to teaching philosophy. I describe how Benjamin's address has inspired a 'Localising Philosophy' project I am developing in Dundee, the main city on the Firth of Tay. To date, this has involved an educational pack for local schools, public engagement work, and works towards a short film. The aim of this paper is to share and test details of this project, as a way into thinking about how a focus on material culture and 'exceptional technologies' might have wider relevance for teaching philosophy today.

Nick Wilcock (University of Chichester) - From Paulo Freire's Critical Pedagogy to the Disestablishment of Education

Paulo Freire is widely regarded as both the progenitor and leading figure of critical pedagogy. He developed the theory and practice on which his pedagogy rests out of a complicated symbiosis of thought which incorporates Christianity, Marxism, existentialism, and Hegelianism. What results is a model of education that is central to a political project – a political project which is democratic, radical, and built upon a view of the interdependence of theory and practice. In this paper I begin by presenting a brief overview of Freire's argument as found in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* the clearest and most complete statement of his politico-educational project. Within which he argues that the vocation of the human animal is 'humanisation' and provides a theoretical and practical methodology for overcoming the corrupting and coercive state of affairs that persists. Then I highlight how the esteem with which Freire is held has provided a protective barrier from critique. His practices have been abstracted and assimilated into first world settings, and his theory has become beyond reproach. As such, the intention of this paper is to draw attention to two significant limitations of Freire's politico-educational project,

that, even in its strongest manifestation, demand to be addressed. Firstly, the model remains inconsistent due to an unsatisfactory account of the relationship between means and ends. Secondly, the model highlights a necessary conflict between the individuals of the state, and the state itself which all but guarantees political failure. Finally, I shall argue that the consequence of these limitations leads to the unlikely consideration of the disestablishment of education as the most favourable resolution for critical pedagogical practice.

### A3 – Nietzsche 1

Joshua Sharman (University of Warwick) Gift Giving in Nietzsche's Zarathustra

In Nietzsche's Zarathustra, we encounter, frequently, the theme of the 'gift'. The text begins with Zarathustra's determination to return to humanity, "to become man again," in order to give the gift of his wisdom. Likewise, the first section ends with a chapter on that which Zarathustra deems the highest virtue, the virtue of 'gift-giving'. Understanding the motif of the 'gift' and the 'gift-giving virtue' is central to uncovering the importance of one of Nietzsche's most elusive texts, as well as highlighting the relation between his philosophy and the Platonic tradition. In what follows, I will initially focus on the first section of Z, and then move to a discussion of the whole text. My aim will be to understand the essential ambiguity of Nietzsche's conception of 'gift', as it unfolds in Z, by way of Zarathustra's dual role as herald and healer. Firstly, I examine Zarathustra's announcement of his intention to bring a gift to humanity. Secondly, I look at the most significant appearance of the gift motif, in the section titled "On the Adder's Bite". Thirdly, I turn to the symbolism of the gift presented in the final chapter of the First Part, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue" (Z.I.22) – which brings together the concept of the gift as it manifests itself in both Zarathustra's role as herald and his role as healer. Finally, I relate the foregoing discussion of the gift motif in Zarathustra to the inversion of Platonism Nietzsche envisaged throughout his career, whilst also touching upon the role of 'gift' found in those writing after Nietzsche, namely Heidegger and Deleuze and their appropriation of the terminology of 'gift'.

Meng-Shi Chen (Tung-Fang Design University) - (Dis)embodiment of Ecstasy: The Significance of the Allegory of Dionysus's Dismemberment in *The Birth of Tragedy*

Of all the mystic experiences across religious traditions, the experience of ecstasy is likely the one that Nietzsche is most attentive to, repeatedly highlighted by him as Dionysian impulse that plays the major role in tragic experience. Yet, despite the common consent that Dionysian ecstasy is the main source of tragic joy that resembles the affective state of *ek-stasis*—being out of place, specifically how does Nietzsche use Dionysus as the mythical religious figure to outline the notion of ecstasy? I point out that the allegory of Dionysus's being torn apart by Titans presented by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* should not be underestimated, for Dionysus's dismemberment—*sparagmos*—indeed embodies the notion of ecstasy, a spirit and feeling of life, that Nietzsche introduces in his early philosophy. In the context of Schopenhauer's metaphysical ideas, I show that for Nietzsche what Dionysus suffers most is not corporeal demise and death, but the coming into being of the individual, generated by "the state of individuation as the source and primal cause of all suffering, as something inherently to be rejected." What the individual suffers most is therefore not Dionysus's being torn apart, but its metaphysical meaning as the birth of individual, yet the suffering of the birth of individual can only be symbolized in Dionysus's being torn apart. Dionysus's dismemberment meanwhile denotes the promise and hope of his rebirth regarded as the highest joy of the return to the primal unity; and therefore it signifies both the principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*) as well as the shattering of that principle itself. The significance of Dionysian dismemberment consequently becomes the explanatory site where ecstasy reveals itself—an affective state of how one loses oneself in the metaphysical and metaphorical sense of the shattering of the principle of individuation where extreme pain and joy collide.

Dr. Evaldas Juozelis (Mykolas Romeris University) - Nietzschean Philosophy for Posthumanist Scientific Future

I presume that one of the fundamental purposes of avant-garde European philosophy is an adequate evaluation of ongoing cohesion of post-industrial societies' intellectual and behavioural setup and cutting-edge scientific

practices – bioengineering, cybernetics, AI simulation etc. – that currently undergo crucial transformations. Initially, it poses a conundrum for the definition of *human*. If physical, emotional and cognitive human capacities are shaped by DNA, so virtually are the building blocks – teamwork, empathy, rivalry, rule-following – of all socio-cultural phenomena. Consequently, avant-garde philosophy accredits a certain type of *biophilosophy*. Paradoxically, the eventual symbioses of AI-human and body-technology induce a *biopolitics* that not merely follows certain biologically determined patterns, but programs its own *posthumanist* agenda, henceforth expanding and dissociating modern concepts of *human agency, identity, responsibility, virtue, property* etc., while simultaneously re-assembling and re-arranging them in a certain *posthumanist framework*. Hence, it challenges a “humanist” perception of *science*. We are *already actualizing* posthumanist framework by producing brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) that decode and convert neural brain activity into external machine control, though *we do not know* what consciousness is or how it works. Similarly, we *actualize* science within techniques of *sciens, scindere* – splitting, cleaving, dividing and separating – without knowing what *scientific knowledge* exactly is. Another paradox is a repetitive emergence of sciences as *unifying compositions* of certainty or truth (*episteme*), whereas they are bio-culturally adapting sets of skills and applications (*techné*). Therefore, my humble aim is a clarification of posthumanist framework as a promising exploratory tool, which I believe specifically resembles the paradoxical Nietzschean *Weltanschauung*. I complement Nietzsche’s “why science?” interrogatory stance by dissecting it into "what", "where" and "how": what is (the definition of) scientific knowledge, where it operates, and how it obliges mankind with no manifest justificatory foundations.

#### A4 – Walter Benjamin

Noel Boultong (Noboss, Kent) *A Typology for Violence*

How is violence in society to be characterized? To answer that question the issue regarding different kinds of sovereignty might be analysed before ascertaining how each indicates implications for violence itself. In this paper, such a procedure will be reversed. Three ways in which violence can be understood will be delineated – a psychological/mythic or religious interpretation, a second one emphasizing sheer physicality and a third focussing upon ideological considerations – before indicating the implications of each for extreme forms of rule. Walter Benjamin in his “Critique of Violence”<sup>1</sup> focusses upon law’s opposition to justice so that the latter is cast as Messianic in character where an iconic sense of violence emphasizes a value structure opposed to a presently existing status quo sustained by a mythic, fate-imposed violence embodied in law, made manifest in *authoritarian* rule. Hannah Arendt’s characterization of violence is more indexical or physical in character in the way she distinguishes power from violence,<sup>2</sup> where if the latter substitutes for the former we have totalitarian rule dissolving into *tyranny*. Ernesto Laclau, whilst allowing for this Messianic dimension even if reduced to the idea of ‘promise’ secularly understood,<sup>3</sup> renders a more intellectual<sup>4</sup> or institutional sense of violence emerging through antagonism resulting from a collision between two hegemonic articulations needed to sustain democracy if *totalitarianism* is not to emerge. After these three types of understanding of the nature of violence have been delineated it may become possible to ascertain which of these three interpretations of violence, given their respective strengths and weaknesses, offers the most promising approach in answering our initial question.

Gavin Rae (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) - Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ as an Ethics of Responsibility

Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ essay has, in the last thirty years or so, attained cult-like status for a certain strand of political theory. This is despite—or possibly because—of its considerable hermeneutical challenges. While it is generally agreed that the work focuses on the role that violence (or force) plays in creating, sustaining, and altering legal systems, interpretations differ on whether the latter in particular leads to an affirmation of violence or non-violence and, indeed, whether Benjamin offers a political *theology*—where radical political change emanates solely from a transcendent divine violent act—or a *political* theology, wherein radical political change emanates from a human act of divine inspiration immanent to the political-judicial system to be replaced. In this paper, I engage with the pros and cons of reading Benjamin’s concept of divine violence in transcendent and immanent terms before affirming the latter and tracing the consequences of this; namely that there is a disjunction between the violence of the act itself and the epistemological knowledge

underpinning its justification. Agents can then appeal to divine violence to justify radical political change, but yet cannot be sure that such action really is divinely inspired. While those affirming this *political* theological reading have generally used it to affirm the *political* significance of Benjamin's essay and, in particular, his notion of divine violence, I argue that this misses the ethics of responsibility inherent to it: the divine can be appealed to when employing violence to instantiate a radically different political order but the legitimacy and consequences of that appeal cannot be known beforehand and so must be shouldered by those making it. When read in this way, Benjamin's essay reminds us of the difficult relationship between politics and epistemology, as well as of the opportunities and dangers that result from appealing to theological sources to justify radical political change.

### **A5 - Deleuze & Guattari 1**

Nathan Widder (Royal Holloway) - The Univocity of Substance and the Formal Distinction of Attributes: The Role of Duns Scotus in Deleuze's Reading of Spinoza

This paper explores Gilles Deleuze's thesis that Spinoza takes up and transforms medieval theologian John Duns Scotus's concepts of formal distinction and the univocity of being to develop his ontology of substance. It will begin by explaining how Deleuze's idiosyncratic reading reflects his aim of using Spinoza to challenge post-Kantian and specifically Hegelian conceptions of the Absolute. Afterwards, it will review Duns Scotus's development of univocity and formal distinction from their Aristotelian and early Christian origins to show how Duns Scotus deploys them to respond to questions concerning the unity of the categories, the nature of divine attributes, and the problem of individuation. It will then examine how Deleuze reads Spinoza as taking these concepts away from their role in sustaining divine transcendence and deploying them in a project of ontological immanence by re-reading them through Spinoza's notion of expression. The conclusion will briefly highlight the limitations Deleuze finds in Spinoza's development of univocity and how this leads him towards Nietzsche.

Allen Chiu (University of Dundee) Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ Problem: Deleuze & Nāgārjuna

The purpose of this piece is to articulate a sense of what I call the "Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ Problem", and to examine how it connects to wider issues in comparative philosophy. By the "Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ Problem", I mean the tendency in Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ philosophy to prioritize Deleuze rather than the And. In this paper, I examine three component parts of this problem, by relating Deleuze's philosophy to an unusual source: the Buddhist philosophy of Nāgārjuna. There is what I call the 'Deleuze and Guattari' problem which focuses on the relative importance ascribed to Guattari in their joint works. Then there is the 'Deleuze and Major Thinkers' problem, which focuses on the difficulty of creating new content from already explored avenues in Deleuzian thought (Proust, Spinoza, and Psychoanalysis, for instance). Finally, there is the 'Deleuze and Minor Thinkers' problem where Deleuzians turn to tangential influences in Deleuze's work (Sartre, Simondon, and Archaeology, for instance). I respond to these problems in three parts. First, I discuss the "Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ Problem" in general, showing the relation between the three variations of the problem and the problem of bias in comparative philosophy. Second, I show how a focus on the specificity of the relation between Deleuze and Nāgārjuna can minimize the impact of the "Deleuze & \_\_\_\_\_ Problem". Lastly, through a deepened focus on Deleuze and Nāgārjuna, I strive to show that a comparative perspective should not be a mechanism of determining which thinkers are more 'legitimate' or 'correct', but rather a trajectory of understanding and exchange, a free becoming.

### **A6 - World, Explanation, and Justification**

Jonathan Egeland Harouny (Stockholm University) - The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended

Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue in favor of *non-factive mentalism*, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon the facts about one's non-factive mental states. Internalists often argue in favor of non-factive mentalism using Stewart Cohen's (1984) new evil demon problem. Internalists and

externalists agree that there is something that is epistemically good or valuable about both your actual beliefs and your beliefs in the demon scenario. Internalists claim that the epistemic property which these sets of beliefs share most intuitively should be thought of as *sameness of justification*. Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim, usually either by challenging the internalist intuitions directly, or by arguing that there is a more plausible way to think about the epistemic property in question. Recently, both kinds of externalist objection have been raised against the argument from the new evil demon problem in favor of non-factive mentalism. The goal of this paper is to defend the argument against three prominent objections – a pair of which is offered by Clayton Littlejohn (2009) and one by Timothy Williamson (2007). According to Littlejohn's first objection, the internalist intuitions elicited by the new evil demon problem commit the proponents of non-factive mentalism to certain counterintuitive epistemic principles. I respond by arguing that Littlejohn fails to motivate the claim that the aforementioned principles are counterintuitive, and that he also begs the question against the internalist. According to Littlejohn's second objection, the internalist intuitions elicited by the new evil demon problem fail to carry any special force since there are conflicting externalist intuitions. I respond by showing how Littlejohn fails to provide some of the necessary details in the examples that are supposed to elicit externalist intuitions, and that when these details are provided the externalist intuitions plausibly disappear. According to Williamson's objection, the beliefs of the victim in the demon scenario are blameless but unjustified. I respond by showing how Williamson's suggestion is vulnerable to a *modus tollens* insofar as it fails uphold an intuitive distinction first pointed out by James Pryor (2001) between rational perceptual failings and irrational cognitive failings.

Roberto Redaelli (University of Milan) - The Logical Realism of Emil Lask between Postmodernism and New Realism

Emil Lask (1875-1915) had, as a man and as a philosopher, a singular and tragic destiny. In his short life, he was a brilliant exponent of the Southwestern neo-Kantianism and his thought inspired some renowned philosophers – from the young Heidegger to Plessner, from Lukács to Weber – at the beginning of twentieth century. But, after his death, occurred on the eastern front in 1915, his name and his works fell into oblivion. The obscurity of his language and the complexity of his “provisional” major works, together with his premature death, contributed to the forgetfulness of his figure. Indeed, although nowadays it's possible to observe some important signs of interest in Lask's works, his philosophy remains mostly unknown. The aim of my paper is to show the modernity of some genuine issues presented by Lask's in his major works: his 1911 *Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre* and 1912 *Lehre vom Urteil*. Particularly, starting from these writings, I intend to highlight the contribution that Lask's philosophy can offer to the current debate between postmodernism and New Realism over reality. If the so called New Realism criticizes on the one hand the constructivism of postmodernism, which argues the artificial and constructed character of reality, on the other it seems to come back to a pre-critical dogmatism, reducing the entire reality to an independent thing by the knowing subject. Between the postmodernism, which swallows up the reality in the hermeneutical circle, and the New Realism, which proposes again a radical form of realism, we can find a viable option in the theory of intentionality and meaning developed by Lask in his logic. Starting from an original interpretation of Kant's Copernican Revolution, Lask claims that the realm of being is identical with the logical realm of validity. Therefore, in the sensible world, the object consists originally of two elements: the logical form and the sensible matter. The unity of form and content is called the absolute sense or meaning identified by Lask with the truth untouched by all subjectivity: “the object is the truth”. Deepening these philosophical framework, Lask, in his *Lehre vom Urteil*, criticizes the subjective interpretation of truth and proposes, at the same time, a new form of realism, a logical realism, based on the panarchy of the logos and the autonomy of the object. This form of realism, which I intend to present in my paper, can help us to rethink the status of reality in the current debate between postmodernism and New Realism, giving back to the object a new dignity without falling into some traditional forms of naive realism. In this way, the forgotten destiny of the Southwestern neo-Kantianism incarnated by Lask's philosophy can play today a decisive role in defining our philosophical horizon

## **B1 - (Panel) – Towards a Social Epistemology of Technicity**

The panel will discuss ideas and debates surrounding the political implications of technology and technological rationality. By approaching the problem from an epistemological perspective, we will examine the mythical reduction of ‘technicity’ to an imagined apparatus grounding the reproduction and organisation of modern forms of political exploitation. The panel will consider thinkers (Mitrani, Marcuse, Simondon, Barad) who share a common critical approach to the question of technology that aims to refute both the technocratic dream of a fully rational society, and the technophobic mirage of recovering ‘pre-technical’ forms of human practice.

1. Andrea Bardin (Oxford Brookes University) - Political Significance of Onto-Epistemology: Simondon with Barad (via Leroi- Gourhan)
2. Dr. Giovanni Menegalle (Kings College London) - Technocracy and Totality: On the Work of Nora Mitrani
3. Taila Picchi (University of Pisa and University of Florence) - The Project of Technicity: Marcuse’s Reading of Simondon

## **B2 – Sexuality**

Stella Sandford (Kingston University) - “‘Envy Accompanied with Antipathy’”: Bentham and Freud on the Psychology of Sexual *Ressentiment*

Jeremy Bentham’s recently published writings on sexuality (c.1814–1823) are an important (and extremely surprising) addition to the history of philosophical sexuality studies. In ‘On Sexual Irregularities’, ‘Sextus’, ‘General Idea’ and *Not Paul, But Jesus* Bentham argues that homosexual sexual pleasure is in itself good and argues for the ‘Proposed ultimate liberty – viz. all-comprehensive liberty for all modes of sexual gratification not predominantly noxious’. At numerous points in these writings striking parallels with Freud’s writings on sexuality, particularly the latter’s *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) are obvious. Like Freud, Bentham finds no moral distinction between same-sex and heterosexual sexuality. Understanding sexuality primarily in terms of pleasure (rather than reproductive teleology) and presupposing sexual orientation to be matter of taste, Bentham, like Freud, denies that same-sex desire is either pathological or unnatural and advocates for a measure of sexual freedom against its deleterious suppression by ‘civilization’. This means that, unlike the *psychopathia sexualis* of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries it is the pathology of the ferocious condemnation of homosexuality, not the seeker of same-sex pleasure, that Bentham’s analysis aims to understand. This paper will argue that Bentham’s conception of sexuality is surprisingly radical, even in relation to Freud. It will demonstrate the relation between Bentham’s and Freud’s writings on sexuality. It will then show how Bentham’s utilitarian defence of same-sex pleasure is grounded on a Humean conception of natural taste and thus excludes ‘natural antipathy’ as a justified basis for the condemnation of homosexuality. It will investigate Bentham’s psychological explanation for the (unwarranted) condemnation of same-sex sexuality, and the problem of the relationship in this explanation between what Bentham calls the ‘principle of antipathy’ and the ‘principle of asceticism’. In conclusion this paper will suggest that Bentham’s writings on sexuality reveal a more complicated picture of Bentham’s psychology than his well-known ‘psychological egoism’ or ‘psychological hedonism’.

Emma Ingala Gómez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) - The Problem of Sexual Difference

Whether under the form of a vindication of matter and the body within the so-called new materialisms, as a retrieval of Luce Irigaray’s statement that sexual difference is the philosophical issue of our age, or as the cornerstone of a Lacanian inspired ontology of the signifier and language, the notion of sexual difference, which originally comes from the two different but related contexts of psychoanalysis and feminism, is currently experiencing something of a theoretical resurgence. Rendered unpopular in the 1980s and 1990s by some voices within gender studies, feminism, and philosophy that accused it of perpetuating a binary and fixed opposition between man and woman, of imposing and sanctioning two identities in a heterosexual matrix, and of prolonging the hegemonic and dominant ideology of patriarchy, sexual difference is now taken to offer a

fundamental challenge to identities, which, in so doing, brings about a creative and transformative process. In this paper, I will assess the importance of the question of sexual difference to issues of emancipation and transformation. In order to do so, I will first outline the contexts where this notion was formulated, the criticisms that were addressed to it, and the debates it inspired, before examining a number of current reappraisals of sexual difference that try to think it away from the double-bind of the essentialist/constructivist opposition (for example, Elizabeth Grosz, Étienne Balibar, Judith Butler, Lauren Berlant, Catherine Malabou, Alenka Zupančič, or Joan Copjec). I claim that these approaches have in common a post-foundational perspective, which leads them to understand sexual difference problematically and not apodictically or assertorically.

### **B3 – Philosophy of Mind 1**

Maik Niemeck (Freiburg) Reviving the Adverbial Interpretation of Brentano's Concept of Secondary Consciousness

There is widespread agreement between many contemporary philosophers of mind that phenomenally conscious states have a subjective character. (among others cf. Block 1995; Frank 2011; Kriegel 2009; Levine 2001; Metzinger 2000; Schlicht 2014; Strawson 2011; Williford 2006; Zahavi 1999) The subjective character of experience is most commonly characterized as an awareness that oneself is currently undergoing a specific experience. This is not such a new idea and something similar has been proposed quite some time ago among others by Franz Brentano (1874) under the name of “secondary consciousness” (cf. Huemer 2017). That is why competing contemporary accounts took Brentano as an early proponent of their particular view. Some of Brentano’s quotes suggest that he understood subjective character as another object of experience and thus that he was an early adherent of so called *self-representationalism* (cf. Kriegel 2003; Zahavi 2004). In the light of this assumption, it seems misguided to ascribe to Brentano an *adverbial* understanding of secondary consciousness – i.e. the position that it is a *way* or a *mode* in which primary experience takes place rather than an additional object – as proposed by Thomasson (2000). Since Brentano himself speaks of a secondary object of experience one might think that it is a too wide terminological stretch to assume that he actually had a mode in mind. However, in the proposed talk I will argue that his claims that secondary consciousness is only peripheral and that it can never become inner observation are evidence that he was not a self-representationalist after all. Moreover, I will explain how one can interpret modes as objects of the modality of experience rather than as objects of its representational content by drawing on recent proposals made by Recanati (2007) and Musholt (2015).

Jesús López-Campillo (University of Murcia) - Self-deception: A Neo-Expressivist Account

Self-deception is an irrational mental condition which involves lack of knowledge (subjects are self-deceived about *p*) and lack of self-knowledge (subjects are unconscious of being self-deceived). Most accounts of self-deception assume that it also involves false or unwarranted belief. One of the most prominent accounts of self-deception is *motivationalism* (Johnston, 1988; Mele, 2001; Nelkin, 2002; Van Leeuwen, 2007). According to motivationalism, a subject is self-deceived regarding *p* when her belief has been formed by a biased assessment of the evidence available to her, and when the bias has been caused by the influence of a motivational state (such as, the desire that *p*, the anxiety that no-*p*, etc.). I will argue that motivationalism accounts cannot adequately explain the behavioural *conflict* characteristics of paradigm cases of self-deception. The reason why, I will contend, is that self-deception is a *sui generis* mental state different from belief and from any other psychological kind. To develop this idea, I will assume a neo-expressivist account of mental states (Wittgenstein, 1953) according to which mental states are identical with *expressive patterns*. An expressive pattern is a sequence of expressive episodes (utterances, gestures, facial expressions, silences, actions...) manifested by the subject along a certain period of time (minutes, hours, days, months..., depending on the mental state). Self-deception is a *sui generis* mental state because it presents a differentiated kind of expressive pattern. This expressive pattern is composed by three kinds of episodes repeatedly manifested by the subject: 1) she sincerely utters that *p*, 2) she acts inconsistently with what she utters, and 3) she rationalizes her irrational behaviour confabulating reasons for her actions. It will be shown that this neo-expressivist conception is able to explain, unlike motivationalism, the behavioural conflict of paradigm cases.

## B4 – Recognition

Farida Youssef (The British Museum) - A Spatial Understanding of Recognition: Marivaux's *L'Île* Read through Rancière

Recognition is the confirmation or the acknowledgement of one's identity. As important as this is, its recent conceptualisations eclipse the actual work of recognition. While they look at the relationship of self and other, what happens between them is overlooked. This essay will focus on the space in-between self and other, thereby unveiling a spatial quality to recognition. To illustrate the discussion, the essay will use the encounter between master and slave found in Marivaux's *L'Île des Esclaves* [*The Island of Slaves*]. A remarkable feature of his play is the master and slave's reversal of roles, each acts *as if* they were the other, and this instantiates a *mise en abymes*. Reversals are prominent in Rancière, whose work centres on the instability of experience. The essay will, firstly, following Rancière, argue that this acting *as if* disrupts the inequality between master and slave, and highlights the reversibility of their identities. Furthermore, it will be argued that the reversal of roles, which is thematised by the gap between recognition and misrecognition, inserts recognition within that space. Then, in a second part, the relationship between the gap and recognition will be furthered in order to understand how the properties of the former reflect on the latter. The aim of this part will be to examine the unfixed nature of the gap and to see how identities are affected by it. By revisiting the *mise en abymes*, the essay will show that it is an important factor of the destabilisation of recognition. The conclusion arrived at will be a new form of recognition, which, by espousing space, shows it to be alive.

Gašper Pirc (University of Ljubljana) - Social Recognition and Human Suffering: The Role of Critical Hermeneutics in Understanding of the Social Pathologies in the Contemporary Society

In recent years, it seems that the theory recognition, largely based upon the insights provided by Hegel's philosophy and exemplified by the work of authors such as Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Paul Ricoeur, has been able to offer the alternative means to investigate the questions of social cognition, justice and morality, challenging abstract normative theories in social and political philosophy. In the paper, I argue that the recognition-based normative philosophy requires being supplemented with a robust hermeneutic of social pathologies and cognition to reach its scientific potential. In the presentation, I present a case for the significance of critical hermeneutics, influenced by the work of Paul Ricoeur and the Critical Theory, in the understanding of the social pathologies and the vulnerability of human beings in the modern society. I emphasize the complexity of the relationship between the sphere of mutual recognition and the primary communal co-existence, and the sphere of institutions as the determinate patterns of the material and symbolic reproduction of society, often mediated by ideological and strategic discourse. In an effort to avoid the extremes of Habermas' functionalist separation of "lifeworld" and "system" or the overly psychologically oriented theory of recognition in the earlier Honneth's philosophy, I focus the attention on the symbolic mediation in society, effective history and the interpretative nature of the social conduct. I accentuate the role of critical hermeneutics in identifying the state and possible causes of the phenomenon of social suffering as the primary indication of the pathological social condition and argue that the reflection upon the asymmetry between the normative expectations and the potentially sufferable singular human experience represents the urgent yet elusive task of contemporary social philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and sociology.

## B5 - Political Philosophy 1

Birte Loschenkohl (EUI Florence) - Repetition and Collective Action in Karl Marx

This paper develops a new understanding of transformative political agency through a reading of the notion of repetition in Karl Marx. In 'Capital', Marx refers to the movement of capital as circular and (seemingly) self-perpetuating. Its repetitive character in turn makes capitalism appear entirely beyond human control and thus inaccessible to human actions directed towards change. Repetition here is utilized to describe a structure that discourages and inhibits attempts to act differently and alter the given order. In the '18th Brumaire', Marx analyzes three different modes of collective action through the lens of repetition: First, the tragic repetition of the French Revolution, apt to implement moderate change; second, the farcical repetition of Bonaparte's coup d'état, using the form of revolution to perpetuate the given; and third, the 'social revolution of the 19th century', repeating itself--its own failed attempts in order to take them up anew--instead of repeating a concrete historical figure or phase. Rather than affirming a sense of fateful defeat and impossibility of action, Marx here offers suggestions for how we might understand a form of revolutionary agency that works with and through failure. This form of repetition, then, a repetition not of past victories but of present failures, is what allows Marx to keep the utter hopelessness of radical change because of the repetitive character of capitalism in view, without therefore resigning to the immutability of the present. Through my reading of Marx, I will thus argue that repetition can be a helpful conceptual tool in spelling out a model of political agency that seeks to transcend, subvert, or otherwise alter a given order which has become seemingly unchangeable and inaccessible to our actions.

Luke Collison (Kingston University) - Action and *Potentia* in Hobbes's Theory of the Commonwealth

According to the standard reading, Hobbes's sovereign is constituted solely by a contract between each individual with one another. Whether taken metaphorically, historically or mythically the paradigm of a verbal or written legal contract is presumed to embody the primary character of Hobbes's model of the commonwealth and its means of constitution. However, as Tuck notes understanding the details of the mechanism of the contract is a 'much harder problem' than conventional readings suggest. While the problem is often reduced to finding a source for obligation in the state of nature, others have recognised that there exists a dual structure in Hobbes's account. Oakeshott and Johnston noted that Hobbes's political model was composed of two intertwined, parallel or even contradictory lines of thought 'which intersect in his doctrine of sovereignty.' One is located in the logic of a political theory of rights, while the second consists of a behavioural analysis of human nature. In general, however these accounts continue to maintain the priority of the contract. My account questions the constitutive priority of the contract and points instead to the role of 'actions' insofar as these are 'signs of the mind'. Through a close analysis of Hobbes's political writings, in particular focussing on *De Cive*, I demonstrate that Hobbes's use of the Latin terms *potestas* and *potentia* reveals the supporting role of practices such as obedience in constituting the effective capacity of the sovereign. Obedience is identified by Hobbes as belonging to a set of invariant 'natural' practices, that includes prayer, honour, worship, and ceremonial practices. For Hobbes, these signify directly and universally, that is, independently of any particular conventional kingdom. The aim of the paper is thus to unravel the supposed paradox, identified by Sabine, that in Hobbes '[t]he performance of covenants may be reasonably expected only if there is an effective government which will punish non-performance' yet the government must be established by such a covenant.

## B6 – Heidegger 1

Matt Burch (University of Essex) - Expressive Control: Heidegger on What Makes Actions Properly Agential

In “Self-Expression and Self-Control” (2004), Marya Schechtman identifies a kind of paradox in the way we think about agency and action, namely, it’s a commonplace to say that people are “not themselves” when their self-control is compromised, and yet it’s just as common to think that people express their “true selves” when they lose control or “let go”. Although Schechtman explores this tension by drawing on different phases of Harry Frankfurt’s work, I will look at it through the lens of two major contemporary approaches to moral responsibility. On the one hand, rationalist views identify our agency with our rational capacities and maintain that properly agential actions for which we’re responsible are those over which we exercise rational control. On the other hand, conative expressivist views identify human agency with a nonrational deep self and maintain that we are responsible for any actions that express that deep self. Neither approach does justice to Schechtman’s paradox: the rationalist cannot explain why we feel more ourselves when we lose control, while the expressivist fails to explain the importance of agential control. In this presentation, I propose that Heidegger’s phenomenological account of agency offers a kind of middle way between these views that can do justice to Schechtman’s paradox. Specifically, I will argue that for Heidegger full-blooded intentional action always involves self-expression and agential control, or what I call expressive control.

Irene McMullin (University of Essex) - Norm and Ideal

This paper considers the role of ideality in practical agency. It examines in particular whether a normative orientation toward the better and the worse requires one to represent those conditions as such in order to try to realize them and if so, the nature of that representation. Does ‘the better’ primarily show up via a concrete role model that points toward an ideal, or in an inchoate sense of aspirational possibilities of becoming? Does the given that is transcended in light of a better possibility show up as flawed or simply as ‘to-be-overcome’? I will consider in particular the relationship between reason and thinking in thinkers such as Arendt and Heidegger insofar as we can characterize the former in terms of an orientation toward specific or specifiable norms, while the latter involves not a responsiveness to determinate measures but rather an orientation in which such determinacy is itself in question. I will argue that the absence of a determinate measure in thinking does not imply the absence of measure as such, however. Getting clear on what this means will require us to consider the places in Heidegger’s oeuvre where he discusses the Platonic idea of the Good and Arendt’s invocation of Kant’s notion of the transcendental ideal. But how does the orientation to the good inform our everyday coping? I will reject suggestions that this can be understood as a form of reflective cognizing – despite the invocation of the concept of ‘thinking’ – and argue instead that openness to the unspecifiability of the good shows up in a complex experience of inadequacy, yearning, and delight that is operative in our experiences of trying to be. Such experiences do not themselves provide reasons for pursuing this or that specific possibility, but rather give direction to Dasein’s striving more generally.

Denis McManus (University of Southampton) - Heidegger and the disappearing ‘we’

In a dialectic familiar from some recent discussions of the philosophies of Kant and Wittgenstein, our sense that we have an immediate grasp of things is questioned by pointing to forms of mediation, a questioning that then leads to sceptical worries, a resolution of which seems to call for idealism, a position which seems inherently unstable, collapsing back into realism. In the latter stages of this dialectic, we encounter what Jonathan Lear has labelled ‘the strange case of the disappearing “we”’. In this paper, I will briefly indicate how previously I have placed some of Heidegger’s ideas in relation to this dialectic in countering two forms of the suspicion that he is committed to a problematic idealism, and then look at how we might do the same with his discussion of our acquaintance with others.

## C1 (Panel) - Envisioning Citizenship in Democracies: Some Perspectives

Who is a citizen? And what relationship links the notions of citizenship and political agency to the production of collective identities? This panel investigates the conditions for membership in democratic regimes, from Antiquity to modern times. It will address citizenship and agency from three different angles: alleged autochthony as a basis for citizen-identity and agonism in the Athenian *polis* (Valentina Moro.); political agency and the juridical paradigm through the lens of governmentality (Irene Dal Poz, Monash University/University of Warwick); representative thinking as civic virtue and condition for democratic participation (Clementina Fusillo, University of Warwick).

1. Valentina Moro (University of Padova) - Agonism and Discourse: Citizenship in Classical Athens
2. Irene Dal Poz, (Monash University & University of Warwick) - Citizenship after Sovereignty
3. (Clementina Giulia Maria Gentile Fusillo (University of Warwick) - Representative Citizenship, A Possibility

## C2 – Feminism 1

Jana Sawicki (Williams College) - The Jouy Case: Again, or Questions Concerning the Value of Feminist Critique

Foucault's foregrounding of the case of the farmhand, Jouy, mentioned in several texts, most notably, *History of Sexuality, Volume One (La Volonté du Savoir)*, catalyzed debates among feminists about Foucault's insensitivity to gender and sexual oppression that remain unresolved. Feminists such as Monique Plaza (1978), Linda Alcoff (1996), Ann J. Cahill (2000), and more recently, Chloe Taylor, have argued that his description of Jouy's sexual encounters with a village girl, Sophie Adam, as "bucolic pleasures", evidenced a cavalier and masculinist attitude toward sexual abuse of children—an attitude that underpinned his willingness to recommend both de-sexualizing rape law and lowering the age of consent for sex with minors. In contrast, Shelley Tremain has pointed to feminist's insensitivity to the fact that Jouy was considered "imbecilic", thus subjected to the biopolitical power of the medico-juridico complex in which Foucault was most interested. In this paper, I revisit important moments in this debate as a point of departure for raising questions about the aims of feminist critique, the limits of identity politics, carceral feminism, and the value of challenging Foucault's alleged insensitivity to sexual oppression. My aim is less to resolve the debate or to defend Foucault, than to open up questions concerning the value and aims of feminist critique.

Charlotte Knowles (University of Groningen) - Freedom, Complicity and the #Metoo Backlash

Catherine Deneuve recently criticised the #metoo campaign on the grounds that it confused courtship with harassment, invoking Simone de Beauvoir in an attempt to present her position as consistent with a Beauvoirean feminism of freedom. What she overlooked, however, is that Beauvoir is also a central theorist of female complicity. *The Second Sex* offers various compelling examples of the different ways in which women can be complicit in their own unfreedom, including by embracing and defending their position as sexual objects. But exactly how women become complicit remains an open question. The aim of this paper is to offer a systematic account of complicity by focussing on the Heideggerean strands of Beauvoir's analysis. I begin by evaluating Susan James' interpretation that complicity is most usefully illuminated through the lens of seventeenth-century accounts of republican freedom, which allow us to emphasise the dependent situation of woman as the primary cause of her complicity. While James's analysis is compelling as far as it goes, I argue that it makes complicity seem like the inevitable outcome of female existence and fails to adequately take account of Beauvoir's claim that women *actively embrace* their own unfreedom. To overcome these issues, I propose an alternative interpretation by viewing Beauvoir's account through a Heideggerean lens, an approach warranted by her own use of Heideggerean terminology and imagery. I demonstrate how this approach enables us to systematise the active role agents play in reinforcing their own unfreedom with the role situation plays in drawing women into complicity. I argue that this approach preserves the strengths of the republican interpretation, but is better able to account for instances where complicity may not be inevitable – such as in the case of privileged, middle-class women like Deneuve – and yet agents still act to reinforce rather than resist their own unfreedom.

### C3 - Aesthetics 1

Clint Verdonschot (University of Essex) - Feasible Aesthetic Rationalism: Kant, Wittgenstein and Baumgarten on Aesthetic Norms

Against the predominant view, originating from Immanuel Kant (AA:V KdU/CPJ), I shall argue with Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) that aesthetic experiences should be characterized as a form of cognition, rather than through a particular feeling that accompanies them. Regardless of whatever feelings are felt, aesthetic experiences are the result of making use of one's cognitive capacities in a special way. However, with Kant and against Wittgenstein, I shall argue that aesthetic cognition is not a subspecies of practical knowledge: aesthetic perception is not the perception of an object's 'fit' to a particular practice. Instead, I turn to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten ([1735] 1983, [1750] 1983) to argue that aesthetic cognition is a capacity to appreciate an object's manifold characteristics [*notas*] that render its meaning rich, but also ambiguous. An object known aesthetically is appreciated without subsuming it under any norm. Consequently, it does not make sense to say of the aesthetic object that it 'fits' anything. This does not mean, however, that there are no aesthetic norms. These, I shall argue, are norms of disorientation, disrupting the functioning of cognitive capacities. Ordinarily we perceive in order to act: our knowledge is gained to serve our ends. Aesthetically, perception is unguided by practical aims, signalling a *mis*-use of our capacities in perception. In short: aesthetic norms exist but their form is antithetical to normative practice and their content is negative, parasitic on the practice to be disrupted. Besides avoiding the silliness of some of its predecessors (golden sections, serpentine lines, significant form, etc.), this account of aesthetic rationalism has two interesting upshots. First, it frees aesthetics from the yoke of one particular feeling: in principle, any feeling can accompany aesthetic perception. Second, it reveals us to ourselves as beings that can strive for more than practical knowledge: besides practical and normative, we are also aesthetic beings.

Mathew Abbott (Federation University Australia & University of Leipzig) -Peacock Tails, Human Art, and the Problem of Display: Toward a Problematic Naturalism

This paper contends that narrowly naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of art cannot account for the normative structure of human aesthetic practices because they cannot account for the role played in them by rational self-consciousness. Engaging influential work in evolutionary aesthetics, the paper argues that while inferences from animal behaviours can shed some light on human art, getting a grip on it requires philosophical attention to how animality is transformed by entry into the space of reasons. Endorsing this claim about reason in human life does not mean endorsing a chauvinistic picture of rationality as a special endowment that raises us above the rest of nature. Nor does it mean denying the affective character of aesthetic experience. As John McDowell, Terry Pinkard, and Matthew Boyle have argued, rationality should be conceived not as a property that separates us from animality but as a constitutive aspect of our being animal. The problematic naturalism developed here recognises that we can be disquieted by our naturalness; it is attuned to the derangements of life in the space of reasons. On this basis the paper gives a new interpretation of the significance of display in art, a problem fundamental to modernism that also appears to be crucial in the aesthetic lives of non-human animals. Art is part of how we negotiate our problematic status as rational animals. Modernism brings this to light in instructive ways. It transforms art in the way rationality transforms animality: by bringing it to self-consciousness.

Jörg Schaub (University of Essex) – Aesthetic Freedom and Democratic *Sittlichkeit*

In my paper, I defend a novel Hegelian account of the role and contribution aesthetic freedom makes to democratic *Sittlichkeit*, or ethical life. Using Axel Honneth's *Freedom's Right* (2014) that aims to outline a distinctly democratic form *Sittlichkeit* as a backdrop, I argue that this attempt is unsatisfactory as it falls short of providing an account of a form of free life. This shortcoming is due to the fact that Honneth simply copies the architecture of relations of freedom that Hegel outlined in his *Philosophy of Right* (1821). Like Hegel, he distinguishes relations of social freedom (personal, economic and political freedom) from relations of individual freedom (moral and legal freedom). This architecture of relations of freedom gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom: First, Honneth's account of democratic *Sittlichkeit* does not encompass a variant of freedom that is able to turn the norms and roles that give shape to established relationships of personal, economic and political

freedom themselves into the subject matter of a (sufficiently unrestricted) practice of freedom. Second, the norms and role-mediated relationships of freedom in which freedom is realised have an in-built tendency for conformism that poses a threat to freedom. Against the backdrop of this diagnosis, I propose that aesthetic freedom is best understood – along the lines of moral or legal freedom – as a distinct variant of individual freedom that licenses individuals that are recognised as aesthetic subjects to relate to their social world aesthetically. On this basis, I then show that integrating relations of aesthetic freedom into our account of democratic *Sittlichkeit* provides us with the resources to address the two dimensions of unfreedom that mar Honneth's account of democratic *Sittlichkeit*.

#### C4 - Deleuze & Guattari 2

Bill Ross (Staffordshire University) - Toward a Deleuzian Cosmology

Deleuzian philosophy of nature has in the main been assimilated to Chaos and Complexity Theory. This paper makes the case that this focus obscures much of the potential in Deleuzian thought for dialogue with physics more generally, both classical and contemporary. This is argued from a particular perspective; Deleuze's natural philosophy is a Cosmology in the Whiteheadian vein. There is a triple motive for this decision: it foregrounds those aspects of Deleuzian thought which are cosmological, such as the concept of the chaosmos; it accentuates common ground between Deleuze and Whitehead in ways not usually acknowledged; it places Deleuze in conversation with contemporary scientific cosmology, which is in truth the intersection of multiple competing models both Relativistic and Quantum. I argue that 'holographic' and 'network' theories are of particular interest for this conversation. A growing trend in modern scientific cosmology is toward an evolutionary paradigm, whereby it is understood that laws, constants and even natural kinds may vary over the lifetime of the universe. Murray Gell-Mann, Stuart Kaufmann and Lee Smolin are influential advocates. Both Whitehead and Deleuze speak directly to this trend, not just in the broad sense, but with respect to specific embedded problematics, such as the association of natural law with symmetry, non-locality, the dimensionality of space and the derivation of matter from energy. The nature of the scientific event is in many ways just as nuanced as that of the two philosophers. The intention is not simply to outline compatibilities between the philosophy and the physics, however. I argue that Deleuze and Whitehead are able to foreground questions of the limit and the constant which bear directly on multiple lines of travel in modern physics. There is still a great deal of uncharted ground for Deleuzian commentary.

Audronė Žukauskaitė (Lithuanian Cultural Research Centre) - Biology is the New Ontology: Deleuze, Simondon, Ruyer

This paper will explore Gilles Deleuze's definition of multiplicity in terms of biological life and will trace specific aspects of multiplicity in the philosophy of Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon. The paper will concentrate on such specific features of multiplicity as progressive differentiation, qualitative difference, immanence, and virtuality. The Deleuzian theory of multiplicity is very much indebted to Simondon's distinction between the pre-individual and the process of individuation, and Ruyer's distinction between equipotentiality and the actual morphogenesis or development. These insights help Deleuze to formulate his idea of double differentiation: to conceptualize a living being as potentially or virtually containing multiple differences *in itself*, without a privileged point of view, and also to define the living being in its multi-phased actual development and its capacity to differ *from itself*. In this sense Deleuze formulates a very dynamic theory of life, which explains multiple forms, and the unlimited variations of living beings. The double articulation of differentiation helps to explain the emergence of change and the plasticity of every living being. In this sense Deleuze creates not only the theory of life but also the theory of art and artistic creation as far as art incarnates this drive for change and plasticity. We can argue that for Deleuze nature is always creative and artistic, following its melodic lines, and, *vice versa*: art is intrinsically vital and biological.

This paper follows a historico-philosophical itinerary according to which Greek civilization came into being as an immanent and decentralized network that delineated the problematic settings of Greek philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the emergence of western philosophy from Greece has to do with the Geophilosophical nature of philosophy itself, that is, with the relations it maintains between its actual territorial origins and a potential and unrecognizable Earth. Geophilosophy refers not to the simple geographical conditions of a particular philosophy, but to the geographical, social and mental milieus that create the possibilities of human activity and historical development. Although the authors claim that these milieus display an immanent structure within which the Greek community has established itself as such, they do not elaborate on precisely how it came to create such an environment through which it would occupy this “new earth”. In this paper, I employ recent historical studies to analyze the Greek environment not only in terms of immanence but also in terms of networks and networking, which are identified with new and influential scholarship that attempts to place the Greek maritime component under a networking framework. I demonstrate how the Greeks have transformed the Mediterranean Sea into a virtual center of connectivity across which they migrated, founded new cities, created regional identities, and transported cults, myths, artifacts and most importantly philosophies. I argue that this dense hyper-network of connections, nodes and flows formed a pre-philosophical problematic environment that allowed the Greeks to re-establish their fractal territory, and created a “spatial” image of thought which Greek philosophers would internalize and engage with.

### **C5 - Ontology**

Savvas Ioannou (University of St Andrews) - Ontological Commitments: Paraphrases or Truthmaking?

For Quine (1948), if a statement mentions an entity and we want to argue that the truth of this statement does not presuppose the existence of such an entity, then, we should paraphrase this statement to another statement that does not contain any expression which even purports to mention the alleged entity whose being is in question. Van Inwagen (1990) paraphrased sentences about macroscopic inanimate objects into sentences that mention only simples in order to show that the truth of these sentences do not ontologically commit us to the existence of composite inanimate objects. However, Uzquiano (2004) argued that either plural quantification over composites cannot be paraphrased as plural quantification over simples, or they can be paraphrased by quantifying over regions of space too. The second option is problematic because then a region of space can be identified with a macroscopic inanimate object. I will argue that what we can paraphrase and what we cannot paraphrase just reveal the limits of our linguistic abilities. A better way to discover whether we are ontologically committed to certain entities is to use the truthmaker theory (Heil, 2003; Cameron, 2008). Following Cameron, I claim that there are things that exist fundamentally and other things that exist derivatively. We are ontologically committed only to the things that exist fundamentally. I will propose that Xs do not exist fundamentally, but they exist derivatively, if we can describe, without mentioning the Xs as entities that exist fundamentally, the conditions under which it is correct to use specific sentences about Xs. These descriptions are made by referring only to simples, their properties, space-time points, and how predicates and sentences are satisfied by them. I believe that my view should be preferred as it does not face the problems that the paraphrasis view does. Those conditions can be given for the sentences presented by Uzquiano (2004). They do not claim that regions of space-time exist fundamentally. Therefore, there is not something that exists fundamentally and can be identified with macroscopic objects.

Artur Kosecki (University of Szczecin) - Amie Thomasson's "Easy Ontology" and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's Views on Ontology

According to Amie Thomasson the correctly understood ontological questions are formulated on the basis of conceptual apparatus and they are answered in reference to our conceptual competence and empirical investigations. Thomasson claims that ontological issues are relatively easy to solve or resolve. She calls ontology, which is understood in this way, “easy ontology” (2015). The purpose of the presentation is to justify the thesis that the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, an eminent philosopher from the Lvov-Warsaw School

(Woleński 1989), make it reasonable to claim that he could accept the consequences of the so understood ontological program, that is, accept that solving or resolving of ontological problems is relatively easy. According to Ajdukiewicz's views from the article *On the Notion of Existence* (1949/1978), the proper use of the expression "This table is round" in the object-language entitles us to accept the expression "Tables exist". The answer is based on inferential rules and empirical rules. Ajdukiewicz makes a "trivial inference" from the "uncontroversial truth" as does Thomasson. I shall present the arguments stating that the Polish philosopher is one of the forerunners of "easy ontology", as are S. Schiffer (2003), B. Hale and C. Wright (2001).

Wolfgang Sattler (Independent) - On the Natural Understanding of the Question of What Something Is.

According to both Aristotle's and Kit Fine's essentialism, an adequate answer to the question of what some particular thing X is states essential properties of X. There is an important, though usually ignored difference between these forms of essentialism concerning this question, though. According to Aristotle (Topics I.5, I.9, VI.4), that question is adequately answered by stating the species, the genus and the differentia, but not particularizing properties of X. According to Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence, 2005) stating certain particularizing properties of X is also an adequate answer to that question. By 'particularizing properties' I mean properties that distinguish one particular from other particulars of the same species. Examples are properties of origin, e.g. that Socrates stems from his actual parents, and properties of material constitution, e.g. that the set of planets has Earth, Venus, etc. as members. Fine's view has so far not really been challenged and seems widespread among contemporary essentialists. In this paper I argue that our natural understanding agrees with Aristotle and not with Fine. Stating particularizing properties of X is, in our natural language, adequate in response to the questions, who or which one X is, but not what X is. Part of the appeal of Fine's position is, as I will further argue, that Fine uses abstract entities, namely sets, as paradigms of things having essences. The question of what some set is, however, easily gives rise to a reinterpretation of that very question into the question of which one among many a set is. The different conceptions of the question of what something is, is indicative of a more basic difference between Aristotle's essentialism and contemporary forms of essentialism, such as Fine's and also Kripke's essentialism. That difference is, as I will briefly expound, ultimately about the different explanatory aims of the different kinds of essentialism.

### **C6 - Kierkegaard**

(John-Baptiste Oduor (University of Essex) - Can Kierkegaard Think Politics

Kierkegaard is not a political thinker. However, in this paper I will argue that in the Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard comes very close to a political conception of the relationship between the individual and the social world. What stops Kierkegaard from developing a fully social, or political, conception of agency is his insistence on the inexplicability of anxiety. What a religious conception of sin and a modern conception of politics share is that they both force us to recognise that the individual's agency is deeply implicated in the pervasive wrongness of the world. Kierkegaard's religious interpretation of this implicatedness revolves around the idea of our anxious relation to original sin; in contrast to this, a political conception of agency attempts to understand this implicatedness in socio-historical terms. What unities the religious and political perspective is an attempt to try and make sense of how the individual can understand her relationship to this pervasive wrongness in a way that does not deny her agency, that is, in a way that leaves open the possibility of salvation or social change. However, it is also on this point that the political and religious strategies diverge. Kierkegaard attempts to explain what the relationship between the original, world transforming sin, and our subsequent individual sinful acts, through the concept of anxiety, but whilst doing so he insists on the inexplicability of anxiety. In contrast to this, I argue, a properly political conception of agency cannot abide the existence of phenomena that cannot be explained in social terms. After drawing this contrast between what I take to be distinctive about political and the religious conceptions of agency, I will look at what I take to be the dominant understanding of race, epitomised in the work of the American writer Ta-Nehasi Coates. What we will see is that the politics that he, and people like him, propound ought to be (insofar as they fail to understand racism as reducible to other socio-historical phenomena such as class) understood as a kind of religious, rather than political, thinking.

Luke Jenner (University of Essex Philosophy) - Thinking About the Ambiguity of Evil through Kierkegaard

The typical narratives offered by the media in response to acts we may label 'evil' (such as terrorism, child abuse, etc.), can often fall into one of two categories. More liberal sources, such as *The Guardian*, tend to focus on environmental factors, thus deflecting blame away from the perpetrator(s), while more right-wing sources, such as *The Daily Mail*, often lambast the individual(s) and imply full responsibility for their actions. Interestingly, in the case of the former, the word 'evil' is rarely used – instead the focus is on trying to explain the seemingly inexplicable. Conversely, the latter doesn't seek to understand, but often uses the word 'evil' (often in capitals) to imply full-responsibility and guilt. In this paper, I show why both these strategies are unsatisfactory by focusing on the work of Søren Kierkegaard. In *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard rejects the doctrine of original sin, and Pelagianism, which emphasises free choice, as overly simplistic and downright wrong when it comes to the category of evil. Instead, he offers us a complex account of the human condition, by developing the role that anxiety plays in our everyday lives. I relate the sources of anxiety that Kierkegaard offers to contemporary examples, before discussing how his view of freedom escapes the problems associated with the theological theories above, and ultimately exposes the ambiguity of evil. This highlights the flaw in the media's implicit or explicit declarations of the perpetrator as 'innocent' or 'guilty'. I finish the paper by arguing for the practical relevance of Kierkegaard's thought, especially in the media and the courtroom.

### C7 - Spinoza 1

Beth Lord (University of Aberdeen) - Spinoza and the Art of Reasoning

For Spinoza, the fiction writer, the artist, and the prophet are skilled at imagining and engaging others in imaginative visions, but the architect is skilled at rational thinking. The architect has less in common with artists than she does with exemplars of reasoning such as the "free man" of *Ethics* Part IV. Like the free man, the architect deals in adequate ideas: she deduces properties and relations from the essences of geometrical figures, and understands what follows from those properties and relations. She knows how a structure will relate to its human inhabitants, and what physical and social relations it enables. In this sense, the architect's purpose and "art" is to develop possibilities for human flourishing from geometrical understanding. This is also the task of the *Ethics*: Spinoza works from definitions and axioms, in the style of Euclid, to develop propositions that reveal our ethical potentialities. At times, he takes specific geometrical concepts to be foundational for metaphysical, ethical, and political claims. Spinoza appears to believe that *designing* buildings, relationships, and politics for human flourishing begins in geometry. Yet the nature of the transition from geometry to flourishing is not very clear, and the grounding for such a transition is not well understood. In this paper I will argue that for Spinoza, being highly rational involves practising the "art" of deducing positive human outcomes from geometrical understanding. I will argue that this is indeed an *art* that involves interpretation, judgment, and design, which can be performed better or worse. This suggests that both the architect and the philosopher are artists of reasoning and designers of structures that augment human relations, and that the best religious and political leaders can be artists in this sense too.

Raúl de Pablos Escalante (University of Puerto Rico) - Philosophy as Love: Between Desire, Reason and Understanding Considerations on the fifth part of Spinoza's Ethics

This paper discusses the role of love in the fifth part of Spinoza's *Ethics*, titled "Of the Power of the Intellect, or on Human Freedom". In the last part of the *Ethics*, Spinoza introduces a double concept of love: love toward God (*amor erga Deum*) and the intellectual love of God (*amor Dei intellectualis*). The aim of this work is to distinguish both concepts in order to comprehend their respective scope. Although both concepts tend to be confused, they involve different affective and intellectual processes. The *love toward God* is a concept that originates in the intersection between affects, images and reason. It is considered as "the most constant of all the affects" (EVP20s; trans. E. Curley, Princeton University Press, 1994) and the most powerful. This kind of love still maintains the characteristics inherent to the affects, that is, the transition toward a different degree of perfection (EIIIdef.3). According to Spinoza, affects have a dual aspect, psychical and physical, so they entail

simultaneously the mind and the body. In the *love toward God*, reason allies with the imagination, making use of its associations to conceive the most potent and integrating idea. In contrast, the *intellectual love of God* does not arise from reason neither it seems to have an affective dimension (EVP32c). Proposition 32 of the fifth part emphasizes that: “Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.”. Has the third kind of knowledge practical consequences? What kind of knowledge it produces? What kind of pleasure (*delectation*) accompanies the *intellectual love of God*? When this love stops being affective? These are some of the questions that will guide us in our presentation.

## D1 – Pedagogy 2

John McKeane (University of Reading) - Sarah Kofman’s *Socrate(s)* and Pedagogical Dialogue

This paper proposes to examine Kofman’s 1989 work in which she addresses Socrates as a destabilizing figure in the thinking of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. She discusses the various aspects of the myth of Socrates (ugliness, seduction, corruption of youth, irony, aporia, etc.). While Kofman’s reading of these aspects and their afterlives might appear firmly rooted within the philosophical tradition, I wish to assess how far it this reading is shaped by her great interest in psychoanalysis. Specifically, this involves looking at the way the master-pupil relationship is conceptualized, whether in terms of identification, projection, Oedipus, and so on. The second aim of the paper is to try to draw some broader conclusions concerning the pedagogical model that Kofman’s book, cross-fertilized by philosophy and psychoanalysis, proposes. Does she assume a one-to-one dialogue between master and pupil, applicable only in elite educational settings, rather than (for instance) the contemporary university? Or is her insistence on Socrates’s irruptive, monstrous influence actually well-suited to cutting across the grain of pedagogical discourses that value conformity so highly?

Sacha Golob (King’s College London) What would it be to teach ethics? Kant, Nietzsche, Levinas

Greek philosophy ascribed central importance to the techniques through which individuals were taught to lead an ethical life. The aim of this paper is to examine the way in which that question reappears, both recognisable and transformed, within post-Kantian European philosophy. I begin by introducing three key texts. The first is the quasi-Socratic “catechism” which Kant proposed for use in moral education: having sketched this, I briefly locate it in the broader framework of his enormously popular *On Pedagogy*. The second is Nietzsche’s account of his own development in *Schopenhauer as Educator*. The third is Levinas’s attack on the Socratic method in *Ethics and Infinity*: as he puts it there, “teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain”. With this textual backdrop in place, I turn to the possibility of teaching ethics; not in the sense of summarising the claims made by different theorists, but of creating the conditions for ethical development in others. I argue that three concepts play a particularly important role in the way in which such teaching functions within a post-Kantian context: these are ‘distance’, ‘heroism’ and the ‘hint’ or ‘gesture’.

## D2 – Aesthetics 2

Cynthia Cruz (Rutgers University) - Failure as Resistance in Alexander Kluge’s *Yesterday’s Girl*

This paper will examine the acts taken by the character Anita G. in Alexander Kluge’s film *Yesterday’s Girl*, acts that appear on the surface to be self-destructive or irrational but are, indeed, acts of willful resistance. Anita G, a young, Jewish woman from East Germany, attempts to assimilate to post-War, West Germany. Near the start of the film she is shown in court where she has been summoned for having stolen a cardigan. When the judge asks her why she has stolen the cardigan, she responds: “It just came over me.” Her response, though technically responding to his question, does not actually answer the question he is asking of her. He is looking for her to take responsibility for her action while her answer, instead, places the responsibility elsewhere, outside of her self. In this interaction, Anita G.’s response creates a space. Here, the figure of Antigone comes to mind. In her act of defiance, that of resisting Creon’s dictates, Antigone creates a space between herself and Creon, and by extrapolation, her culture’s dictates. At the same time, as Judith Butler writes in *Antigone’s Claims*, Antigone

admits that she is engaged in this act of defiance and at the same time refuses to deny she did so. What is critical here is Antigone's refusal to back down. In this paper I will be examining how Anita G.'s acts of defiance can similarly be interpreted both as acts of failure and of resistance and how these acts can be understood to be examples of what in *One-Dimensional Man* Herbert Marcuse calls "inner freedom," "the private sphere in which man may become and remain 'himself'."

Sonia Arribas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) - "As good as a Chorus". The Mousetrap in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

As the editors of the latest edition of Arden Shakespeare write in their introduction, *Hamlet* remains a mystery and there will never be a "theory of *Hamlet*". A great part of this mystery resides in the Mousetrap, its central scene. It is undoubtedly the fundamental scene for the dramatic tension of the play in its entirety. However its importance extends well beyond that. In my presentation, I will delve into it, reviewing what certain philosophers and psychoanalysts (Lessing, Schlegel, Schmitt, Danto, Cavell, Critchley, Rank and Lacan), have said about it: the Mousetrap as an unfolding of reflectivity, as an aspiration to verisimilitude, its power of mirroring, its capacity for representation, its "primal scene" character, its mise-en-abyme layout, its fictional structuring of the truth, and that, essentially, it is a play, with the multiple meanings attached to this word. By carefully analysing some of the Mousetrap's central elements and small details, I will show how these readings deepen to greater or lesser success the profound nature of *Hamlet*'s mystery, which is also that of the Mousetrap.

Ashley Woodward (University of Dundee) - *Dispositif*, Matter, Affect, and the Real: Four Fundamental Concepts of Lyotard's Film-Philosophy

Jean-François Lyotard's work remains a largely untapped resource for film-philosophy. This paper will survey four fundamental concepts which indicate the fecundity of this work for current studies and debates. These terms indicate the relevance of Lyotard's work in the contexts of the renewed interest in the *dispositif*, new materialism, the affective turn, and second-wave Lacanianism. As Adrian Martin has argued, the concept of the *dispositif* (or apparatus) is ripe for rehabilitation in the contemporary context because it shows a way beyond the limiting notion of mise en scène which has dominated approaches to film. Lyotard's prevalent use of this term is one of the sources feeding into its current renewal. Following Jean-Michel Durafour, *matter* may be situated as an important theme in Lyotard's film-philosophy. If it is not one that Lyotard explicitly makes central in his writings on film, it is nevertheless one at the heart of his aesthetics, which may be extended for film. *Affect* was an important theme for Lyotard in many contexts, including his approaches to film. In the essay "Acinema" affect is understood in the context of a singular intensity which disrupts narrative and transmits sensation directly to the body of the spectator-listener. And in "Two Metamorphoses of the Seductive in Cinema" there is an early intimation of his later concept of the affect-phrase, where a disruptive scene in Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* is analysed in terms of an abeyance of the film's "seductive" effects. Finally, *the Real* emerges as a central concept in Lyotard's last essay on cinema, "The Idea of a Sovereign Film." This concept in some ways resembles Lacan's, but while Lacanian film theorists often see the Real as symbolised within the film's narrative, Lyotard emphasises the formal and material dimensions of the Real which disrupt the narrative construction of the film.

### D3 - Nietzsche 2

Rachel Silverbloom (DePaul University) - Redemptive Illusions: The Necessity of Deception for Life in Nietzsche's Philosophy

In *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism*, Bernard Reginster claims that the later Nietzsche overcomes what Reginster perceives as a flaw in Nietzsche's earlier works; namely, Nietzsche's insistence on the necessity of illusions for the affirmation of life. Reginster argues that the later Nietzsche abandons a commitment to the necessity of aesthetic illusions for life and commits to a more authentic affirmation of life by means of the will to power. This later emphasis on the will to power allows Nietzsche, on Reginster's view, to affirm life not merely *despite* suffering but rather *because of* suffering; Reginster argues that this later view no longer requires illusions for life's redemption, and instead is able to affirm life *as it is*, with all its adversity. Against Reginster's reading, I find it very difficult to see how this affirmation is, as Reginster claims, *without* illusions or deception of any kind. Furthermore, I do not find it convincing that this was Nietzsche's own goal, given his insistence that life *is* appearance, *is* illusion. Following Daniel Came, I am deeply troubled and perplexed by the idea that we can truly "affirm life not in spite of the gas chambers of Auschwitz but because of them, not in spite of the rape and torture of children but because of it," *without* "either the falsification, concealment, or evasion of such events." It seems to me that any affirmation of suffering *requires* deception, whether in the form of dissimulation, distancing, or some other illusory meaning-granting. I will argue that, insofar as Nietzsche's project is characterized by an attempt to maintain contact with the Dionysian insight of the meaninglessness of existence and, at the same time, avoid a resultant nihilism or even death, illusions *must* be in place, and that Nietzsche himself remains committed to this view.

Richard J. Elliott (Birkbeck) "Too Cowardly to Lie": Normative Considerations of Illusion and Falsification in Nietzsche

Nietzsche's works discuss the transfigurative power of particular forms of illusion at several punctuated moments during his philosophical career. As well as his famous remarks concerning the capacity for the human psyche to actively falsify experience in the *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche also makes numerous remarks in his later period (broadly, from 1882 onwards) that reinforce the affirmative potency for such a capacity, albeit conceived as of a more narrow scope by Nietzsche. However, he also makes numerous criticisms of many philosophers and historical figures for their own respective attempts to falsify their world: he accuses Socrates (particularly, but among others) of self-deception, and charges past philosophers with a lack of a particular kind of honesty. As such, it makes it difficult to know where Nietzsche draws his normative lines about the 'right' kind of falsification or illusion at a meta-empirical level, i.e. how these falsifications shape our values, as manifest responses to our unconscious drives. A considerable amount of recent Nietzsche scholarship has claimed that a deep-seated and unresolvable tension resides in Nietzsche's normative project between his valorization of both truth and illusion. The purpose of my paper is to try and characterize the different senses in which falsification and illusion can possess positive or negative normative statuses for Nietzsche. I will analyse Nietzsche's texts to qualify Nietzsche's remarks on these themes so as to offer some consistency along normative lines. I will further consider whether Nietzsche left such discussions of these topics in his published works intentionally ambivalent, not least because of what he saw as their inability to directly convince on conscious, rational fronts, but also so as to stimulate a deeper, more transformative affective response than that which would be possible through the means of traditional philosophical argument.

#### D4 - Political Agency/Subjectivity

Dan Degerman (Lancaster University) - Dis/empowering Factors: Exploring the Sources of Political Agency

In this paper, I theorise the factors that enhance or diminish the political agency of individuals. Drawing on the political thought of Hannah Arendt, I understand political agency to refer to the individual's capacity to act in concert with other people to shape or respond to public issues. Arendt notably set out only two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for political action: plurality and speech. Given that activists have proved time and again that political action may arise in the most inhospitable of places, we are well-advised to follow Arendt in eschewing more comprehensive lists of necessary conditions political agency, which generally lead us to over-predict powerlessness. We can, however, speak productively about and explore phenomena that generally enhance or diminish political agency. I propose five categories of dis/empowering factors: affiliations; spaces; things and tools; basic laws and institutions; and, hermeneutical resources. These factors affect the political agency of individuals both externally and internally. A lack of practical resources for effective political action tends to engender a sense that political action is futile or the prerogative of a select few. If this sense is widespread, fewer people will engage in political action; consequently, the empowering factors deteriorate, and become fewer and farther between. Conversely, more and better resources for action tend to engender more political action, greater faith in its effectiveness – or at least meaningfulness

Jimena Vazquez Garcia (University of Essex) - The Political Lack of the Digital Subject

The current argument regarding the relation between the digital platform (i.e. the exacerbated use of the internet through smartphones and social media) and the political is a positive one: it is easier to connect citizens and governments, information is better accessed and political organization has fewer difficulties. Overall, the insertion of the digital into the political is seen as responsible for the creation of new spaces that make participation effortless. The conventional analysis is based upon a conception of the digital as a tool which the subject uses to its advantage in its relation to the political. This paper will argue in favour of a more nuanced understanding of the digital, and claim that we have neglected to look at how the digital is using the subject. In other words, we have omitted an analysis of the subjection process that happens through the digital when we analyse it as a discourse; such analysis represents the core of this paper. The subjection process will be analysed under a Foucauldian lens and bring to the fore three key characteristics: the panoptic, mediation of discourse and biopower. By showing the mechanisms of each these characteristics at play in the subjection process through the digital, this paper will ultimately question how political the subject and the new spaces created by the digital actually are. The paper concludes that we are, in fact, dealing with politically lacking subjects and spaces. This argument has important implications for political practice, critical theory and, particularly, calls upon the urgency of a new type of subjectivity.

Ben Turner (University of Kent) - Comparing Problems in Political Philosophy after the Ontological Turn: The Case of Agency

One of the primary functions of political philosophy is a decision on what problems are considered as political. The political philosopher, therefore, places limits on what it is possible to consider as political. It could be assumed that work in comparative political theory broadens the basis of such problems beyond the Western political canon. This paper will dispute this assumption by arguing that comparative political theory fails to broaden its scope of comparison insofar as it focuses on comparing answers to what are perceived as shared problems across disparate traditions, presupposing identical limits to politics. In contrast, the contemporary ontological turn in anthropology focuses our attention on how ontological assumptions shape what is perceived as a political problem. This allows a diversification of political *problems* rather than *answers* that assume a homogeneity of those problems across disparate anthropological contexts. This paper will argue that by way of a focus on how ontology frames political problems, comparison in political philosophy can be tied more closely to a decentring of the limits to politics set up by the Western canon. The paper will first characterise comparative political philosophy as a method that identifies shared political problems across disparate traditions. Second, it

will claim that anthropology's ontological turn allows one to conceive of political problems as the result of a particular ontological dispositions, through reference to the work of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. Third, as an example it will give a brief exploration of how the problem of agency is not a unified concept, and is shaped differently by ontological presuppositions, taking examples from the work of William Connolly, Saba Mahmood and Marilyn Strathern. It will be concluded, therefore, that anthropology's suggestion that ontological presuppositions shape political problems is central to diversifying our understanding of the ontological basis of the political.

## D5 – Feminism 2

Iraklis Ioannidis (University of Glasgow) - Piercing Feminism in Peirce: Thinking Peirce's Phaneroscopy without Being

Peirce's *Phaneroscopy* has been predominately interpreted through the paradigmatic mode of thinking with 'Being' - (l'être/ εἶναι) and what comes before it, with it, or out of it (being(s)-entities, presence, subject, object, logic as calculus – in Peirce's words, *logica utens*). There has been very little attention to what Peirce calls *logica docens* or question(ing). As such, very little attention has been paid to concepts that weave the *phaneron* of *Phaneroscopy*: *effort* and *resistance*. In this paper, I would like to follow these two concepts which appear on Peirce's *Phaneroscopy* and risk the hypothesis that Peirce's philosophy stands as an anticipated critique on classical metaphysics (sensible/intelligible entities) and classical phenomenology (the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being). As such, it bears significant affinity to contemporary post-structuralist feminist critique which philosophizes with the logic of an unlimited welcoming of the Other. To accomplish the articulation of such a hypothesis I shall focus on the concept of *phaneron*. The latter has predominately been explained through the schema of being (ontology) as 'what there is' presupposing a concept of unity (being/is). What can be predicated to be through 'is' leads unavoidably to our equating the *phaneron* with the phenomenon - or something lived broadly construed (*erlebnis*). Resisting this interpretation, I will attempt a reading of *Phaneroscopy* according to which the schema 'is' cannot be interpreted as assimilating an existential import unless the utterer of the 'is' has been taken into account. With the aid of *logica docens* we can pose the question: whose phenomenon? What kind of being would there be (exist) "if I were to discourse the effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind?" (p. 75). For the envisioned, *there are* colors but for the blind *there are not*. For Peirce, as for post-structural feminism, speaking (about what there is), is never neutral. Who could do justice as to *what there is*? Objectivity becomes justice through self-criticism, questioning oneself. Thinking, philosophizing or doing science with the *logica utens* of *Being* unaided by a *logica docens* would rest on a democratic implicature on how most people are (the average, normal, man, heterosexual, bipod, two eyes etc). The role of *logica docens* allows Peirce to question such an implicature and overcome the appropriation of the Other which, as the feminists claim, reduces the Other to the order of the other of the same. In this way, Peirce can talk about *phaneron* which does justice to all by speaking about feelings (of) resistance and effort: active and reactive forces. No single thing exists but qualities, multiplicities which are phenomenolized reactively as a *shock* (Peirce) or *choc* (Nietzsche). It is these existential shocks that *Phaneroscopy* allows us to phenomenolize in dialogue with the Other and which are not allowed in thinking with Being alone – which Peirce classifies as nominalistic thinking. As an antipode, *Phaneroscopy* allows axiology to take precedence over ontology and epistemology. *Phaneroscopy comes to be* an open invitation to the Other who could phenomenolize qualities which cannot be phenomenolized by the order of the same and the one. The Other does not only play the role of the principle of verification, as Apel reads Peirce, but all the more so, the Other is required in order to initiate any quest to objective knowledge. It is the Other who questions the same for knowledge to begin. The only presupposition of *Phaneroscopy* is the welcoming of all Other: it presupposes a space of expressing Otherness in dialogue.

Robert Booth (University of Liverpool) - Why Ecofeminists Should (Also) Be Ecophenomenologists

It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that, insofar as they take themselves to be doing critical environmental philosophy, ecofeminists are invested in a particular iteration or extension of the project of critical self-reflexivity established by Kant. Given this interpretation of the ecofeminist project, however, it is interesting to note that much contemporary ecofeminist theory is effectively committed to a kind of metaphysical naturalism

which unduly limits the radical sort of critique which ecofeminists rightly encourage about the reductive, androcentric, and dualistic assumptions which underwrite our contentions about the allegedly 'objective' furniture of the more-than-human world. In this paper, I want to explore some ways that reconfiguring ecofeminist insights within the context of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology might foster more positive and robust modes of critical self-reflexivity than those available within even a 'progressive' naturalistic remit. By resituating their insights ecophenomenologically, I want to argue, ecofeminists may become more reflexive about their tacit intentional contributions to the world's concrete physiognomy because androcentric or dualistic conceptual assumptions need not just delineate the ways that we typically carve up the world's 'objective' furniture, they may partly dictate the more basic terms under which more-than-human entities are inaugurated as discernible objects in the first place. Thus, I contend, ecofeminists may thereby more effectively challenge their own colonial tendencies by both becoming more open to the radically heterogeneous 'objects' that may be configured by differentially situated entities, and by addressing the sedimented perceptual habits which plausibly underpin and perpetuate the androcentric and dualistic conceptual schemes that ecofeminists rightly aim to disrupt. My paper will, therefore, focus more on how the habitus of radical reflection that Merleau-Ponty's account forces may be useful to the ecofeminist project than whether Merleau-Ponty's idiosyncratic phenomenological claims hold true.

### D6 - Heidegger 2

Elena Bartolini (University of Milan) - Heidegger and the Principle of Non Contradiction. Considerations from his ontological account

During 1929, for his return to Freiburg, Heidegger held a public lesson where the main topic he discussed was 'nothing'. Precisely during this lecture, he released some statements on logic considered extremely critical against it and consequently against all those sciences which mainly rely on logic. Logic, he claims, is mostly concerned with things, dedicating all its efforts to clarify and understand them. In other words, these sciences, interested into beings, miss to pay attention to no-thing, i.e., being itself. Such account is a consequence of Heidegger's ontological position critically responding to metaphysics, conceived by Heidegger as a misunderstanding of what should be intended for being. Such misunderstanding pertains, I will argue, to a particular reading of the Aristotelian principle of non contradiction, also influenced by Aristotle's attention for what he calls *οὐσία* and then, as Heidegger suggests, to its *Anwesenheit*. From the philosophical point of view, focusing on this aspect of what it is, therefore missing the pivotal role of its openness and relation to the context, leads to an hypostatic interpretation of being, even in logic. The principle of non contradiction, as claimed by Aristotle, should be read considering its temporal - and hence contextualized - indication. Affirming that philosophy is concerned with nothing means that it should not be engaged with delimited objects exclusively cogitated in themselves, closed to the surrounding context, but rather listen to what is in between gathering them. Hence, it is possible to read this lecture given by Heidegger not only as a critic to logic but as an invitation to pay attention to those interconnections and relations that *are* constitutive of reality.

Mersiye Bora (Royal Holloway) - Reading *The Origin of the Work of Art* with Displacement: Exploring the Unreliable World with Mona Hatoum's Artworks

In *The Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger grants the work of art a privileged position to explore the being of beings. Accordingly experiencing work of art displaces us from the hassle of everyday worries to the awareness of the meaning of beings. Work of art also sets up the opening where historical man dwells. Drawing from this, I will argue that displacing effect of the work of art has the capacity to open the meaning of displacement in terms of immigration experience. This paper investigates the truth of beings in the world of the displaced through the phenomenological description of Mona Hatoum's works. I argue that Mona Hatoum's works, such as the *Grater Divide*, which is a gigantic kitchen utensil, displaces its audience from the ordinary like every artwork. However, the kind of displacement here is quite different from the displacement Heidegger experiences in the exhibition while standing in front of Van Gogh's painting of the peasant woman's shoes which open up the truth of the equipment as reliability which is 'protected in the world of the peasant woman' (BW, OWA, p.160). Instead of opening up the truth of beings in terms of reliability, Hatoum's art displaces the viewer in a manner that transports them into an unreliable world. I argue that Hatoum's works unconceal the truth of

beings in displacement. Therefore, they are the site of truth. However, on the other hand, they also put into question whether in this age the work of art still opens up a dwelling place for historical man.

Oisín Keohane (University of Dundee) - In All Modesty: The Concept of the Naked Truth

My paper will argue that a certain conception of truth, namely, the naked truth, or better yet, truth as modesty, comes to pre-eminence by the time of Botticelli, and that this complicates Heidegger's account of the history of truth. Heidegger claims that truth as *aletheia* was systemically covered up by truth as certainty (*Gewissheit*) by the time of Descartes. I will suggest, *contra* Heidegger, not that truth as *aletheia* was covered up at this time, but that it was enfolded into the emerging idea of the naked truth via a notion of modesty. One of the pivotal moments in this history I will demonstrate is when Leon Battista Alberti in his *Della Pittura* shifts the term *pudica* (modesty or shame) from the figure of 'Repentance' to 'Truth', something depicted in Botticelli's painting *Calumny of Apelles*. As Erwin Panofsky has noted, the result of this is that the so-called Venus Pudica pose becomes entangled with the figure of truth, leading a considerable number of subsequent thinkers and artists to link truth with (a naked) woman. One major consequence of this meeting between Venus Pudica and Truth is that (some) truth processes, which had hitherto been seen as indifferent to sexual difference, become sexuated – suggesting that those who occupy the sexuate position 'woman' would sometimes entertain a different relationship to truth, or some truths, than those who occupy the sexuate position 'man' or 'trans'. I will hence argue that the nude is best thought of not as a pictorial genre or form of art, but as a sexuation of thought, even if this sexuation is sometimes achieved in a problematic way by insisting on the motif of 'modesty' when it comes to female nudity. The last part of the paper will conclude by examining the recourse to the notion of 'modesty' (*pudeur*) in Jean-Luc Nancy and Federico Ferrari's *Being Nude* (which itself recalls Alberti and Botticelli under the heading of 'Veritas'). It will be demonstrated that despite paying attention to what I call the Botticelli Moment, they invoke the notion of modesty in ways that continue to be objectionable.

### **E1 - Politics: Cinema, Alterity, Comedy**

(Ricardo Samaniego de la Fuente (University of Essex) - Adorno on Aesthetic Progress and the Systematic Surrender to Unguided Chance

Adorno is infamously known for his criticism of the culture industry, especially for his dismissal of jazz music and cinema. Yet, it was not by mere elitist blindness that Adorno wrote: "[e]very visit to the cinema leaves me, despite the utmost watchfulness, stupider and worse." Despite the exaggeration, this followed from his diagnosis of the historical dependence of film on the demands of the market. After a brief exposition of the problematic relation between intra-aesthetic technique and extra-aesthetic technology Adorno found in (Hollywood) film, I move on to a reconstruction of his argument for what constitutes progress in art. Adorno contends that aesthetic progress involves a dialectical relation between subject and object, the artist and its material, where the former manages to acknowledge but transcend the historical tendencies sedimented in the latter. With the weakening of the subject under the growing power of a 'totally administered system,' Adorno contends that the artist, if it is to regain its autonomy, must deliberately deliver itself to the objectivity of a heteronomous reality without losing itself in the process. Using the examples of serialism, atonality, and *musique informelle*, I expose how this plays out in music, before finally turning back to film. Does the possibility of an "emancipated film" fit Adorno's theory? I argue that it does: film is a medium better suited to carry on this dialectical process, whereby the subject can wrestle its autonomy without negating the objective pull of reality. As a photographic medium, film inevitably surrenders to its object, and yet—through techniques like montage—the subject can jolt in, and thus become aesthetically autonomous.

Leonie Hunter, PhD Candidate (Goethe-University Frankfurt) - On Political Comedy

Since well before Eco wrote his famous eulogy of the subversive force of comedy (Eco 2011), its peculiar tendency to destabilize and expose structures of power has been critically acknowledged by noted authors such as Plato, Hegel and Kierkegaard. Yet, none of them has (convincingly) worked through the concrete

implications the aesthetic spirit of comedy evolves in the political sphere. My contribution hence addresses the current prospect of emancipatory political change through the lenses of the comedy. Comical situations are often characterized by practices of doubling which give rise to the disrupting force of laughter (Zupančič 2014). As a once ridiculed situation cannot be identically re-established after its interruption, a call for change is inherent to comical practices. Interestingly enough, this call is introduced by the comical featuring of the allegedly 'original' as an imitation in itself (Dolar 2017). Thus, the comedy not only brings by the transition of a situation into new situation, it moreover gives evidence to the irreducible fallibility of all social situations. This de-essentializing potency of the comedy is of special interest to contemporary political philosophy, as the acknowledgment of fallibility is a crucial axiom of postfoundational democracies (Marchart 2010). Consequently, the logical conclusion can be drawn that emancipatory practices aiming for political change are well advised to repeat the comical movement of imitation in order to preserve an awareness of contingency. However, different strands of philosophy have shown that in spite of the conceptual appeal of such an application, actual comical practices often have unintended and undesired political consequences. First, I will tackle the stabilizing effects of institutionalized forms of irony (convincingly brought forward by Boltanski and Chiapello in their discussion of the capitalistic incorporation of artist critique and by Žižek's critique of cynical reason) and secondly, I will deliberate on Hegel's warning of regression inherent in practices of mockery. In order to defend the political comedy against itself, I will end my argument by tackling the political alignments of a truly emancipatory comical spirit with respect to Adorno's concept of *Heiterkeit*.

Christopher Watkin (Monash University) - Michel Serres, Alterity, and the new Politics

Despite the explosive increase in the amount of Michel Serres's work available in translation over recent years, its subversive power and political heft remain largely unexplored. This paper seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of Serresian thought in challenging one of the central loci of recent European philosophy, the opposition of sameness and alterity. Much French thought of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been marked by the positive valorization of alterity, an ethical position that has recently been subject to a vigorous assault, notably from Alain Badiou. However, in a way hitherto little remarked Badiou shares a great deal in common with the philosophies of alterity from which he seeks to distance himself, and Michel Serres's still relatively unknown rethinking of sameness and otherness offers, I argue, a much more radical alternative to the ethics of difference. Drawing both on Serres's translated and as yet untranslated works, this paper shows how the Serresian ontology of inclination, along with his conceptual personae of the hermaphrodite and the parasite, open the way to a distinctive ethics and politics that present new insights about the nature of violence and about the relation between the singular and the universal. Serres's thought refuses the categories of sameness and alterity in a distinctively radical way, offering a fresh and penetrating critique of any politics based on the paradigm of production and exchange.

### **E2 (Panel) - Individual, Autonomy, Populism**

Contemporary societies are plagued by populist and nativist politics. Although this seems to be a new phenomenon, philosophers have been conscious of the threat posed by masses driven by fear since at least Spinoza's *ultimi barbarorum*. What can philosophers and individuals do in a society ruled by populist politics? Should we withdraw ourselves from the world and enjoy the autonomy of thinking detached from political concerns? Or should we engage in other ways of resistance? The purpose of this panel is to critically engage with these questions through the works of different authors from Spinoza to the 20<sup>th</sup> century

1. Philip Waldner (Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt) - Spinoza on Prophetic Thought and Speech
2. (Oliver Istvan Toth (Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt & University Budapest) - Voting Out the Absolute Spirit: Populism and Objective Spirit After the End of World History
3. Kata Dóra Kiss (independent) - Liberation of Desires: The Critical Philosophical Practice of Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

### E3 - Foucault

Simone Webb (University College London) - “employ your care about that which is really your self”: Mary Astell and the final Foucault

In his final years Michel Foucault (1926-1984) turned his attention to ethics, considered as the self's relationship to the self, approaching the topic through ancient philosophical texts. Notably, his analyses of the care of the self and practices of the self largely overlooked their potentially gendered aspects. Feminists have consequently debated the value and use of this work to women's lives and practices today. There has been only limited engagement, however, with historical texts about or by women in relation to Foucault's work. I bridge this gap by examining the English philosopher Mary Astell (1666-1731) through a late-Foucauldian lens. I analyse Astell's best-known work, *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies* (1694, 1697), through the framework of care of the self and practices of self-constitution, using this analysis to shed light on Foucault's concepts from a gendered perspective. *A Serious Proposal* is aimed at female readers, presenting an analysis of their condition and also a curative regimen for this condition. I argue that Astell portrays women specifically as in need of caring for themselves due to the detrimental effects of poor education and misogynistic societal custom. She advocates a series of intellectual and moral practices of the self aimed at constituting women as coherent, ethical selves. Women following her programme will be “absolute Monarchs in [their] own Bosoms” (SP, 234), instead of being governed by emotional fluctuations and concerned only with superficialities. Astell thus presents practices of the self as a mode of resistance against internalised misogynistic custom. Astell's understanding of women's specific need for self-care and the possibility of work on the self as feminist praxis, I suggest, can both be drawn on today when considering the feminist potential of Foucault's writing.

Jack Coopey (Durham University) - The Ethics of Evil: Teleology and Foucault's War on the Self

To undo teleology one must use teleology, perhaps this is a maxim that in-itself has teleological truth, value and meaning in our understandings of what this previous mode of representation provided. The work of Michel Foucault dealt with, and perhaps effectively parried teleology in its three distinct stages of historical understanding and historiographical methodology. The early Foucault used genealogical techniques borrowed from Nietzsche to separate and discern continuities and discontinuities in several areas of human life, knowledge itself, medicine, power and sexuality. The later Foucault in his theorization of his previous methods in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* attempts to understand how these earlier genealogies, which seem ethereal teleologies become inculcated and made concrete in material, physical reality within historical contexts. And in the last ten years of his life, Foucault attempted to destroy teleology altogether in his *College de France* lectures by practicing a new historical methodology on himself in a new ethics of resistance inspired by his interlocutor of Heidegger. Now, teleology itself can be seen as one that does not just appear as ideal, continuous and uninterrupted but perhaps fragmented teleologies remain in its place, as a last shade cast by the shadow of its legacy. Teleology's being as one as a *Begriffsleiche* is too generous, in reality it may appear as a spectre, that even during its supposed life before its death, the teleological beliefs were in actuality, far more fragmented and non-totalizing as once believed. In this paper using Foucault's *College de France* lectures as a context, we shall see that any critique or deconstruction of teleology leads to not only a re-affirmation and re-animation of the corpse of teleology, so therefore, within intellectual history and history of philosophy whilst teleological understandings permeate orthodox understandings, teleological fragmentations are inherent to the fragmentary nature of thought itself

Timothy Secret (University of Winchester) – ‘...and yes I said yes I will Yes’ – Foucault's last word on consent

This year saw the publication of the fourth volume of Foucault's *Histoire de la sexualité, Les aveux de la chair*. Its press release proclaimed that this text deals with “the prickly question of consent”, claiming that with the rise of the #MeToo movement the time was ripe for Foucault's ideas. With this, his literary executors justified breaking Foucault's will, which demanded there be no such posthumous publications, even via the “Max Brod-Kafka trick”. Stuart Elden and Chloë Taylor rapidly downplayed the hope that Foucault's account of consent might prove directly relevant to contemporary discussions of sexual misconduct and consent in the *New York Times*. However, we might nevertheless ask whether certain developments in the history of consent in early Christian

thought addressed in this volume continue to structure our concepts and debates, particularly those discussed under the banner of “the libidinalisation of sex.” In this paper, we will focus on Foucault’s discussion of the historical novelty of the Augustinian model of consent as the will to want – an act of the will on itself and thus of form without specific reference to content. Consent is construed on this basis as a relation to one’s own libido, through which the subject beings itself into being as a *subject of desire* that is also a *subject of law*, without any external reference to the other. To what extent do we continue to identify ourselves with a subject with this structure and does it offer any avenues for new ethical practices in relation to consent?

## E4 - Political Philosophy 2

Andrea Rossi (Koç University) - *Askesis* of Neoliberal Man

This paper draws on recent literature on economic theology (Benjamin, Foucault, Agamben, Leshem, Stimilli) to discuss the constitution and governance of contemporary subjectivity, starting from a reflection on the cultic and pastoral aspects of neoliberalism. As it has been suggested, the latter appears to mobilize and capture not only the intellectual, relational, affective and emotional faculties of individuals but, rather, their capacity for autotelic action *tout court*. Considering how such ability is also the basic drive of any form of *askesis*, neoliberalism might then be viewed as an ascetic programme deployed on a global scale: a political project aimed at producing a certain kind of self-conversion (*metanoia*), both individually and collectively (Stimilli). The paper will illustrate how the relations of willing servitude that obtain between governed and governors in neoliberal regimes are intimately related to this worldwide *metanoic* ‘experiment’. In order to do so, the essay will first propose an interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of pastoral power along with Nietzsche’s account of priestly asceticism, so as to illustrate how early Christianity turned *askesis* and the conversion of the self into targets and instruments of governmental control. It will thus show how neoliberalism has reactivated – within an entirely different context – this mode of governance and how it has integrated it into its logic of economic valorisation. To put the argument schematically: the ubiquitous imperative to self- enhancement promoted by neoliberalism betrays a form of compulsory *askesis* that implicates the self in its recursive *ethical de-formation*, in ways that seemingly reproduce the basic operations – rather than the visible expressions – of pastoral rule in the Christian age. This permanent de-structuration of the self has somehow become the ‘end in itself’ (i.e. the autotelic and ascetic horizon) that secures and is secured, in turn, by neoliberal rule. Problematizing this ‘mysticism of (self-)destruction’, I will suggest, might be crucial to political resistance in the present

(Judith Zinsmaier, (Tübingen) - Hannah Arendt’s implicit criticism of liberal concepts of opinion

The term “post-factual” has become widespread during the last year. Regarding our “postfactual age” many critics call for a return to truth. This call simplifies the problem. It is not enough to stress the significance of facts. Although political action must of course be related to facts, the key concept of politics is the *opinion*. For Hannah Arendt, opinions are what constitutes “the very essence of political life”. In my talk, I want to explore her specific concept of opinion. My thesis is: As a *normative* concept it is implicitly opposed to descriptive concepts of opinion of liberalism. Liberalism does concede a positive value of opinions but often impedes the question of normative limits of the freedom of opinion. The reason for this is that the theoretical starting point of liberalism is the autonomous subject. The negative liberties of the individual are the lynchpin of liberalist theory. In this context, freedom of opinion is of high importance. Here, opinions are conceived in a purely descriptive manner as that which the autonomous individual believes. For Arendt, in contrast, every human being is always already implicated in a community and thus in a common background of experience. The theoretical view of an autonomous individual, that as such is of a particular opinion, is not tenable from this perspective. In consequence, Arendt does not consider an opinion as the already existing viewpoint of an autonomous individual, which is brought into public only in a second step. In contrast, she conceptualizes opinion and publicness as always already mutually related. This basic constellation yields at the same time the *normative* benchmark for opinions. As we can see in the context of her theory of judgment, this benchmark consists in considering the viewpoints of others.

This paper criticizes a span of views about political liberty by developing three points about the social unfreedom inflicted by oppression and other forms of domination. First, social unfreedom does not lie in the hostility of one's environment. Constraint and suffering do not, as such, constitute unfreedom. Nor does the disrespect from which those impingements often emanate. I draw on this point, together with discussion of the systematicity and sociality of the unfreedom inflicted by oppression, to criticize a span of broadly liberal accounts of unfreedom which emphasize non-interference and capability. The second point I develop is that unfreedom is not a privative phenomenon. It is not just the absence of freedom. The absence of freedom in sleep, death, stones, or the undeveloped agency of an infant does not mark unfreedom. Third, those who suffer the unfreedom inflicted by oppression may robustly express characteristically human forms of agency in navigating their lives. I draw on these last two points to criticize Hegel-inspired approaches to social freedom which emphasize the importance of salutary social conditions to the development of a fully-formed human practical psychology. On the basis of this discussion I tentatively suggest that, as individuals, our freedom is inalienable. To understand unfreedom as central among the harms inflicted by oppression, we ought to look for it beyond the ways that oppression affects a person as an individual, and see unfreedom instead as a corrupted form of social life.

### **E5 - Deleuze & Guattari 3**

Dr Niall Kennedy (Independent) - The Intercessor or Heteronym in Gilles Deleuze and Fernando Pessoa

Fundamental to the definition of the Deleuzian author in philosophy, literature, or cinema is that author's relationship with a persona or character known as the 'intercessor'. Yet recent scholarship has not adequately defined the nature and role of this intercessor and its relation to a family of similar concepts such as the 'conceptual persona', the 'aesthetic figure', or the 'Original'. Scholars such as Charles Stivale view the 'intercessor' as a philosophical interlocutor who challenges and extends our ideas and 'falsifies' the common-sense presuppositions we hold to be true. By contrast Ronald Bogue or Bill Marshall prefer to focus on the employment of the power of the false, as the passage between the several constructed roles of the 'intercessor' challenges our notion of stable identities and thus truth itself. I intend to read the Deleuzian intercessor in conjunction with the writings of Fernando Pessoa, specifically the latter's employment of 'heteronyms'. While Pessoa has been studied at length within French philosophy – by such figures as Alain Badiou and Judith Balso – they have not attempted a lengthy analysis of his work in connection to Deleuze, or to the concept of the 'intercessor'. In this short paper I will prioritise Deleuze's essay on Melville's short story *Bartleby, the Scrivener*, in which he uses the character of Bartleby as a paradigmatic example of an 'original' character, stressing his impersonal nature and quality. I will bring these writings into communication with the shorter prose pieces of Pessoa, including his philosophical writings. I argue that Pessoa's heteronyms provide a productive model for our understanding of the Deleuzian 'intercessor', particularly their relation with the 'impersonal' or bachelor author who creates them. By bringing together the heteronym and intercessor, I hope to further our understanding of the basis for literary, philosophical and artistic creativity in these two thinkers.

Jaakko Karhunen (Loughborough University) - The theory of production of subjectivity in Félix Guattari's late philosophy

The premise of Guattari's last book, *Chaosmosis* (1992), is that subjectivity has to be rethought 'from the point of view of its production' (p. 1). The traditional Kantian account of subjectivity, conceived as the unifying conditions that make experience possible and are the same for all individuals, is inadequate from Guattari's point of view. Subjectivity should be conceived as unconscious, plural, heterogenous, polyphonic and collective, as opposed to conscious, individuated, and unitary. *Chaosmosis* presents a theory wherein subjectivity is conceived as both a result of a process of production, and as self-producing. The characteristics of subjectivity are molded by a social, machinic process, but subjectivity is also creative, and thus able to alter itself and the social conditions of its production. Guattari's concept of subjectivity expands well beyond the domain of subjective experience. Subjectivity obtains all-pervasive and vitalistic characteristics: the individual is only a 'terminal' through which subjectivity manifests itself (*The Three Ecologies*, p. 24). In order for these subjective

manifestations to take place, certain ‘modelisations’ of subjectivity are required. However, Guattari does not differentiate between a modelisation of subjectivity from a model of psyche or mind. The former are various conceptions of the self that are socially effective, informing and altering the self-understanding of individuals. The latter are theoretical constructs that try to explain the nature of human psychology. These two can affect each other – for example, psychological theories might provide social modelisations of subjectivity – but they are not identical. Through a reading of Guattari’s theory of production of subjectivity, I argue for the renewed importance of *psychologism* as a critical concept in European philosophy. Furthermore, I will contextualise Guattari’s metapsychology in terms of the dispute over psychologism between Frege and Husserl.

Thomas Waterton (Royal Holloway) - Gilles Deleuze, Wilfrid Sellars, and the Possibility of Empiricism

This paper evaluates Gilles Deleuze’s theory of encounters as a contribution to a Sellarsian critique of epistemology, concluding that (against the views of modern Sellarsians like Rorty) he reveals the possibility for a non-givenist form of empiricism. Wilfrid Sellars’ hugely influential *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* repudiates the idea that “sense data” are given to the mind in a way that would permit them to be used as foundations for empirical knowledge. He argues that although *sensory* consciousness is innate, *classificatory* consciousness (consciousness of facts and kinds) is acquired through language-learning, and so knowledge of public objects is logically prior to knowledge of private, mental episodes of awareness. The possibility that inner sensory episodes are self-authenticating foundations of knowledge is thus rejected by Sellars. He uses the term “givenism” to refer to the equivocation of causes of thought (in sensation) with justifications of beliefs (which require knowledge of kinds). In a striking case of parallel philosophical evolution, Deleuze makes the same argument in his early work. He also distinguishes sensory and classificatory consciousness and restricts the latter (and, therefore, the possibility of knowledge) to what is ‘explicit and communicable’—in other words, to what is public. Deleuze’s critique of givenism is found in his rejection of recognition and representation as “postulates of the dogmatic image of thought.” Deleuze’s and Sellars’ independent developments of this critique of empiricist foundationalism reveal a lacuna in Sellars’ account. While Sellars wanted to delimit sensory consciousness from the (implicitly normative) sphere of classificatory consciousness, Deleuze’s interest lies in those interactions between the two spheres which *disrupt* categories of thought, which he calls “encounters.” By focusing on disruption rather than justification, he can investigate *non-givenist* interactions between the spheres. This enables him, *contra* Sellars, to revive a form of empiricism without succumbing to givenism.

### E7 - Law and Morality

David Woods (University of Warwick) - Seriously Bored: Schopenhauer on Solitary Confinement

I argue that Schopenhauer’s scattered observations about the relationship between boredom and solitary confinement provide the basis for a novel and instructive interpretation of the primary harm of solitary confinement. I begin by arguing that the primary textual evidence confirms Schopenhauer’s awareness of the widely reported harms caused by a growing trend for policies of universal solitary confinement in the reformed prison systems of Europe and North America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, supposedly as a humane alternative to traditional punishments. According to Schopenhauer, these unpredicted harms should remind us not to underestimate of the seriousness of boredom as a form of suffering. However, Schopenhauer’s warning faces two main difficulties. First, since the method of punishment in solitary confinement is social isolation, the natural, and indeed popular, conclusion to draw is that social deprivation, not boredom, is the primary cause of the harm. Second, it has been objected that Schopenhauer’s account of boredom is inadequate in itself and, moreover, that cases of confinement only clarify its general inadequacy: for, according to Schopenhauer, boredom is caused by a lack of things to desire, but the person in solitary confinement has no shortage of things to desire, immediate release not least of all. I defend Schopenhauer against both of these difficulties by reconstructing his remarks about boredom and solitary confinement in light of his view that the will, the body, and action are fundamentally identical phenomena. Seen in this light, I argue, extremely restrictive external circumstances such as solitary confinement may, in fact, be capable of depriving a person of desires that we might otherwise assume were his/her private mental belongings. I argue that the very idea of (what might be called) *conative deprivation* is a useful conceptual contribution to the task of interpreting the harm of solitary confinement.

Susana Cadilha (IFILNOVA, Universidade Nova de Lisboa) - Why should moral objectivity be threatened by evolutionary explanations of morality?

The fact that human beings are products of evolution had profound implications for our conception of morality. But what does it really mean to say that our moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis? We may want to know how human beings came to acquire and develop the capacity to make such judgments (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Machery and Mallon 2010). And from a philosophical point of view, we certainly want to know if the evolutionary forces merely shaped a general capacity for making moral judgments, or if they shaped the content of particular moral judgments. For instance, are we all prone to make judgments that condemn incest and in-group aggression or cheating? But even if that is the case, what are its philosophical implications? Evolutionary debunking arguments claim that if we had had a different natural background, we might have a completely different tradition of moral thought, and if that is the case, then moral judgments can't be considered as objectively true (as moral realism presupposes). Why should that be a problem for moral judgments only? Aren't we capable of mathematical judgments because of the way our general capacity for thinking is designed? Such a fact doesn't seem to undermine the validity of mathematical reasoning or the truth-aptness of mathematical judgments. A somewhat distinct evolutionary debunking argument states the following: evolutionary processes would not have given us our capacity for moral judgment in order to help us in accurately tracking moral truths as such (Joyce 2006; Street 2006) because what matters in the moral/practical domain is what we happen to do, not that we actually track moral truths. I think this could be an argument against moral realism – but an argument which lies entirely within the domain of moral philosophy. An evolutionary story concerning the processes that gave us a capacity for moral judgment won't tell us whether there are objective moral facts. Analogously, being able to track truths about highly abstract mathematical propositions or to formulate laws of physics had no significant reproductive advantage either, but from that it does not follow that there are no such truths or such laws.

## **F1 - Philosophy of Mind 2**

Veridiana Domingos Cordeiro (University of São Paulo) and Hugo Neri (University of Cambridge)

John Locke (1689) was the first major philosopher who posed the “problem of personal identity”, suggesting the “evidence of memory as a fundamental way to solve it. For Locke, a person  $A_1$  is the same person  $A$  from earlier moments if and only if person  $A_1$  remembers enough of what happened to  $A$ . Philosophers have been discussing this problem for centuries because ever since Locke made his proposition, he has been harshly criticized. Joseph Butler was the first to point out that if one's identity is made of memories; how does one know that all the memories actually refer to oneself? With this question, Butler suggested that Locke is assuming that the personal identity is composed by memories only experienced by oneself - something Butler thought too strict and implausible. Three centuries later, the philosopher of mind Sydney Shoemaker (1970) introduced the concept of “*q-memory*”, which does not presuppose the self-reference of an episodic memory. We may have a *q-memory* of a past experienced by a third party as if it was in oneself's own past causing similar mental states and recognition. Shoemaker's conclusions suggest that the *self* is also possibly externally constituted. From that, other contemporary conceptions of *self* emerged (e.g. the “distributed identity” proposed by Heermink, 2017) in dialogue with other disciplines such as Sociology and the Cognitive Sciences. The aim of this paper is to discuss some questions emerged of this old problem about memory and identity: a.) In what sense is the *q memory* an adequate answer to the Lockean problem?, b.) Is the distinction made by Shoemaker between perception and consciousness valid to solve this problem?, c.) In which way does the most contemporary conception of “distributed self” embrace other explanations about the “social” and about “semantic and episodic memories” considered by Sociology and the Cognitive Sciences

How does habit figure within sophisticated forms of perceptual experience? Can habitual activity explain our grasp of relations, thus providing foundations for conceptual skill? These questions form the core of the issue I wish to designate as the 'intelligibility of habit'. My talk reassesses Bergson's views on this topic, showing the way his reflections develop ideas from the empiricist tradition, as well as insights from 19<sup>th</sup> century French philosophy. Bergson's views on habit exerted considerable influence on 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy and psychology, particularly due to the distinction he draws in *Matter and Memory* (1896) between habit-memory and image-memory. As recently noted by Sinclair (2017), taking up Bergson's distinction means regarding habit as raw mechanism devoid of intentional content, inclination or drive. This opens a gulf between Bergson's ideas on habit and the considerations of intelligibility indicated above. In the talk, I argue that the clear-cut distinction between habit and conscious thought or action is not Bergson's considered view. Closely reading sections of *Matter and Memory*, I show that the core of Bergson's contribution concerning habit involves the description of a 'movement of the idea': an actualization of *meaning* in habitual movements. The distinction between two memories, I submit, only indicates internal limits within this movement. I proceed to examine Bergson's overlooked reconceptualization of habit in the decade following *Matter and Memory*, focusing on Bergson's innovative 'dynamic schema', introduced in 'Intellectual Effort' (1902), and discussed in his (recently published) courses. I argue that the 'dynamic schema' provides a proper framework for underscoring Bergson's key insight from *Matter and Memory* onwards: habit emerges as intelligible in the context of a direct grasp of temporal relations in active endeavours. I conclude by noting the way Bergson's 'dynamic schema' involves refashioning Felix Ravaisson's influential conception of habit.

## F2 - Technology

Isabel Millar (Kingston) - Algorithmic Extimacy: Enjoyments of the Alethosphere

Taking its cue from Jacques-Alain Miller's developments of the later Lacan and the notion of the 'alethosphere', this paper explores the *extimate* status of Artificial Intelligence in the age of ordinary psychosis. The alethosphere pre-figures a world where the subject is plugged in to her own singular mode of enjoyment, yet is recorded by the Other. The mechanism for sustaining such an alethosphere, Lacan terms the *lathouse*. These are the *objet a*'s we find lurking everywhere; they latch on to us from our phones, laptops, and maybe soon our sex-bots. Lacan predicted that science and capitalism would soon have a means of harvesting these objects of desire in a mutually beneficial way. The lathouse is a machine, an artificial object for siphoning off enjoyment; it is merging with forms of intelligence at an exponential rate and is omnipresent all over the capitalist technoscape. The ordinary psychotic accordingly lives with the conviction that her own personal mode of enjoyment should be catered for by a signifier that concerns her particular idiosyncratic truth. Her *objet a* is literally "in the pocket". The position of the hysteric, as she who demands knowledge from the other, I argue is now increasingly taken up by new forms of Artificial Intelligence, forms that may well be "in the pocket" of the ordinary psychotic denizen of the alethosphere. These lathouses may not just be causes of desire then, but rather extimate points of enjoyment. They are impossible objects that attempt to capture something of *jouissance* of the other's body, which allow the truth of our enjoyment to be recorded by the Other. Does the hysteric's position now belong to the algorithmic lathouse or AI, who seems to know what we want better than we do? And if so, does she *enjoy* giving it to us?

Pierluca D'Amato (Durham University) - Becoming-algorithmic and becoming-alive: On Technoliving Hybrids and cross-border processes.

What is the relationship between life and the digital? In order to clarify their connection, we need a definition of life that takes into account the conditions of the hybrid nature of human life, which is related to some form of technicality since its very appearance. As the discipline maps objects based only on carbon-chain chemistry, however, a traditional definition derived from biology will not satisfy the necessary requirements to accomplish this task. With this presentation I would like to propose an alternative perspective that could help to formulate a description of the digital and of its effects on human life, a perspective grounded on a definition of life that

allows the study of the set of relations originated by a coupling of heterogeneous elements: organic and non-organic, natural and artificial. Outlining the development of non-linear physical phenomena, the consequent formation of bioids and of sympoietic systems, I will make use of concepts drawn from the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler to sketch what could be defined “non-organic life”, which connects the organic to the inorganic, life and techniques, into the same hybrid bodies. On this basis, it is possible to describe the process of becoming- algorithmic of human life, which is associated with another process, that could be named becoming-alive of digital technologies. Focusing on the specific functions that a thing must have in order to be considered alive, the second part of the presentation will link Aristotle accounts of life to the contemporary research in the field of Artificial Life and address the question of biological viruses and computer viruses as instances of the same process of general virality that can be found both in the biological realm and in the digital one.

### **F3 - Concepts**

Clive Cazeaux (Cardiff Met) - Art, philosophy and the connectivity of concepts

This paper focuses on arguments from Ricoeur, and Deleuze and Guattari, to the effect that concepts are defined by their capacity to reach out and connect with other concepts. This emphasis on connectivity is in contrast to the tradition within philosophy of picturing concepts as discrete containers that either confine life or reduce it to shared, uniform properties, for example, Plato’s analogy of knowledge as an aviary in the *Theaetetus* and Aristotle’s metaphor of predicates as containers in *Prior Analytics*. The paper compares the accounts given by Ricoeur, and Deleuze and Guattari, for the capacity of concepts to reach out to other concepts, and shows how both are offered as attempts to bring art and philosophy into relation. However, the two accounts differ over how the process of connection is theorized. With Ricoeur, a concept is only a concept if it is inherently predisposed to connect with others, and open to being misapplied through metaphor, whereas, with Deleuze and Guattari, connection is left as the general notion of each and every concept being mutually consistent with other concepts, with the consistency attributed to external, extra-conceptual actions of ‘bridging’ and ‘correspondence’. The contrast between an inherent predisposition and a reliance on external actions, I argue, makes for two very different accounts of the connectivity of concepts. It means that Ricoeur is better placed to provide a theory of philosophical discourse that is open to the aesthetic, and can show it through metaphor, while Deleuze and Guattari can only assert or state an art–philosophy relation through a series of technical claims. I reflect on the value judgment contained in the ‘showing (stronger) – stating (weaker)’ distinction, and on the wisdom of relying upon metaphor in a context where two of the philosophers involved reject it for perpetuating the very sense of propriety that keeps art and philosophy apart.

Juan Serey Aguilera (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso) - Reinhart Koselleck and the Reflective Role of the Conceptual Historian

Conceptual History as developed by Reinhart Koselleck and other historians represents the culmination of a historical and philosophical process whose origin can be traced back to the origins of Modernity. The introduction of the concept of *Geschichte*, opens the door to the concepts involved in each and every historical horizon. Thus, concepts as Burger, Revolution, State and others are described by the Conceptual History, making explicit, so to say, the different meanings they have had throughout its history. One of the main philosophical influences of the Conceptual History is Immanuel Kant, who is strategically quoted by Koselleck in his texts in order to show how concepts and experiences -not intuitions as in Kant- are related to each other. This subtle modification, I believe, has very important consequences to comprehend the nature of the concepts in Koselleck and its ideological presuppositions. According to Koselleck, Concepts articulate their meanings within a wider horizon which corresponds to the space of experience and expectations, being the first the social order with its conflicts and changes, while the second consists in the opening of these Concepts to the future. All this process has as result the detachment of the Concepts as described in the Conceptual History from the kantian framework in which concepts find their ultimate unity in the synthetic unity of apperception. Consequently, there is no transcendental subjectivity in Conceptual History. However, Koselleck does not address the problem Kant was trying to solve, namely, the problem of the self reflection of the subjectivity

involved in the activity of applying concepts to appearances and leaves in the shadows the analysis of the place occupied by the conceptual historian within an ideological framework

Moritz Gansen (Technische Universität Darmstadt) - UnFrench Philosophy

In his section of the essay “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature”, co-authored with Claire Parnet and published in *Dialogues* in 1977, Gilles Deleuze variously professes his preference of Anglo-American literature and philosophy over their respective French counterparts. “The French,” he explains, “are too human, too historical, too concerned with the future and the past. [...] They do not know how to become, they think in terms of historical past and future. [...] They are too fond of roots, trees, the survey, the points of arborescence, the properties.” For him, he explains, “an encounter with English and American thought” formed part of the opening-up of a possibility “to think, in French, things which were very new”. Unsurprisingly, however, Deleuze was not at all the only French philosopher who sought to trace an Unfrench “line of flight” that might help create new ways of thinking. In 1982, for instance, Jacques Bouveresse published an essay explaining “Why I Am so very UnFrench” in Alan Montefiore’s collection *Philosophy in France Today*, putting himself at odds with “the ‘Gallic’ style of thinking” while explicating a supposedly eccentric “sympathy for the analytic tradition”. And in 1991, Pascal Engel, who had previously been a “ferventdisciple of Deleuze and Foucault” until he discovered, under the influence of, among others, Bouveresse, that the “continental” road was not leading anywhere, attempted to outline two greater “philosophical dispositions”, one French, one American, out of which he chose the American one, favouring collective reasoning over the “irrationality” of a neo-romantic cult of genius. Probing these three exemplars, the proposed paper will show how closer inspection of a somewhat inconspicuous constellation within the field of French philosophy may yield insights into the stakes, but also the paradoxes and impasses of an Anglo-American de- and reterritorialisation of French philosophy and its images – after all, how Unfrench can one become?

#### **F4 - Human/Non-Human Distinction**

Thomas Khurana (University of Essex) - The Irony of Self-Consciousness: Hegel and Derrida

In a well-known passage from his *Lecture on Aesthetics*, Hegel writes that “precisely because he knows that he is an animal,” man “ceases to be an animal and attains knowledge of himself as spirit.” In my contribution, I will investigate the ironic structure of self-consciousness that comes to the fore in this passage. As this remark by Hegel suggests, self-consciousness is not self-grounding and self-positing in the sense that by virtue of the very fact that I know myself to be a being of a certain type I actualize myself as this type of being. Instead, self-consciousness is suggested to be structurally self-negating and self-transgressive: Precisely by knowing myself to be a being of a certain kind, I cease to be that very being; and, even more so, in ceasing to be that being I attain knowledge of my peculiar difference from the thing I know myself to be. In my paper, I aim to unfold this ironic structure by exploring the different ways in which Hegel and Derrida (particularly in *L’animal que donc je suis*) elaborate this issue.

Tom Whyman (University of Warwick) - McDowell and Marx on what separates us from the animals

What distinguishes human from animal life? For John McDowell the answer is clear: non-human animals are dumb, irrational brutes. But human beings are able to exercise conscious reason, *logos*. This means that, whereas animals act as the mere slaves of imperatives forced upon them by their appetites or environment, human beings – in coming to be responsive to the demands of reason through the appropriate *Bildung* – are able to reflect on these imperatives and thus gain a certain sort of freedom in relation to them. Us human beings then, insofar as we are rational are distinctively *free*. In Lecture VI of *Mind and World*, McDowell famously associates this story with Hans-Georg Gadamer. But he also invokes another figure from European philosophy: namely, Karl Marx. According to McDowell, in his 1844 fragment on ‘Alienated Labour’ Marx also asserts that human life is distinguished from its animal equivalent by virtue of the fact that human beings are able to consciously reflect on their activities – and, for this reason, “a properly human life is... distinctively free.” In this talk, I will address

McDowell's invocation of the early Marx. I will argue that although McDowell is right to detect a certain affinity between his account and that of the Marx of the 1844 manuscripts, his unwillingness to engage with the political aspects of Marx's account opens up a certain blind spot. This blind spot means that McDowell is unable to see why, in *The German Ideology*, Marx would exchange this account of what distinguishes human from animal life for one which downplays the importance of consciousness in order to emphasise a more obvious material fact about human activity. The significance for McDowell is that, if he were to adopt a similar account, he would find himself immunised against criticisms of his naturalism that have recently been levelled at him by Michael Thompson.

## F5 – History

Philip Conway (Aberystwyth University) - Historical ontology, rehabilitated: discerning the modal differentiae of history and philosophy

History and philosophy have a relationship both fraught and fundamental. Indeed, in the European tradition after Kant, philosophy may be well understood in terms of the gradual historicisation of its categories – a process concomitant with the emergence of the philosophy of history and, perhaps, of historical consciousness per se. Moreover, while historians, as a collective, tend to be rather theory-averse, the question of what it is to write *history* has received perhaps more philosophical attention than any other form of writing. This paper derives from a larger project named ‘The historical ontology of environment: from the unity of nature to the birth of geopolitics.’ This project articulates the history of concepts such as milieu, climate and environment in ontological terms – that is, as pertaining to collectively cultivated practices of existential reception. Diverging from the ‘historical ontology’ of Michel Foucault and Ian Hacking, the project therefore also requires the development of a distinct conceptual vocabulary. Drawing on the works of Isabelle Stengers, William James, Dipesh Chakrabarty and others, this paper will attempt to explicate both history and philosophy as modally distinct regimens of collective practice, while at the same time putting them into a relation of complementarity and coordination that undertakes to resist the capture of the present. This philosophical process of ‘penser par le milieu [thinking through the middle]’ will then be related back to the historical concepts of milieu, climate and environment, with a view to suggesting intellectual and political possibilities as yet uninvestigated.

Sinkwan Cheng (Durham) Reassessing Decline through a Dialectical Standstill: Critical Temporality in an Age of Crises

To lament decline risks reaffirming allegiance with that myth of modernity called “Progress.” Even a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical reading of history according to which the slave will win remains captive to the myth of Progress, and above all lends itself easy prey to *ressentiment* which Nietzsche detects as consuming the mind of the slave undergoing this dialectic. My paper will draw inspirations from Koselleck, Benjamin, and Lacan to generate a critical temporality in an attempt to arrest the politics of cultural despair in a “dialectical standstill”—a standstill which is still dialectically related to dialectics, albeit a Lacanian dialectic of desire rather than a Hegelian dialectic of drive toward a grand *Telos*. I seek to transform Koselleck’s insight about the vanquished via Lacan to force open an alternative perspective on “decline” in order to pull an emergency brake on the triumphal processions of victors in historicism (Benjamin). In reading history dialectically (without telos), “where there is danger,/ A rescuing element grows as well” (Hölderlin). Again, reading history dialectically—itsself a tautology given that history is by default a dialectical relationship between external events and subjective consciousness (that is, external events as mediated through, reflected upon, and interpreted by the subject)—it is via “history from the inside” (Collingwood) that I seek to engage Western *fin-de-siècle* mentality and discourse about decline. To reread the Master/Slave dialectic through a Koselleckian viewpoint, the vanquished, by virtue of being confronted with the question of why reality contradicts their conventional narrative, are much more likely than the victors to reexamine history in a deeper and more thorough manner, and to search for new ways of thinking, thereby acquiring more profound insight into the past (and the future). The victors, by contrast, are more prone to be limited by their recent victory to a short-term perspective confirming and reinforcing the existing prejudice

of their innate superiority. Taking the clue from Koslleck, I argue that decline rather than progress offers humanity an opportunity to think anew and to understand itself anew. Decline puts an emergency brake on the tale of progress, and opens up a radically heterogeneous space for us to reexamine history and historiography (without this brake, History would lapse into a psychotic Big Other in the Lacanian sense). Decline puts a check on human rational planning: it forces us to ask why reality proves us wrong, and above all makes us question where our thoughts go wrong. Decline compels us to open ourselves to surprises, the unpredictable, and the unforeseen —and above all, to the limitations of the human mind and human agency. The narrative about progress, by contrast, is not likely to be creative and innovative.

### **F7: The Frankfurt School**

Samuel James Oliver (University of Essex) “Normative Revolution and the Horizon of Freedom”

This paper outlines and criticises a classical dilemma that has recently surfaced in discussions within the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory. On the one hand: the idea that a theory that does not engage with the possibility of a radical change in the basic normative framework underlying a society is not sufficiently critical. On the other hand: the contrasting idea that focussing on such a possibility of radical transformation is a misguided utopianism that only distracts us from taking up more pragmatic projects of reformative change. The former position is that of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, most notably Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. The latter position, meanwhile, has been recently advanced by Axel Honneth, the current head of the Frankfurt School’s Institute for Social Research. Rather than simply choosing a side of this dilemma, I show how a look at the thought of Jacques Derrida, a thinker so often rejected by the Frankfurt School, can offer us a framework for understanding the “strange” unity of reform and revolution that underlies and accounts for this dilemma. In other words, Derrida can help us understand why it is that engaging with the possibility of a radical ‘normative revolution’ *both* gets in the way of reformative change *and* makes such changes possible in the first place. In addition to contributing to a regional debate within critical theory using deconstructive resources, this paper touches on the broader philosophical topics of horizon, infinity, totality, and alterity, as well as having implications for socio-political questions concerning the relation between reform and revolution.

Jake Parkins (university of Essex)

My central question is: does the work of the radical psychiatrist R. D. Laing contain insights which are useful for articulating the notion of social pathology as understood by Frankfurt School critical theorists? In the literature, few scholars have considered Laing’s philosophy in articulating social pathology. This is a missed opportunity, as not only does Laing’s later work – focused around the claim that society is itself mad and irrational – overlap with the concerns of critical theory, but – just as importantly – his philosophy can address the limitations of the Frankfurt School’s conception of social pathology. In the first part of the paper I will explicate critical theory’s understanding of social pathology. Here, I loosely follow Honneth’s understanding of social pathology: denoting situations where the fundamental logics and processes of a society can be understood as ‘sick’ – insofar as it obstructs individuals’ self-realisation – leading to socially produced human suffering which can be understood as a (set of) symptoms of these deformed logics and processes. Therefore, diagnosing social pathologies has ethical and political importance for critical theory: it is keyed to considerations about what is healthy or unhealthy (conducive to self-realisation or restrictive of it) and emancipation from social domination (if such domination is understood as a symptom of a pathological society). Following this, I consider three limitations of contemporary critical theory’s account of social pathology: firstly, their conception of social pathology lacks a convincing account of what it means to suffer; secondly, it overemphasises macro-level analysis (i.e. climate change) while neglecting micro-levels of analysis (i.e. small groups and the family); thirdly, it overemphasises individual and collective rationality deficiency – this means that its diagnosis can invoke problematic patient-practitioner relations, thus implying that oppressed individuals are passive and reduces their emancipatory agency. I then

invoke Laing to provide a solution to all three problems. Laing focuses on the first- person perspective of the oppressed, which can help articulate their suffering from their perspective; he attentively analyses the interpersonal relations between members of the family and small groups; and he emphasises the agency of oppressed by noting the emancipatory potentialities of madness while criticising oppressive patient-practitioner relations. Hence, in answer to my central question: critical theorists interested in social pathology should also be interested in Laing.

### **G1 (Panel) - Realism Unbound**

Political realism has, over the last decade, developed into one of the strongest challenges to the philosophical and political complacency of contemporary liberal theory. While realism remains inchoate, there is a tendency to see an affinity between realism's methodological approach and political conservatism. The realist critique of liberal moralism is taken as the prelude not to a frank reckoning with existing forms of domination and an exploration of alternative political visions, but to a doubling down on the foundations of 'liberal democratic' capitalism – anything more ambitious being dismissed as dangerously utopian. However, as Lorna Finlayson has incisively shown, there is no need for realism to be allied with conservatism. It is not always more realistic to demand that things remain the same. Our aim is to formulate a positive project out of this insight, exploring antecedents and possibilities for turning realism's critical edge against the coercive institutions of real existing liberalism.

1. Nat Rutherford (Royal Holloway) - Karl Marx: Political Realist
2. Matthew Hall (Royal Holloway) - The Second Political Question
3. (Koshka Duff, Kings College London) The Criminal Is Political: Policing Politics in Real Existing Liberalism

### **G2 - Nietzsche 3**

Kit Barton (Regent's University) - A comparative analysis of the methodology behind Nietzsche's philosophy of history with the methodology of his historicist contemporaries

This paper will demonstrate how Nietzsche's philosophy of history shares common elements with the theories of Neo-Kantian historicist philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windelband. All three display a mutual interest in how history conditions the subject. They argue that knowledge of history is a necessary precondition for further philosophical projects. Since the human subject is always contained within a particular historical environment, any philosophical project that presumes an ahistorical human subject is faulty. The historicist philosophers and Nietzsche agree on this. However, it is within their respective methodologies that a key difference becomes apparent. The historicists, displaying the influence of Kant, are primarily concerned with investigating the epistemological foundations of the knowledge of history, endeavouring to determine what will count *as* reliable historical knowledge and answering problematic questions concerning how any theory uses historical facts and general laws. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is less concerned with these epistemological questions. The 'will to power' and the practical project of willing and revaluing values become the basis for his philosophy of history. While generally Nietzsche is not as concerned with the accuracy of historical facts and whether he can legitimately predict anything on the basis of them, the closest he comes to this historicist form of questioning is within "The Advantages & Disadvantages of History for Life", which will be a particular focus for this paper. By closely analysing this text, it is possible to determine more precisely how much Nietzsche and the Neo-Kantians share and where they exactly they diverge.

Tracy Colony (Bard College) - Composing Time: Stiegler on Nietzsche, Nihilism and a Possible Future

Bernard Stiegler is perhaps the most important philosopher today working on the theme of originary technicity and its implications for diagnosing and responding to our contemporary situation. Stiegler's critical dialogues

with Simondon, Heidegger and Derrida are crucial for understanding his own philosophy and have been well documented in the growing reception of his work. However, there is to date not one extended treatment on Stiegler's relation to Nietzsche. In this paper I will argue that Nietzsche, although less often mentioned, can also be seen as one of Stiegler's key philosophical interlocutors from the first volume of *Technics and Time* up to his most recent work. The basis for Stiegler's engagement with Nietzsche is his understanding of Nietzsche as a tragic thinker. Beyond the merely oppositional thinking of metaphysics that extends from Plato to Heidegger, Stiegler can be seen to accord Nietzsche a more originary insight into the necessary composition of apparently oppositional tendencies. Moreover, Nietzsche's genealogy of guilt is able to articulate an originary default prior to the metaphysical and Christian understandings of an original fall. This also provides the basis for Stiegler's engagement with Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche. These points of proximity with Stiegler's own thought are important for contextualizing Stiegler's accounts of Nietzsche as able to define aspects of the nihilistic character of our current epoch and the need for a different figuration of futurity. While this proximity is important for understanding Stiegler's critical appropriation of elements from Nietzsche I will also articulate what for Stiegler, despite this proximity, still remained unthought by Nietzsche.

Matt Bennett (University of Essex) - Nietzsche's Expressivism, or, What if Alexander Nehamas hadn't quit smoking?

The expressivist's Nietzsche maintains that for at least some very important human activity, our actions are not the realisation of an intention formed independently of the action. Rather, what we do is an expression of who we are, such that the mental is determined either epistemologically or metaphysically from the behavioural. For example, in a recent articulation of this way of thinking about intention and action, Alexander Nehamas describes how he quit smoking: not by forming a psychological commitment to the goal of quitting and then following this goal, but rather by moment by moment, piece by piece, repeatedly resolving not to smoke, until at some point realising that without ever intending to, he has "quit smoking". The important point for the expressivist is that Nietzsche thinks of significant ethical achievements – most notably "becoming who we are" – in the same terms. Thus for the expressivist Nietzsche we become who we are not by formulating or discovering our core personality, and then acting in accordance, but instead by revealing ourselves to ourselves by how we live out our lives. This, for Nehamas and others, explains why Nietzsche thinks that 'to become who one is, one must not have the faintest idea *what* one is'. The problem that no expressivist reading of Nietzsche has yet solved – or even addressed – is how to understand failure within this moral-psychological model. For if the goals that drive our ethical endeavours are revealed in our behaviour, how can our behaviour ever fail to meet our goals? What if Nehamas, after 2 weeks of repeatedly resolving to not smoke for a day, started smoking again? For Nehamas – and for the expressivist Nietzsche – we can say only that his behaviour reveals he never intended to quit smoking in the first place. But then what does it mean to fail to quit smoking? And more importantly, how could we ever fail to "become who we are"? The goal of this paper is to show how we can solve this problem while retaining the virtues of the expressivist reading of Nietzsche.

### **G3 – Music and Silence**

Charles Lebeau-Henry (independent) - Chopin as "Wegweiser für die Zukunft": Nietzsche on the Possibilities of Music in the Second Part of *Human, All Too Human* (

It has been recognized for some time that, despite their being joined under a single title with a purported unified intent, the three texts that together compose *Human, All Too Human* see Nietzsche offering varying perspectives on art (Young, 1992). More recently, a similar divide between the first and the second part has been noted in regards to the wider tendencies that inform this work (Ansell-Pearson, 2018). In the first volume (1878), Nietzsche denounces the arts of his times for peddling metaphysics and religion, impeding us on the path to the new way of life made possible by science. However, in *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (1879) and *The Wanderer and his Shadow* (1880), he suggests they should show humanity the path to its future by providing models that it could emulate. In this presentation, I wish to concentrate on the treatment of music in the second part of *Human, All Too Human*. Specifically, I will try to examine if, despite only admitting poetry as an art that signposts the future, Nietzsche could coherently allow music to succeed in this function. To do so, I will first present Nietzsche's description of how music works, which I will argue is consistent across the whole book. I will then

focus on the figure of Chopin, who appears to Nietzsche an exception amongst the musicians of his times, a “classic” in a sea of romantics. I will attempt to show, through the analysis of the passages devoted to him as well as through a closer look at the *Barcarolle* op. 60, which Nietzsche lauds in particular, that his artistic practice can fulfill Nietzsche’s *desiderata*.

Ainhoa Suárez Gómez (Kingston) - Silence: From Language to the Body

Jean-Luc Nancy opens his work *Listening* with a question: Is philosophy capable of listening? To address the inquiry, he analyses three variations of the term “sense” (as meaning, as movement, and as physical sensation), and argues that philosophy has given primacy to signification before perception, to interpretation before physical sensation. Following Nancy’s argument, this paper offers a framework for conceptualising silence not from the realm of language, as it has been traditionally done, but based on modes of sensual perception. To achieve this, the work will be divided into three sections. The first part is a critique of Martin Heidegger’s “telling silence” which he acknowledges as the most genuine mode of discourse. This definition is paradigmatic of a prevailing regime that defines silence from a dualistic logic that opposes being to nothingness and subordinates the concept to other phenomenon considered more significant. The next part focuses on the shift derived from John Cage’s experience in the anechoic chamber. I discuss the role of the body as guarantor of sound perception as well as the problematisation of the noisiness inherent in the body’s vitality, particularly as they relate to the composer’s analyses of pieces such as *4’33’’* and *0’00’’*. In the last part I will discuss Nancy’s proposal to move from a dualistic mode of sound perception to one in search of accents, tones, timbres and resonances. His concepts of sense (and non-sense) and “resonant body” are analysed as the basis for a new framework where silence is no longer conceived as a privation, but as an arrangement of resonance.

#### **G4 - Sameness and Alterity**

Andrew Bevan (Kingston) - The Education of Male Desire: Death in Plato and Mishima, Life in Irigaray (

A reading of Yukio Mishima’s *Sun and Steel* and Socrates’ last day as portrayed in Plato’s *Phaedo* reveals paradigmatic examples of a male desire for mastery and sameness achieved through a method for affecting oneself to reduce otherness to sameness, a drive that could only ultimately be accomplished with death. With both authors, it is this mortality and the imminence of death that gives rise to a metaphysics and economy of affect that privileges sameness and purity through defence against and mastery of otherness by reducing otherness to mere opposites. Most notable, however, is the metaphysical dependence in both thinkers on the active/passive. Whilst for Plato’s Socrates, this necessitates the soul’s mastery of the passive body with the eternity of the soul guaranteed through its pure separation from the body whilst still alive, for Mishima, it is the body that must master the soul to guarantee the move toward a universal sensation and a principle of oneness. Overly determined by the active/passive, the life of one therefore requires the death of the other. This reading provides a neat illustration of Irigaray’s characterisation of a masculine self-affection in *In The Beginning, She Was* where she adds that a lack of differentiation from the maternal world results in an understanding of affect as imposed from outside, as a source of imbalance and disharmony that necessitates philosophies of defence and the drive for mastery. Using Irigaray’s philosophy that instead privileges life and difference, I attempt to outline how an ‘education’ of such male desire could occur through an alternative economy of affect that enriches becoming toward differentiation and a singular, sexuated masculine subjectivity. What happens if male desire is severed from this obsession with the end and with sameness?

Jo-Jo Koo (Grinnell College) - Doing Justice to the Other: A Comparative Assessment of Levinas’s and Gadamer’s Reflections on Alterity

Levinas’s reflections on the absolute alterity of the other have become increasingly influential on account of both cultural and philosophical tendencies in the last half century. In my talk I will first sketch the basic line of thought at work in Levinas’s philosophy of alterity, giving emphasis in particular to his crucial assertion that the other makes its “ethical” claim on us *utterly independently* of its situatedness within, and thereby interpretive

mediation via, any horizon of intelligibility. On Levinas's view, the other "signifies without context" whatsoever, constituting the "metaphysical" basis of our "ethical responsibility" to it; its significance is "infinite" and thereby *absolute* apart from any possible capture by any "totality" of meaningfulness). By contrast, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics puts forward a conception of alterity that argues emphatically that the best way we can do justice to the alterity of the other is by thinking through and appreciating profoundly the enabling constraints of the factual horizons of intelligibility that condition our attempts to understand others. In the context of a critical dialogue with Levinas on this issue, one can say that Gadamer effectively rejects Levinas's view that alterity is *absolute* (i.e., radically unconditioned and asymmetrical in relation to the one who encounters the other), but argues instead that we can best do justice to the alterity of the other by getting clear precisely about the *radical conditionality and finitude* of our relation to the other. My talk gives a comparative assessment of these opposing reflections on alterity in Levinas and Gadamer. Its working conclusion is that Gadamer's position, despite the fact that it seems currently out of fashion in contemporary "continental" philosophy, ultimately does more justice to the alterity of the other than Levinas's, notwithstanding their respective rhetorical gestures in their major texts.

## **G5 – Spinoza 2**

Dimitris Vardoulakis (University of Western Sydney)

Why is Spinoza an Epicurean? The short answer to the question above is that Spinoza is an epicurean because he stages a dialectic between authority and utility. To defend this position, I will extrapolate here three key terms of Spinoza's epicureanism—namely, what epicureanism, authority and utility mean, especially but not exclusively in the context of the *Theological Political Treatise*, his most epicurean work.

Elaina Gauthier-Mamaril (University of Aberdeen) - Spinoza's critique of atomism: Redefining Spinozist individuation with Sophie Laveran

In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, "atomistic" theories that proposed a mechanistic understanding of phenomena were gaining traction. They represented an alternative to Aristotelian and Scholastic qualitative views of the world and offered themselves as proponents of "new science" that opposed itself to superstition. As a thinker who opted for the *more geometrico* in his main text and who decries the workings of superstition on individuals and society, Spinoza seems like he would sympathise with this school of thought. However, Sophie Laveran claims that, not only does Spinoza critique atomism on a speculative level, but his rejection of atomism as an ontological model has crucial practical consequences for his ethical project. She argues that by criticising atomism, Spinoza is in fact redefining the process of individuation and the existential as well as ontological meaning of individual things. In this paper, I examine Laveran's argument and comment on the Spinozist individual she is constructing. The first part of this paper focuses on defining the concept of atomism in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Specifically, I make explicit the link between scientific theory and the theories of individuation in its historical context. Secondly, I break down Laveran's argument that Spinoza's conception of individuation and of the existence of distinct individuals is a critique of said atomism. Finally, I evaluate the strength of Laveran's conclusion against Spinoza's text.

## **G6 - Hegel**

Lucian Ionel (University of Freiburg) - Self-consciousness as a Living Kind

The idea of a living kind plays a key role in the constitution of human subjectivity in Hegel's thought. My paper approaches the description of self-consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and provides a reinterpretation of the topic of recognition in the fourth chapter of Hegel's work. Hegel's main argument is that human consciousness fully understands its own nature if it grasps itself as a living kind. I will argue that the recognition of "we" as constitutive to the "I" implies the recognition of what makes human subjectivity possible in the first place, i.e., the living human kind. The concrete dimensions which are at stake in the process of recognition, i.e., sociality, practical experience and corporeality, are experienced against the background of the living kind that human subjectivity embodies. In this sense, my argument should complement the readings of Honneth, Stekeler-Weithofer and McDowell. I will start with Hegel's critique against subjective idealism. Hegel maintains

that the notion of a self-positing subjectivity is an abstraction from the living kind that human subjectivity represents. Moreover, the assumption of a private subjectivity leads to the skeptical concern of whether human knowledge has access to objectivity. Hegel overcomes this skeptical concern by redefining subjectivity as “spirit” (*Geist*), which has the meaning of a collective subjectivity, linguistically and historically constituted. While this is true, my main focus will be to stress that *Geist* is possible only insofar it actualizes a life-form. Finally, the recognition of human subjectivity as a living kind paves the way to the possibility of reason. In some sense, thinking and acting in the light of reason is thinking and acting in the light of the living kind we are. This means that the recognition of the life-form that my self-consciousness actualizes is in Hegel’s view a source of normativity.

Jonas Heller (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) - ‘Universal Usefulness’ and ‘Absolute Freedom’: A Reading of Liberal Subjectivity according to Hegel’s Critique of Enlightenment

In Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, there is a strong connection between three concepts: Enlightenment, usefulness and absolute freedom. Human beings are ‘enlightened’ when they are aware that anything in the sensuous reality is useful. To be useful means to be at the same time something ‘in itself’ and something ‘for another’. Since anything has this structure, anything is useful. But the enlightened consciousness fails to notice that it has the same structure and thus remains *separated* from the objective world. For Hegel, this means that it is not free. Liberation comes with the insight of having the same structure of usefulness. This is when the spirit reaches the shape of ‘absolute freedom’. In my paper, I want to develop a critique of this ‘absolute freedom’ as a critique of liberalism. I will proceed in three steps. Firstly, I will reconstruct Hegel’s critique of ‘absolute freedom’: He associates it with the autocratic violence occurring in the French Revolution, resulting from a conflict between individuality and universality. The French Revolution, however, was not only a breakthrough of violence, but also of liberalism. Secondly, I will therefore give an interpretation of the conflict between individuality and universality as a conflict between society and the state, the two core concepts of liberalism. Liberalism conceives the communal life as proceeding concurrently within the state and within society, as two sides depending on each other. Thirdly, I will show how this liberal perspective on communal life can be described – with Hegel and beyond – as a life ‘in itself’ and ‘for another’, i.e. as ‘usefulness’ in a Hegelian sense. I will explicate how liberal, i.e. modern subjectivity itself (and not only the communal life) has the form of usefulness. Criticising this ‘usefulness’ should therefore not be restricted to the dialectic reversal of freedom into terror, but expand to a critique of this freedom within ‘normal’ liberal life.

## **H1 - Phenomenology**

Max Schaefer (University of Limerick) - The Role of Trust in Michel Henry’s Speech of Suffering

This paper raises the question as to whether trust is not necessarily a prominent affect in Henry’s account of the way language appears as an immanent affectivity. While Henry acknowledges that suffering and joy serve as foundational affects by which language comes to appear, I suggest that trust is essential in Henry’s account of how language is phenomenalized in the finite self. Toward this end, I begin by laying out Henry’s contention that phenomenology needs to see the essence of appearing, its phenomenological matter, if it is to understand appearances themselves. I show that, for Henry, this phenomenological material is an immanent affectivity, and that this results in two different kinds of words: the word of life (affect and its immanent relations of action) and the word of the world (signification and its ecstatic relations of saying), with the latter based on the former. I demonstrate that there is not only an internal structure but also a hierarchy to Henry’s understanding of the way language appears. By showing how this self-founding affectivity is passively received in the finite subject according to a relation of non-reciprocity, I demonstrate that a pre-reflective, non-intentional trust is essential to a comprehension of the affective reality of language. Additionally, insofar as the affectivity of language makes possible, and pursues its self-growth in, language’s appearance in the transcendence of the world as an unreal, transcendent content, I maintain that the affective trust in question must be accompanied by a certain trust in the world’s ability to supplement this growth.

Valeria Motta (University of Birmingham) - What Loneliness Reveals

Simone Weil writes that among human beings, only the existence of those we love is fully recognized. Loneliness is a painful emotional experience that arises when there is a discrepancy between the relationships that people wish they had and the ones that they perceive they have (Heinrich & Gullone, 2006) It is a subjective state of disconnection that people may feel even among family and friends. It is argued that emotional dispositions serve as conditions of possibility for the discovery of significance of value and thus enable us to perceive what is meaningful. If we care about the life of a person, we are disposed to react with fear if the person is threatened. But what sort of truths can be apprehended about the self and the world through the experience of loneliness? What happens when we consider that the experience may embody false impressions? Some argue that even apparently irrational emotions can show what distinguishes emotion from other modes of cognitive activity. The feeling of being afraid is our way of recognizing a potential threat as such. I follow Monague's reading of Franz Brentano, I analyse the claims that (a) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (b) emotions are evaluative phenomena; (c) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of (objective) value, and argue that they can be applied to the experience of loneliness.

Constantin Mehmel (University of Essex) - Disorientation: A Phenomenological Sketch

Experiences of disorientation are both diverse and common: moving countries, losing a significant other, falling severely ill or not fitting in. Most fear feeling disorientated and navigate through life accordingly. In such experiences, we appear to lose our bearings in and with the world, which has tended towards an interpretation of disorientation in purely negative terms as a 'loss of orientation'. Yet, what kind of experience do we actually designate with 'disorientation'? The phenomenon of disorientation has rarely been explicitly addressed in philosophy and remains, in many respects, poorly understood. This paper seeks to further enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of disorientation. (i) I begin by outlining the predominantly negative image of disorientation as 'loss of orientation'. This will help me motivate the question of if, and to what extent, we are still orientated at times of disorientation, despite the tendency to treat the phenomenon as an either/or condition. In contrast, I will suggest that we no longer go on in one sense, and yet we have a different kind of orientation. (ii) Then, as one way of motivating this view, I turn to the phenomenologically rich case study of interpersonal grief. The loss of one's loved one is not just a loss of orientation towards one's partner, insofar as the absence of one's partner is still orientating me, although in a different way. Understanding the ways in which the experience of grief changes the bereaved agent's orientation thus demonstrates that we are still orientated within the loss of orientation. (iii) On this basis, I propose that the phenomenon of disorientation is not adequately captured if it is analysed solely as a loss of orientation but instead requires an account of the complex interplay between orientation and loss of orientation that characterises experiences like grief.

## **H2 - Religion**

Tim Lowe (University of Chichester) - Badiou and the Problem of Evil

The relation of theology to the thought of Alain Badiou has been a particular sticking point in the reception of his philosophy. Thinkers such as Žižek are keen to affirm that the unavowed paradigm of Badiou's thought is religious revelation, supposing a metaphysical opposition between two key facets of his thought: being and event. Many of these thinkers seek to affirm that Badiou's theology lies in the almost miraculous nature of the event as something outside of a situation causing it to change. A curious oversight in much of this literature, however, is how Badiou's thinking on evil in particular corresponds quite closely with theological thinking on the problem of evil. My paper will examine this charge of an implicit theology with specific reference to Badiou's thinking on evil. I argue that the assumption of God prevalent in Christian responses to the problem of evil runs into Badiou's thought in the tension between the claim that situations are structured in such a way that they prevent any meaningful choices, and the demand that a choice must be possible for a situation to change. This tension reveals that the good must always become an option at some point, even though such a possibility is foreclosed by much of Badiou's thought and, as such, this aporia leaves Badiou unable to push through fully the consequences of his own theories, and unable to think evil as an impersonal power. It is

through these assumptions and the inability to think evil as an impersonal power that Badiou sustains the theological in his thought.

Damiano Migliorini (Università di Verona) - Toward a Trinitarian Metaphysics: Trinity and Gunk

Latest Trinitarian speculations claim that God must have a Trinitarian nature. A conclusion reached through reason alone. In the prevalent model (social trinitarianism) the Trinity is described as a perfect relational model. However, the triune God can be understood as ‘communion’ – the ‘reciprocal gift between three divine persons’ – only through apophatic concepts: pericoresis, eternal generation, relatio subsistens. Although many convergences lead to identify the Being-Agápe of God as a cornerstone for a ‘new concept’ of God – we can call it ‘Trinitarian theism’ – it is essential to focus on the limits of such ‘new concept’: what does a ‘relational’ God mean? The paper analyses briefly the ‘translation’ of the ‘agapic principle’ in the so called Trinitarian Ontology, trying to grasp the philosophical implications for a Relational Ontology (RO). It shows that we are far from define what a RO is, despite the fact that today there are numerous attempts to connect it with a Trinitarian metaphysics. The risk, here, is that the use of vague notions of ‘relations’ conducts to some forms of monism. A boundary between relationalism and monism is not easy to place, and we must do it. An hypothesis is to establish a parallelism between the ‘event of love between the divine persons’ and an ontology which claims that the fundamental entities (FE) are ‘aggregations of events’. The FE would be an infinite number of metaphysical infinitesimal points that are, at the same time, substances and relations (this is, maybe, the common insight of Trinitarian speculation and RO). Macroscopic relations and qualities would be derived from the basic relatedness of this gunky world. The paper ends showing that this eventist-infinitesimal ontology has the same apophatic characters of the rational speculation about the Triune God.

### **H3 - Deleuze & Guattari 4**

Deirdre Daly (Goldsmiths) - ‘The World is an Egg’: Deleuze and Hildegard von Bingen

‘The world is an egg’ is an image used by both Deleuze and Hildegard of Bingen: why is does this image recur in works separated by almost a millennium? This paper explores their connection within the philosophy of Immanence. Deleuze clearly values the richness of medieval thought, for his revaluation of the history of philosophy in general, and in particular, for the importance of Dun Scotus’s (1266-1308) concepts of univocity and difference. However, a connection between Deleuze and Hildegard (1098-1179) remains to be made. This is partly because the latter’s contribution to philosophy has been overlooked by her reductive categorisation as a mystic. This paper explores, therefore, how both philosophers used the image of the Cosmic Egg for philosophical purposes and argues for its central importance to the development of the philosophy of Immanence. To do so, the paper must focus on the crossover where both are influenced by the life and the earth sciences. The Cosmic egg is informed, in Deleuze’s thought, by embryology, biological reproduction and evolutionary science: in Hildegard’s, by medicine, natural philosophy and cosmology. What motivates both is the challenge of thinking about creation and creativity. The paper then considers how the image (if it is one) of the Egg operates in their writing and thinking. Surreal and perplexing, ‘the world as egg’ may act like ‘virus’ in the mind, freezing thought as much as unscrambling its routines. To understand how it functions, the Cosmic Egg is finally considered as the kind of untimely, epistemological device that is required by philosophies of Immanence.

James Kelly (Independent) - Time and Landscape: An Application of Deleuze’s Three Syntheses of Time to Landscape and the Geoglyphs of Chug Chug

This paper examines how the three syntheses of Deleuze’s philosophy of time as developed in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) can be used to build a framework for thinking philosophically about changes in landscapes over time and examples from the site of the geoglyphs of Chug Chug in Chile’s northern desert to illustrate the arguments developed. Beginning with the first synthesis (the living present), it seeks to show how the two types of passive syntheses (perceptive and organic) identified by Deleuze can be extended to form a schema based on

perceptive, organic, telluric and cosmological syntheses in order to ground a theory of landscape based on repetition over time. It will then consider how the second synthesis (the pure past), which functions as memory, applies in the context of landscape, arguing that if landscapes can act as a store of memory, this can only be as a partial representation of the pure past identified by Deleuze and that we as humans are thus doubly removed from this pure past when it comes to our interpretations of the land. Finally, it will consider Deleuze's third and final synthesis (the active synthesis of the future), addressing the challenge of how the active subject of Deleuze's third synthesis of time, which is stated in terms of the human subject, can be broadened to include other types of active subjects that determine how landscapes develop over time. The paper concludes that, with its emphasis on repetition, Deleuze's theory of time is apt for thinking about landscape, identifying some of the challenges to doing so and possible directions for future work.

#### **H4 - Political Philosophy 3**

James Bartholomeusz (Independent) - Unlikely friends: Social democracy, Catholic social teaching and the challenge to neoliberalism

Since Francis was elected pope in 2013 there has been a widespread renewal of interest in Catholic social teaching, including, perhaps surprisingly, among secular social democrats. Working within the fields of critical and political theory, this paper aims to situate this interest as part of the ongoing crisis of confidence in neoliberal capitalism, and account for the philosophical convergence of these two broad schools of thought. Why has Catholic social teaching (and its lay cousin, distributism) become attractive to social democrats, to which it has traditionally been opposed in both theoretical and practical terms? There are two possible explanations, which are consistent with one another. The 'shallow' explanation is that both schools have reacted to the effects of and ideological justification for neoliberal capitalism in a similar way, and offer similar policy prescriptions as an alternative. The 'deep' explanation is that some socialist thinkers are in the process of re-evaluating the philosophical underpinnings of their political views, moving away from their traditional approaches (Marxist, Kantian, utilitarian) and towards the virtue-theory approach that underpins Catholic social teaching. A concrete example of this can be seen in the renewed social-democratic attention to local and small-scale institutions – such as cooperatives and municipal utilities companies – as vehicles for progressive socio-economic change. Whether the shallow or deep explanation is adopted, ultimately the convergence of Catholic social teaching and social-democratic thought is a function of the ideological dominance of neoliberal capitalism. While the two schools now overlap to some extent in praxis they still fundamentally differ on first principles, respectively, Christian scripture and doctrine and a secular-humanist commitment to social justice. It seems that their success in challenging neoliberal capitalism will determine to what extent their partial alignment continues.

Dan Swain (Czech University of Life Sciences) - Living the future now – Figures, synecdoches and iconoclasts (Dr.

The idea that political practice should seek to 'prefigure' a desired future by enacting elements of that future within the present is commonplace in many contemporary social movements. This, however, is understood in diverse and sometimes conflicting ways, and this paper will consider three approaches to conceptualising this relationship between present and future. The first draws on the etymology of 'figuration' as elaborated by Erich Auerbach. This sees its origins in disputes among the church fathers over the precise relationship between Old and New Testament, in which a figurative relationship is distinguished from a merely allegorical one and seen as positing an intimate identity between real historical events. Uri Gordon has recently traced the influence of this approach in more recent social movements, but also criticised it for its historical determinacy and for acting as a consolation for activists. An alternative conceptualisation is offered by Benjamin Franks, who suggests that prefigurative practices should be understood as synecdoches, parts that stand in for a desired future whole. Yet this raises epistemic questions of how to recognise such parts as belonging to a wider whole, and a risk of fetishism, in which a part obscures or replaces a whole, instead of representing it. A final approach is offered by those who Russell Jacoby calls iconoclastic utopians, including figures such as Bloch and Benjamin, who are influenced by elements of the Jewish messianic tradition, and as see the present as anticipating a future that

nonetheless cannot be fully named or represented. While there are affinities between these approaches, they also differ in important ways, with consequences for critical theory and practice.

Cillian Ó Fathaigh (University of Cambridge) - Paperless interventions: Jacques Derrida on undocumented migrants and Europe

With the publication of *L'Autre cap* in 1991, Jacques Derrida presented himself as one of the main thinkers of Europe within the tradition of contemporary French philosophy. Since then, this book has been seen as Derrida's definitive position on Europe. My argument aims to show that, in fact, there are a series of "marginal" and neglected texts that better elucidate Derrida's position on Europe, and that these should be taken account of in fully understanding his position. *L'Autre cap* itself is a product of two different pieces published in two different newspapers, and Derrida's media engagement with Europe continued after this. The most well-known example is the appeal that Derrida co-signed with Habermas supporting a distinct European foreign policy in 2004, much of which jars with some of the original theoretical positions of *L'Autre cap*. However, there is not simply this article, but indeed many other pieces, including Derrida's interventions in favour of *les sans papiers*, undocumented migrants, and which reveal a much more complex position in relation to the Schengen zone. When brought together I will argue that these two concerns offer us much greater depth and ambivalence in relation to Derrida's position on Europe. From the examples of Europe and *les sans papiers*, I will propose that there is a coherent but implicit strategy of political intervention in Derrida's thought and this needs to be taken into account to understand Derrida's relation to political philosophy. Finally, even though these pieces may complicate Derrida's 1991 position on Europe, I will argue that his thinking of Europe still represents one of the most challenging, productive and promising that is available to us today

### H5 - Merleau-Ponty

Andrew Inkpin (University of Melbourne) - Merleau-Ponty on sensible ideas and embodied intelligence

In *The Visible and the Invisible* Merleau-Ponty develops a conception of 'sensible ideas' according to which general meaning is inseparable from its realization in sensible particulars. Such ideas – typified by painting and music – are intended to capture the specificity of the sense (*sens*) enacted by embodied agents in expressive action, continuing Merleau-Ponty's lifelong attempts to conceive the lived foundation of intellectual feats. This paper aims first to set out Merleau-Ponty's conception of sensible ideas, drawing on earlier publications and course notes where appropriate, particularly their status ontologically and as a bearer of sense. Its second aim is to assess their philosophical value in understanding embodied intelligent practices, particularly as a supposed general foundation of 'ideas of the intelligence', by considering several examples (mathematics, music, painting). I argue that, although not applicable to all such practices, the notion of sensible ideas accurately characterizes cases in which the body's mediation is reflected in an activity's structure or end-product (e.g. painting) and enriches our conceptual means for understanding the variety of forms embodied-enacted intelligence can take. Against this background, I highlight that a distinctive advantage of sensible ideas is to break with identity-based thinking while accommodating aspects of both generality and particularity.

Ilknur Ozalli (University of Guelph) - Re-Thinking Ethical Hospitality in the Light of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment

My aim in this essay is to explore the relationship between intercorporeality and ethical hospitality in Merleau-Ponty's relational ontology. My argument is that hospitality starts from human spatiality, and that, it is experienced and expressed through the lived body's interpersonal nature. Though Merleau-Ponty never developed a theory of hospitality, I will pursue this exploration by using his theory of perception, embodiment and intersubjectivity to provide the basis for the claim that our experiences of self and space have an interpersonal character. This character paves the way for an embodied insight into welcoming the other into one's own self-identity and receiving the other into one's presence. First, I will consider the intercorporeal nature of our perceptual experience. I will use Merleau-Ponty's analyses of the infant's early interpersonal immersion in perceiving the other to demonstrate the primordial coupling which pairs the body of self and the

other. This coupling exposes the infant to an experience of spatial extension through the lived body of the other. Drawing on analyses of socially extended cognition offered by Shaun Gallagher, I will then propose that the primordial perceptual and spatial experience with the other informs the infant's future perceptual possibilities of recognizing the other's certain way of having a world and provides a shaping influence on the infant's sense of self. To make this argument, I will consider how lived body and human spatiality can be the focal point to develop a context for an ethical account of hospitable subjectivity. A phenomenological investigation of performances of the spatially manifested lived body can give insight into expanding the meaning of our embodied engagements with the other and capturing the interdependency of subjects in constituting social bonds for the hospitable self.

## **H6 - Kant and Post-Kantian Philosophy**

Aaron Higgins-Brake (Duquesne University & Universität Heidelberg) - From Form to Content: Kant and Hegel on Logic

This paper examines the shifting conceptions logic that occur between Kant and Hegel. I argue that one of the fundamental motivations of Hegel's thought is to overcome the separation of form and content that Kant instituted in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly when he restricted pure logic to "the form of thinking in general" (A55/B79). Because of this restriction, pure thinking cannot supply its own content and must receive it instead from sensible intuition. While Hegel's criticisms of Kant are well documented, especially his account of an intellectual intuition developed in *Faith and Reason* and his various complaints about Kant's thing in itself, this paper investigates a less studied locus of critique found in the introduction to the *Science of Logic*. The crux of Hegel's critique there is his claim that because the rules of thinking are determinate and indicate determinations of the relation between subject and object, they are not merely formal but already inherently possess a content. The essential move that Hegel makes in his logic, I argue, is to shift from a dichotomy of form and content towards a dichotomy of determination and negation. Because of this, Hegel implicitly rejects Kant's claim that pure thought is void of content and instead finds that "the determinations of thought have objective value and existence" (21.35). With this Hegel frees himself to develop his logic as a system of *Denkbestimmungen*, which are not therefore merely subjective or formal but rather are equally determinations of being.

On the Role of the 'Feeling of Truth' in J. F. Fries' Philosophy (Tadahiro OOTA, PhD Student, Kyoto University, Japan)

In this paper, I treat the role of 'Feeling of Truth' (Wahrheitsgefühl) by Jakob Friedrich Fries in relation to the development of his philosophy. Jakob Friedrich Fries is a German philosopher contemporaneous with German Idealism and known for his book *New Critique of Reason*. Fries emphasizes Kant's spirit of Criticism and tries newly to fulfil Kant's Critique from an empiricist standpoint. Fries claims that we have philosophical cognitions without being conscious of them and adopt them in our ordinary judgements (Beurteilungen) in daily life. From this viewpoint, Fries finds the task of philosophy in analysing our judgements to reveal the philosophical cognitions that are presupposed by our judgements. Then, how can the philosophical cognitions discovered through analysis be identified? Although their validity is finally justified by reason as a mental faculty, Fries claims that the philosophical cognitions can be identified thanks to the 'feeling of truth'. As Fries does not seem to give a consistent explanation of the concept of 'Feeling of Truth', this concept has been regarded as a product of ambiguity of Fries' philosophy. In this paper, I try to solve this problem by tracing the development of Fries' thought. In Fries' earlier works, he identifies the object of philosophy mainly with metaphysical principles of natural science. As the validity and limitations of these principles can be tested through experience, Fries emphasizes the role of induction rather than 'feeling of truth'. However, in Fries' later works, he extends the object of philosophy to religious beliefs. As religious beliefs can hardly be tested through experience, the concept of 'feeling of truth' plays a different role in this context.

Kant's critical enterprise does not account for the genesis of the faculties. Responding to this, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism attempts a genetic understanding of the transcendental, the introduction of contingency into the faculties themselves – a prior dissonance that encompasses the supposed harmony of our powers of thought. This paper will argue that it is the cinematographic mechanism that provides a model for what Ray Brassier calls Deleuze's "materialist transvaluation of the transcendental." Cinema, as Valentine Moulard-Leonard suggests, "yields an account of the material genesis of conscious experience," and it is in this way that Deleuze's philosophy is a cinematic Kantianism. This paper will not simply explicate Deleuze's Kantian approach to film, but instead posit that the invention of the technological means of cinema produced a rupture in the history of thinking, sparking new philosophies and enabling the creation of new systems of thought. With the cinematic model of the transcendental, the structures of experience that Kant deemed immutable in our consciousness are taken out of the head. As Levi Bryant describes, the transcendental becomes "not something imposed by the mind upon the world," but is instead now "material insofar as they are constellations of potentials belonging to the material world and presiding over the genesis of material beings." These schemas index a transcendental field, an ontological claim for the productive forces of being as the actualization of the virtual, the differentiation of the potentials inherent in an autoproductive matter. This is where the seeds of Deleuze's post-Kantian metaphysics can be found, and this paper will explore how the cinema made this thinking possible: a reelism of the transcendental.