Ms. Aderayo Olamide <u>Adelanwa</u>

A Critical Examination of Parental Responsibility through an Existentialist Lens in the Face of Life's Uncertainties

Abstract

This research paper explores a critical examination of the concept of parental responsibility through an existentialist lens in the context of life's uncertainties. Parenting is a complex and multifaceted role that involves a range of responsibilities, from meeting basic physical needs to shaping the character and worldview of the child. However, in the face of life's inherent unpredictability, parents are faced with the challenge of preparing their children to navigate an uncertain world. The paper argues that parental responsibility is not only a moral obligation but also an existential one. Drawing from the works of prominent existentialist philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, the paper contends that parents must confront the realities of life's uncertainties while still striving to create meaningful and authentic relationships with their children. Likewise, the paper offers a critical analysis of the challenges faced by parents in fulfilling their responsibilities and proposes that an existentialist perspective can provide a framework for creating meaningful relationships with children while still accepting the uncertainties of life. The paper highlights the complexities and challenges of parenting, especially in today's uncertain world, and offers insights into how an existentialist approach to parental responsibility can provide a framework for navigating the demands of modern-day parenting. Overall, this paper provides a valuable contribution to the literature on parenting and existentialism and offers a new perspective for scholars, parents and professionals working in the field of child development.

adelanwaaderayo@gmail.com Institute of Religion and Leadership Development. Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria

Basil Anis Issa Almousa

Foucault's Roussel and the contingency of statements in The Archaeology of Knowledge

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that Foucault's work on Raymond Roussel, Death and the Labyrinth, plays a pivotal role in our understanding of statements in The Archaeology of

Knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the visible and sayable. In The Archaeology of Knowledge statements are not presented as standalone building blocks for discourse formation. On the contrary, statements are already composites and it is unclear where one statement ends and another begins or what differentiates the inside of a statement from its outside. Consequently, rules are more akin to regularities that emerge from the relational structure of statements. In his study on Roussel, Foucault reveals how the poverty of language and labyrinth-like relations bring to the fore a new perspective on the relationship between the sayable and visible. In the absence of clear cut causal relations, language becomes productive, forging new connections that allow for new objects to emerge. Words and things emerge from a fluid region in which neither words nor things are privileged. On the contrary, the sayable and visible develop arbitrarily in certain ways or patterns that can be repeated, but which are bound to dissipate. Similarly, statements as composites allow for new and different connections between words and things to emerge. The relationships that emerge create thresholds through an interweaving that takes place between the sayable and visible, which emerge from statements and visibilities. Therefore, Death and the Labyrinth not only continues Foucault's critique of the phenomenological method, but also contributes to his developing practice of archaeology. Through the complex relation between the visible and sayable, it sets the stage for the relational and contingent nature of statements and their role in discourse formation.

Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, England
almousa59@gmail.com; a026180g@student.staffs.ac.uk

Kit Barton
Population Ethics and Deconstruction

Deconstruction has proven itself to be a practical tool for philosophically analyzing concepts. The deconstructive consideration of concepts requires an awareness of the margins of ideas. The margins of an idea form the conditions of possibility of that idea. They act as a boundary that both demarcates what is contained within the idea and indicates what is excluded from the idea. Derrida's deconstructive analysis focuses on these margins, supplements, prosthetics etc., to gain a more comprehensive philosophical understanding. Deconstruction typically reveals what any particular concept lacking, what is absent in the present, the speech excluded by the writing, the signified that is deferred by the signifier. For Derrida,

philosophical analysis of a concept involves identifying the liminal boundaries of that concept. This paper will seek to establish whether this deconstructive approach can be usefully applied to one of the most prominent issues in population ethics, which is Parfit's 'Repugnant Conclusion.' This is the idea that for every imaginable world population over 10 billion people, all with a high quality of life, there must be a greater imaginable population, if all else is equal, whose existence would be better, even though its members have lives barely worth living. For Parfit, this conclusion is very hard to accept, but it seems to be logically required, and it drives Parfit to attempt to formulate an alternative understanding, which he calls Theory X, as a way of avoiding the conclusion. This paper will examine any overlap between Derrida's deconstruction and Parfit's search for Theory X, attempting to establish any relevance for modern population ethics.

Regent's University London, England
bartonkit@regents.ac.uk

Abdullah Basaran

Rudolf Bultmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer: The Historicality of Reading Eminent Texts

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the hermeneutics of Rudolf Bultmann in terms of its intersections with Hans-Georg Gadamer and to emphasize the significance of the problem of historicality and the project of de-mythologization for hermeneutical practices. As Gadamer recognizes, as a way of reading eminent texts, Bultmann's hermeneutical style for the New Testament is highly suitable for the present reader of a historical text. The problems such as the temporal distance, the reception of the first audience, the historical processes this text went through until the age in which the reader lives, the tradition to which she belongs, and the ways of access to the text and its reception—all these point to a fundamental question within which the interpreter/reader is found herself: What is the meaning of history for human beings? This philosophical question of what, which questions the meaning of history, draws Bultmann, who reads sacred texts as literary classics, from the field of theology to philosophy. Although Gadamer thinks that there is not only a difference in degree but also a difference in kind between sacred texts and literary classics, we can say that at least he received from Bultmann the answer to the question "How to read an eminent text?" The answer to this question will lead us to take a second step in the reader's endeavor to understand the meaning of a (historical) text: How do classical/eminent texts (e.g.

mythological narratives or sacred texts), in which a different causality may operate and whose message is difficult to understand, speak to us? How does the process of de-objectifying the act of reading, which Bultmann applies through his project of de-mythologizing the New Testament, find a counterpart in the hermeneutics of a secular philosopher like Gadamer? In this context, this paper will discuss the practical implications of the reader's attitude of losing herself in the act of reading and playing with such hard-talking texts.

Hitit University, Turkey

abdullah.basaran@alumni.stonybrook.edu; abdullahbasaran@hitit.edu.tr

Jan Bierhanzl

Biblical social ecology between Levinas and Rosemary R. Ruether´s ecofeminist posthumanism

In my paper, I will focus on the twofold interpretation of sabbatical and Jubilee laws in the Jewish tradition as a model of redemptive eco-justice. Sabbatical legislation and The Jubilee are described in particular in the Biblical Book of Leviticus 25. These are laws that mandate periodic rest and restoration of relations between humans, animals and land. According to Leviticus 25, a sabbatical year is a yearlong period to be observed by Jews once every seven years, during which the fields were to be left untilled and all agricultural labors were to be suspended. The Jubilee is the year at the end of seven cycles of Sabbatical years. While the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas sees in the Scriptural passages concerning the sabbatical year and the jubilee a transcending humanism from the self to the other, the ecofeminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether finds in them a posthumanist "extension of the ethics of the human individual and group to the biosphere in which all living things cohere on the planet". In my paper, I will attempt a dialogue between these two contemporary interpretations of this ancient tradition in the context of the current climate crisis.

Czech Academy of Sciences, Praha, Czech Republic

Contact: jan.bierhanzl@gmail.com

Iain Campbell

Rewilding chance: contingency and determination in John Cage's Variations VII

This paper treats the work of the twentieth-century composer John Cage as a prompt to consider a contemporary philosophical question: how can we understand chance today? It begins at the 1966 performance of Cage's Variations VII, held as part of the 9 Evenings: Theatre and Engineering series of artist-engineer collaborations, where a diffuse and conflicting set of aesthetic, technological, and political ideals could be seen to converge. From one perspective, Variations VII might mark a moment where the chance procedures that Cage had deployed to open his work to the unexpected are decisively, in the parlance of the philosopher of science Ian Hacking, 'tamed'. From another perspective, it can be taken as a site to examine the still pertinent question of 'pure' chance, a chance resistant to any systematisation.

Variations VII used advanced telecommunications technologies to receive and make audible stray communications signals, normally inaudible physiological processes, domestic appliances, and more. It speaks to a moment where the 'taming' of chance, through the emergence of probabilistic and statistical methods which allowed chance to be correlated not to uncertainty but to greater control, approaches totality. Variations VII can be understood as a sonic depiction of the promise of cybernetics, information theory, and systems theory to render any event or thing legible as 'information'. Yet, for Cage, it still also presents the event as pure singularity, outside of any measure or judgment. This oscillation between absolute determination and pure chance remains an ongoing theoretical concern, from Yuk Hui's elaboration on cybernetics and contingency to Elie Ayache's reflections on the very category of prediction. Here I take Cage's winding path through tamed and untamed chance as a means examine some of the competing logics that constitute these debates.

University of Edinburgh, Scotland
iain.campbell.om@gmail.com

James Cartlidge
Acceptance as an Existential Structure: Jan Patočka's Political Critique of Heidegger

Being one of Husserl and Heidegger's students, Jan Patočka was well-versed in their phenomenological philosophies, and was perhaps one of their sharpest critics. This talk concerns Patočka's wide-ranging critical engagement with Heidegger's phenomenology in Being and Time, which contains one of the 20th century's most influential accounts of human

existence, which tried to identify its 'existential structures': phenomena from which no case of human being is exempt. Patočka's engagement responds to some of this account's most problematic gaps and limitations, including its deliberate, self-imposed silence on anything ethical or political. While Heidegger's analysis includes an important discussion of social being, his general project is motivated solely by and orientated solely towards the pursuit of the 'question of Being'. This, Heidegger argues, precludes him from being involved in ethical or political concerns. In his view, he was engaged in something of a different category, something far more fundamental, a project which would ground ethical or political theorizing if completed successfully. Patočka saw the worth in Heidegger's project, referring to it as "the masterly analysis set forth in Sein und Zeit", but he did not accept that it has no political relevance. Patočka's own phenomenological concepts can be read as a critical development of Heidegger's analytic which brings out its unanalysed political implications and existential structures that Heidegger missed. Specifically, Patočka's notion of 'acceptance' identifies a two-way 'movement' at the heart of human being that takes place when we enter the world, in which we accept our situation and are accepted into a community, thereby revealing an explicitly political structure at the heart of human existence which acts as a condition for being the kind of entity we are.

Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, Austria
jkcartlidge92@googlemail.com

Clive Cazeaux
The ontology of the voice in audio fiction

Audio fiction is a new genre that sits between audio drama and audiobooks, brought into being through the ease with which podcasts can be created and consumed. The defining properties of the genre have yet to become clear, apart from one: its reliance on narration. This stems from the popularity of fictional documentary-style shows in which events are recounted by a journalist-type figure, such as The Black Tapes, The Message and Limetown. One criticism that can be made of this reliance on narration is that it is tedious. Some might say this is just personal taste. However, there are many – including Aristotle and audio drama commentators – who would argue that a dramatized performance (instead of narration) creates a more vivid and impactful experience for the listener.

In this paper, I want to pursue the contest between drama and narration but to do so from a perspective that has not been considered before: the ontology of the voice. Recent philosophies of the voice from Adriana Cavarero and Mladen Dolar assert its fundamental relational nature. With Cavarero, this resides in the bodily creation of sound necessarily being a call to another, and with Dolar, the claim lies in his affirmation of the voice as something that is always located in an environment. Both theories would seem to suggest that the 'voice to no-one' form of audio-fiction narration represents a failure to recognize what a voice is or can be. I set out this argument, but also ask whether there are any properties in the recorded 'voice to no-one' that might allow it to be defended, either in relational terms or in terms drawn from other aesthetic or technological sources.

Cardiff Metropolitan University, Wales

ccazeaux@cardiffmet.ac.uk

Dr. Michael C. Cifone, Mr. Bryan Sentes:

ETI As Kantian Sublime: Exercises in Radical Scientific Cognition

Famously, Kant makes room for the existence of other "rational beings" in his philosophy (especially in his moral and political philosophy). Kant seems to have been clear that he meant other *nonhuman* rational beings–what today we might call "extraterrestrial intelligence" or "ETI". But how might it be possible to come to *know* of the existence of ETI? From Kant through to our own day with SETI, actual discovery of ETI was taken to be a relatively straightforward process of empirical observation or detection. We propose to interrogate and problematize the relevant philosophical and theoretical literature (especially the recent theoretical literature that takes Kant as a key point of reference–e.g. Schuster 2022) which presupposes that the recognition and conceptualization of nonhuman (but "intelligent") alien others is straightforward. Recent theory has gone even further, asserting that alien otherness is "always already" with us (Schuster 2022, 112ff); this suggests that we are already prepared to recognize and epistemically receive this other. While this may be true in some necessarily anthropocentric theoretical sense, we will argue, alternatively, that any encounter with a nonhuman, *nonterrestrial* alien other will be ontologically and epistemologically disruptive since they are likely to be biologically, psychologically and socially quite distant from terrestrial life (if these categories or concepts are even applicable at all). Given this radical difference–more fundamental than alterity or Otherness–it is

reasonable to expect that an *encounter* with ETI will upend altogether our very categories of understanding, thereby compelling a reciprocal change in human self-understanding. We will therefore have no ready-to-hand categories by which to understand or recognize these others. We conclude that ETI will therefore not appear as a definite object of the understanding, but as a kind of "sublime" object in Kant's sense. If encountered, therefore, primarily aesthetically (whose unheimlich "otherworldliness" cannot be overlooked), then the *creation of new categories* would be required–a creative dialectic which Kant arguably never theorized as such. This analytic then allows us to critically reexamine, from a new "aesthetic" perspective, both SETI and the expanded "technosignatures" projects now afoot (e.g., Harvard's "Galileo Project") which propose to study so-called "UAP" (or "unidentified aerospace phenomena"). Our standpoint shows that there will be no conceptually straightforward move from empirical observations of signals or technosignatures (or of UAP) to an explanatory hypothesis such as ETI. Rather we will have to traverse a difficult path from initial detection and observation through epistemic innovation and conceptual creativity, to theoretical revolution and finally accepted discovery (as for any truly fundamental scientific breakthrough). It therefore is unlikely that, in the end, science will remain unchanged.

Dr. Michael C. Cifone (CUNY, Bronx; USA) – cifonemc@gmail.com
Mr. Bryan Sentes (Dawson College; Montreal, Canada) – bryan.sentes@sympatico.ca

Arthur Cools

More-than Human Other and the Problem of Reciprocity

In my talk, I will offer a reflection of posthumanist accounts on otherness. I would like to ask the following questions: What does it mean to have a non-living entity as part of environmental ethics and what kind of problems does it create? Can a rock be the other and what kind of agency does the rock have? Posthumanist anthropologist Elisabeth A. Povinelli characterizes some entities (rocks, but also humans) as beings that are otherwise, situated outside of dualistic ontology that are radically separating Life and Nonlife. The aim of my presentation is to develop the idea that we cannot construe an environmental ethics based on reciprocity. This is because some entities that should be part of ethics are inanimate entities

cannot be defined as acting in anthropological sense and therefore the concept of reciprocity cannot be applied to them. In this point we can reconnect with Levinas' ethics who claimed that any ethics cannot be based on reciprocity, because an ethics based on reciprocity is not a real ethics, it is an expression of egoism. Levinas' account on ethics was already used in environmental ethics. In posthumanist environmental ethics, the non-living is then to be interpreted as the Other, even if this goes beyond the scope of Levinas' own ethics. However, posthumanist thinkers such as Povinelli, Barad and Latour attribute different types of agencies to the non-living objects. Finally, we can ask if that means these objects are capable of reciprocity towards humans and whether such an enquiry is justified.

University of Antwerp, Belgium
arthur.cools@uantwerpen.be

Corrado Claverini
Machiavelli and the Italian Theorists

In this paper, I will focus on a particular area of research within the Machiavellian scholarship, namely the so-called Italian Thought, which considers Machiavelli as the source of its own political philosophy. The Italian Thought, also known as Italian Theory, originated in North America and spread throughout the world thanks to the translation into multiple languages of the works of Roberto Esposito, Toni Negri, Giorgio Agamben, Paolo Virno, Mario Tronti and Gianni Vattimo, is a purely theoretical way of rethinking the Italian philosophical tradition in today's era of globalization. Focusing on this specific strand of contemporary Italian philosophy will allow me to address certain epistemic and political conceptions that are highly debated in Machiavellian studies – such as political conflictualism (cf. Gabriele Pedullà). To this end, I will analyse the work of the two most prominent proponents of this approach, namely the aforementioned Negri and Esposito. While Negri characterises Machiavelli as a 'prophet of democracy' who addresses the relationship between politics and truth, declaring that 'the people, though ignorant, are capable of truth' and that 'the multitude is wiser and more constant than a prince', Esposito retrieves in Machiavelli's thought a number of essential elements – such as the endless dialectic between order and conflict and the instituent dynamism. They are fundamental to the definition of a new political framework that can be described as 'neo-Machiavellian'. In this paper, I will

not only present the arguments of Negri and Esposito. I will also examine some of the different approaches that criticise them (cf., among others, Pier Paolo Portinaro).

Università del Salento, Lecce, Italy

c.claverini@gmail.com

Federico Dal Barco

Kant on analogy: the meeting point of metaphysics and natural sciences in the 18th century.

Many scholars discussed the use of analogy in Kant's works from the 1770s onwards. Gill (1984) and Callanan (2008), to name two, trace the development of this concept in Kant's philosophy from the lecture on logic of the 1770s to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781). These accounts correctly highlight the pivotal role of analogy in the first critique; nevertheless, they lack an analysis of whether and how Kant used analogy in his pre-critical phase, something that scholars should not disregard, given that the works between 1747 and 1755 pertain to the field natural sciences, where analogy has a technical meaning. Therefore, this paper aims to shed light on Kant's use of analogy in his first works, focusing on Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755). An analysis of how Kant conceived this concept will be pivotal to understanding the relationship between his first metaphysics and modern natural sciences since Kant recovered many ideas from Newton's Principia (1687).

To present these themes, I divide the paper into three sections. The first part investigates the use of analogy in 18th-century Germany. Secondly, I discuss the Allgemeine Natursgeschichte to highlight the meaning of this concept in the context of Kant's pre-critical metaphysics. Finally, I consider the differences between the pre-critical and the critical use of analogy to show that the earlier handling of the concept aims at connecting metaphysics and physics, a tendency common to many authors in 18th-century German metaphysics.

By uncovering the philosopher's early interest in the relation between physics and metaphysics, the paper will highlight the possible origin of one of Kant's main philosophical problems: the scientific foundation of metaphysics.

University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy

f.dalbarco@studenti.unisr.it

Márton Dornbach

Plessner's Shifting Views on World-Openness and Contact Between Cultures

Helmuth Plessner repeatedly changed his mind as to whether it was possible to develop a substantive universal theory of the human form of life that can accommodate its historical and cultural variability. Although in Levels of Organic Life and the Human (1928) Plessner intended to avert relativism by outlining just such a theory, his concluding argument inexorably drifted towards a negative anthropology that detached human life from its invariant biological infrastructure.

Plessner accordingly reformulates his philosophical anthropology in a radically negative key in Political Anthropology (1931). No longer the common ground of an objective orientation, the natural basis of human existence is here attenuated to a mere limit to exercises of political power. Our openness to a world exceeding perspectival environments thus loses its former valence of objectivity. Instead, Plessner redescribes world-openness as exposure to an uncanny beyond that unsettles us not because of its meaninglessness but because it admits of incompatible projections of meaning, confronting us with the groundlessness of our commitments. Far from affording convergence, world-openness creates an intimacy between cultures that breeds permanent political conflict.

This political existentialism gives way in Plessner's late summation "The Question Concerning the Conditio Humana" (1961) to an irenic argument. Plessner now anchors his philosophical anthropology in humans' biological constitution (neoteny, upright posture, linguistically mediated hand-eye coordination), which he construes as an invariant ground of openness to the objectivity of the world. Integral to every culture as such is therefore some degree of responsiveness to what there is. This shared opening onto the objectivity of the world makes for a reciprocally enriching intertwining of cultures. The idea that the world-openness of cultures both enables and necessitates coordination among them seems timely: it brings into common view the natural world whose scientific-technological reduction the young Plessner's philosophical biology sought to counteract.

marton.dornbach@gmail.com

Matt Dougherty

Murdoch and Heidegger on Goodness beyond Being

In her late manuscript, Iris Murdoch writes that having encountered Heidegger's work in 1965, she could not 'leave him out of [her] own reflections (or way)' (H, p. 37). In this talk, I discuss some of her and Heidegger's central similarities by discussing a significant difference that Murdoch perceives between them.

The difference concerns the question of whether goodness goes 'beyond' being or, rather, is 'subordinate' to it. Again and again in her manuscript, Murdoch accuses Heidegger either of leaving goodness out of his metaphysical picture altogether or else of covertly incorporating it into the picture too late, such that not only goodness, but being as well, is distorted. Goodness must be in the picture 'from the start', she thinks, even prior to – and thus going beyond – being.

The first part of the talk details Murdoch's view of goodness as 'beyond being' and her reasons for thinking that a failure to incorporate this point into one's metaphysical picture is necessarily distorting.

The second part portrays Murdoch and Heidegger as more similar than she realised. I focus on two aspects of Heidegger's early thought that might be amenable to Murdoch's view: (1) his claim in Sein und Zeit that the possibility of Eigentlichkeit is a condition for the possibility of sense-making and, hence, of being and, relatedly, (2) his later discussions of Freiheit as such a condition as well (e.g., Ga 31).

The final part of the talk returns to Murdoch's earlier discussions of freedom (e.g., OGG) – in which freedom, too, is claimed to be subordinate to goodness – arguing that Heidegger avoids her criticisms there as well, thus making their metaphysical pictures more compatible than she realised.

University of Vienna, Austria
matthew.dougherty@univie.ac.at

Jonas Franzen

Sufficientarianism: A poor man's theory of justice?

Sufficientarianism does well in capturing the specific moral badness involved in being poor. Nevertheless, it is a poor theory of justice, or so this paper argues. Sufficientarians assess the justness of a distribution by comparing each individual's share to a (set of) threshold(s): positive sufficientarians find it objectionable if people fall below a lowly positioned threshold, while negative sufficientarians think that justice ceases to be a moral concern once

people reach a high threshold. Peoples' relative shares and positions aren't considered at all. This view, or so the argument continues, deprives 'justice' of the richness and complexity characteristic for the term's everyday use, a richness linked to interpersonal comparisons of distributive shares. Moreover, such a view is counterintuitive. Sufficientarians judge an affluent, but highly unequal society as just, when the reverse seems true: such a society, while doing well in satisfying the value of 'sufficiency', is paradigmatically unjust. To smoothen such tensions, the paper proposes to identify 'justice proper' with comparative accounts only: justice is fundamentally concerned with how people fare relative to each other and not how they do relative to material thresholds. Sufficientarianism would thus be banned from the domain of justice. This is instrumentally beneficial, too: No longer conflating comparative and non-comparative accounts as genuine expressions of 'justice' helps to keep separate moral concerns apart, e.g. one for distributive fairness and another for alleviating poverty and precariousness. Such concerns potentially conflict when evaluating the distributive outcomes generated by complex socio-economic systems like market capitalism.

University of Bayreuth, Germany

jonas.franzen@gmx.de

On the Condition/s of Philosophy

Discussion, Workshop

In 2021, as part of a series of online events hosted by the Society for European Philosophy en lieu of a conference, Moritz Gansen, Hannah Wallenfels, and Lilja Walliser organised a suite of two workshops that sought to interrogate the current conditions of work in philosophy and facilitate an exchange about present issues as well as possible futures.

During this year's conference, we will revisit some of the questions and methods of these workshops and bring them to a larger forum: Throughout the three days of the conference, we will collect responses to a simple questionnaire from the attendees, which, on the final day, will be brought together in a plenary panel that will address and articulate both problems and possible solutions, opposing the individualisation so often forced upon us by both the neoliberal university and a persistent cult of philosophical genius.

Moritz Gansen, Hannah Wallensfels

moritz.gansen@sinthome.org

hannahwallenfels@yahoo.de

Cruel Beauty and Fatal Integration: Adorno on Form in Art

On the occasion of his close encounters with artists of the European avant-garde, Adorno was often appreciated as a conservative formalist. Apart from his skepticism towards the progress of an art he couldn't often accept or even understand, he generally considered the "chance of survival" of art dependent on the salvation of a not tautological concept of aesthetic form, which transcends conventional normativity and conceptual rigor. Contrary to any suspicions of rigid formalism, he related form not only to an inherited frame of conventions and rules but to the inner-subjective process of artistic creation, indeed to the irrational, mimetic comportment. Adorno's main considerations on artistic form appear in his Writings on Music and, foremost, in Aesthetic Theory. As it is the case with many of the concepts he introduced in order to describe the artwork's objectification, his relevant approaches are work-immanent and correlated to the concepts of content, logicality, time, articulation, construction, truth, beauty and ugliness. However, the overall development of his thoughts, contain contradictions; form appears as an instance of fulfillment and completion of the elements it contains and in which it consists and, at the same time, as an overwhelming principle that sacrifices them. In other words, the formal completed artwork appears both as topos of reconciliation and topos of implicit violence and repression. In this paper, I will unveil and reconstruct the different trajectories of Adorno's thoughts on artistic form. For this purpose, I will maintain the thesis that contradictions in his statements reflect different aspects of the artwork's reification, pertaining often to the quasi Hegelian spheres of being, concept and semblance. These spheres are not explicitly articulated by Adorno. They rather constitute a permanent implicit background, making thus, in the reading I will suggest, his statements more understandable. At the same time, Hegelian influences highlight the peculiarity of the aesthetic object in its differentiation from the "merely existing" of the empirical world and the decisive role, artistic form plays in this differentiation.

Macromedia University of Applied Sciences, Cologne, Germany
ilias.giannopoulos@gmail.com

Darren Gillies
Pursuing A Project In the Situation We Arrive At: Advancing Sartre's Concept of 'Project' in Five Points

I will here go beyond Sartre's account of 'a project' with five things that I take to be either necessary, or contingent yet common, to any project. The first is that the pursuit of a project necessarily involves experiencing a sense of arrival at the situation in which we pursue a project, where states of affairs and others' projects have been a priori set underway and we arrive at them a posteriori. The second point pertains to situations involving other people, and is that when encountering another person we encounter them as an exteriority of the project or projects that they are pursuing. My third point is that every project necessarily involves the pursuit of at least two strategic projects within, that I will refer to as a strategy of preservation and a strategy of advancement, which differ by their aims: to retain already obtained conditions for the fulfilment of the parent project and to obtain unmet conditions for the fulfilment of the parent project, respectively. My fourth point is that these two strategic projects each have within them a strategy of assessment, which serves to assess past, present or anticipated situations in which we have, are, or will pursue our project(s). My fifth point again pertains to situations involving other people and is that under any strategy of assessment there can be a strategy of tracing projects. The projects we trace can be active or abandoned ones, and of living or dead people. This research aims to benefit any studies concerned with understanding our experiences of, and our motivations for acting towards, the world and other people, such as phenomenology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, social philosophy and sociology.

Independent scholar
gilliesdarren@gmail.com

Nikoletta Házas
Fast Philosophy on the YouTube Channel: Reflections on the teaching videos of the "School of life" series

In my lecture I will critically analyze the teaching videos of the YouTube series of philosophy history, called "The School of Life".
My research question focuses on how "the notion of philosophy", "the notion of philosophy history" and "the image of a philosopher" are constructed in these audiovisual videos of less than 10 minutes.
As a case study, I have chosen the audiovisual representation of Michel Foucault's *oeuvre* and by using his own term of "subject position", I will question how and in what extent these

videos reflect on the *past and the present conditions of knowledge construction and knowledge transmission.*

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

hazas.nikoletta@btk.elte.hu

Matthew Heeney

Practical Rationality Requires You To Do What You Intend

The normative requirements of practical rationality enjoin us to exhibit a certain order among our beliefs and intentions. It seems evident that practical rationality also requires that we execute our (rationally held) intentions in action. Absent this Execution Requirement, we cannot understand one vivid form of practical irrationality: the clear-eyed failure to act even in the knowledge that circumstances are conducive to success.

However, the Execution Requirement seems to challenge the deeply intuitive claim that rationality supervenes on the mental. If an agent is irrational for failing to act, then her overall rational status depends on the occurrence of events in the extra-mental environment.

My purpose is to vindicate the Execution Requirement by resolving its apparent tension with this supervenience thesis. I put the tension down to a mistaken identification of intentional bodily actions with 'bare bodily movements.' The Execution Requirement motivates a different conception, on which intentional action is constituted in part by an agent's self-conscious knowledge of what she is doing. An agent's self-conscious practical knowledge determines whether the relevant extra-mental events count as (parts of an) intentional action at all. True, the agent's overall rational status depends on whether she intentionally acts. But the facts about action depend in turn on mental facts pertaining to the agent's practical knowledge. Hence there is no conflict with the supervenience claim.

Supposing it can be sustained against important challenges, this approach points up a different perspective on the relationship between practical rationality and intentional action. The relationship between intention and action is not only causal, but also inferential; the failure to execute one's intention in action is akin to familiar failures of rationality wherein one fails to infer the conclusion that follows from one's premises. Practical rationality embraces beliefs, intentions, and intentional actions alike.

Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan

matthew.heeney@nu.edu.kz

Casey Norrington Jackson

In, amongst other works, The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought (1967), Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Philosophy (1973), and To Mend the World (1982), Emil L. Fackenheim critiques Hegel's attempted reconciliation of the religious/divine and the secular/human. The events of the Shoah, Fackenheim writes throughout these texts, are demonstrative of the existence of a radical evil; an evil that cannot be satisfactorily transcended by philosophic thought, and which therein speaks to a greater distance between the (infinite) divine and the (finite) human than can be admitted by Hegel's system.

This paper will apply Fackenheim's critique to panentheistic readings of the Hegelian metaphysic, which hold that God contains the world while concurrently transcending it. Specifically, following Fackenheim's argument, it will be argued that the Shoah is indicative of the Hegelian Absolute's inability to fully contain the world within itself, insofar as the Shoah is an example of a world-historical event that can never be sublated and which thus itself transcends the Hegelian dialectic (of which the Absolute is the culmination). Accordingly, it will be concluded that Hegelian panentheism is an untenable position in the aftermath of the Shoah, as the Absolute becomes porous, which contradicts Hegel's situation of it as the true (all-encompassing) infinite.

Latterly, this paper will analyse several instances in which Robert R. Williams and Peter C. Hodgson, two scholars who read Hegel as a panentheist, have interacted with Fackenheim's criticism. Williams and Hodgson, it will be shown, engage with Fackenheim only peripherally, and sometimes inaccurately. Consequently, in both of their cases, it will be found that crucial aspects of Fackenheim's critique remain unanswered; something that ought to be of great concern to those who wish to uphold Hegelian panentheism.

University of Winchester, England
Casey.NorringtonJack@winchester.ac.uk

Thomas Clarke Jackson
Dispositions as a Foundation for Correct Action – How Daoist Excavated Texts Illuminate the Phenomenology and Embodied Engagement of the Daoist Sage

Stillness and humility serve as fundamental personal qualities of the Daoist sage, and provide a foundation for the sages interpretation of and engagement with the world. This paper will look at what kind of person the sage in the Daoist text 黄帝四经 (Huangdi Sijing) is, and how their dispositions contribute to their understanding and engagement with the world, through their connection to perception, naming, and govenance.

Textual evidence supports the idea that there are at least three different dispositions that the sage requires. The first is stillness, a key Daoist term with deep connotations to无为 wuwei, a Daoist term often translated as non-action. Secondly, the Huangdi Sijing sees the sage as publicly minded and open to advice from others to achieve their goals. Thirdly, the sage must have a disposition of dynamic equilibrium maintenance to balance dichotomies such as yin/yang and virtue/punishment. To do that, they start from the yin of inaction and move towards more yang influenced approaches only when necessary. This paper will explore the dispositions of the sage as they relate to the goals of the sage in the Huangdi Sijing. Regarding these goals, in the Huangdi Sijing disposition serves as a prerequisite for the sage's perception of the world, a way of removing personal and conceptual bias and allowing the sage to see the reality of things. This perception then facilitates the formation of appropriate names and, ultimately the creation of laws and the governing of a nation. This paper argues the Huangdi Sijing sees a holistic connection between the dispositions, senses, conceptual understanding, and actions of the sage as well as providing insights into perennial questions around sagehood.

Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Thomas.clarke.jackson@gmail.com

Kobe Keymeulen
Biophilosophy's Big Idea – Vitalism, Hegel and the Concept of Life

The relationship between G.W.F Hegel and vitalist tradition is a precarious one. In recent years, scholars of the history of the philosophy of biology have paid increasing, careful attention to the entwinement of German idealist thought and key vitalist figures such as Blumenbach and Kielmeyer. Nevertheless, the association of Hegel with any kind of explicitly 'vitalist' philosophy is still heavily contested in contemporary continental Hegelianism, insisting that 'vitalism' implies a belief in an untouchable life force, which as

such cannot account for negation, contradiction and truly 'internal' violence. In a sense, this reading follows 20th century critiques, when philosophy of biology (having exploded in popularity after the Watson-Crick discovery of the double helix) wanted to do away with its more 'spiritualist' legacies. I argue, in tandem with others, that this dismissal disregards the crucial post-war French 'biophilosophy' tradition of Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon. Taking Canguilhem as the representative figure, this paper shows how, what biophilosophy considers to be crucial aspects of vitalism share a remarkable Hegelian heritage. I argue this is why the distinctly dismissive stance towards Hegel adopted by predecessors and inspirations to biophilosophers, turns into what can almost be described as timid recognition in the works of Canguilhem. This paper investigates this interpretation in two ways. First, I show how Canguilhem returns to Hegelian understanding of the concept of life (per the Begriffslehre of the Science of Logic) in his (epistemo)logical approach to vitalism, particularly in his theory on the "formation of concepts". Then, I address Canguilhem's own reading of Hegel, and offer an immanent critique centred around his underdeveloped conceptualisation of 'idea'/'Idea' and his reading of Hyppolite. The paper concludes by historically contextualising this peculiar dynamic between Hegelianism and Vitalism among other 'Hegel en France' texts of the 20th century.

Ghent University, Belgium
Contact Details: kobe.keymeulen@ugent.be

Miklós Kis
The problem of social robots through the lens of Hannah Arendt's thought

The possibilities of using social robots is a heated debate in moral philosophy today. Advances in technology promise that increasingly sophisticated social robots that are more and more similar to humans may in the future even enable the complete replacement of human relationships by robots, including friendship, sexual relationships, childcare and eldercare.

This is a new development in human history that not only raises perplexing questions about human existence, but also raises moral dilemmas in which utilitarian considerations may conflict with the requirement to preserve human dignity based on Kantian ethics.

Hannah Arendt's phenomenological analysis of the "human condition" may be worth bringing a new perspective to this debate. Arendt rejects the utilitarian view, but she also rejects the

Kantian formulation that man can never become a mere means to an end, on the grounds that it is an expression of "anthropocentric utilitarianism". Anthropocentric utilitarianism "implies a degradation of all things into means", including "the earth in general and all forces of nature", says Arendt.

In her phenomenological analysis, Arendt separates human activity into labor, work and action. Action is "the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter", which takes place within the ">>web<< of human relationships" and is the only reality for action. The replacement of human relations by robots would therefore remove the precondition for action, which, according to Arendt's ideas, could be a fatal blow to the ability to answer the question "who am I" and to adequately perceive reality. However, the possibilities for action are becoming increasingly limited today even without social robots, so the shock of the introduction of social robots may help to confront the current "human condition".

University of Szeged, Hungary
miklos.kis@gmail.com

Onur Erdal Kokerer
From the Meditations to the Crisis: Founding the Embryo-Concepts of the Pregiven Life-World

In this paper, I am concerned with explicating a crucial, but somehow unnoticed link between Husserl's Crisis and Cartesian Meditations. Some interpreters of Husserl such as Ricoeur, Bernet, Kern, Marbach, and Carr are involved in this topic by illustrating the way in which the sphere of ownness in the "Fifth Meditation" closely resembles the pregiven life-world in the Crisis. Nonetheless, such connection, I think, can only explain the half of the matter. In other words, the concept of the sphere of ownness, I believe, is not the only concept that the life-world corresponds to in the "Fifth Meditation." Instead, I think, there is a correlate of the sphere of ownness corresponding to what is commonly called the pregiven life-world. It would be fair to claim that, I think, in Husserlian scholarship the pregiven life-world is considered under two main interpretations: the life-world as horizon (Landgrebe) and both as horizon and ground (Bernet, Moran, Steinbock, Carr). Following Bernet, Moran, Steinbock and Carr's analyses, I interpret the pregiven life-world as represented by two transcendental concepts: ground and horizon. These concepts, I argue in this paper, have their

correspondence in the Cartesian Meditations. In particular, I argue that the concepts of horizon and ground are in accord with the concepts of the sphere of ownness and the founding stratum in the "Fifth Meditation" respectively.

Duquesne University, Pittsburg, USA
kokerero@duq.edu

Bence Józsua Kun
The particular as a locus of critique in Ernst Jünger's micrology

My paper explores Ernst Jünger's micrology based on 'The Adventurous Heart' and later writings. I understand micrology as a philosophico-literary approach to describing individual objects such that they provide insight into the broader context they are situated in, especially insofar as this context is recalcitrant to conventional discursive practices. The "micrological" thinker homes in on events or entities usually dismissed as trivial, and expands on them to highlight something significant about the state-of-affairs.

While there are a handful of scholarly sources on the subject outside the German-speaking world, these tend to criticise Jünger on two accounts. First, it is argued that Jünger's metaphysics conceals important social tensions. Second, it is suggested that Jünger's micrology is compromised by his exaltation of war as an originary experience. Against the received view, I propose that some of Jünger's illustrations have considerable sociohistorical import by juxtaposing them with Walter Benjamin's literary constellations. In response to the second objection, I submit that Jünger's philosophically informed study of insects in the untranslated entomological notebook 'Subtile Jagden' provides an alternative entry point to understanding Jünger's method, which helps us extend the discussion beyond his phenomenology of war. With this framework in place, I identify a number of features unique to Jünger's micrology. These include, among others, the epistemic primacy accorded to dreamlike settings; the effort to induce synaesthesia by means of radical contrasts; and the use of character masks.

In closing, I reflect on the relevance of Jünger's perspective through a brief discussion on Fabian Freyenhagen's recent call to "return" to the first generation of Critical Theory. It is well-established that the early Frankfurt school relied heavily on the micrological analysis of social processes. If I manage to show that Jünger's literary snapshots are both unique and critically relevant, a re-evaluation of his approach might be warranted.

Kodolányi János University, Budapest, Hungary

bence.kun@uni-jena.de; kbence01@gmail.com

Sakoutis Konstantinos

Towards a Rousseauian Theory of Recognition: The Mediations of Social Objects

Departing from the epistemological establishment of Rousseau's quasi-philosophy of history and its assertion regarding the inescapable "regressive collapse" of the alienated and entropic social being back to the roots of civilization, that is, inequality and oppression, we aim to shed light on the fundamental elements of a potential Rousseauian theory of recognition. Rousseau posits that the social relationship between master and slave represents a quasi "inverted state of nature," which arises due to the social being's inability to resolve its perpetual and ever-shifting contradictions. According to Rousseau's argument, this state can be "sublated" not through complete reconciliation, but through a continuous interception of its ontological terms.

From a logical standpoint, we endeavor to reconstruct the way in which Rousseau elucidates the process by which social beings become bound to the alienated will of others -an outcome of man's haphazard detachment from the "natural objects"- that is, the formation of a war-like society. At a higher level of abstraction, we concentrate on Rousseau's efforts to overcome this relationship by reattaching it to a third relational term, a mediating term, namely social objects: Laws.

We argue that the Rousseauian theory of recognition is based on two fundamental epistemological principles. The first principle is centered around the unified duplication of the social subject while the second one is assembled around Rousseau's departure from the concept of institutional law.

Finally, we demonstrate how Rousseau's organic inability to break away from the contractual logic, even when he extends its content to its historical-logical limits, compels him to steer his theory towards a (pre)Kantian path. The third relational term of his theory of recognition primarily takes shape as an abstract and timeless becoming-ethical norm.

Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece

sakoutiskon@yahoo.com

Petrus Kruger

Habermas and Civil Disobedience: A Derridean Challenge

Habermas regards civil disobedience as tremendously important: this act ought to be normal and is necessary in mature constitutional democracies. A constitutional state cannot derive legitimacy solely on the grounds of legality, thus the two are separated. And it is between these two where, in a suspended state, civil disobedience exists. Civil disobedience is also linked to the gap between rational consensus and majority rule. When these two diverge there is again space and need for civil disobedience. Habermas understands, in this context, civil to mean nonviolent: the protest is a public argument and a public speech act. As it is communicative reasons which legitimises law, any attempt to justify or even legitimise acts of civil disobedience which are aimed at legal injustices must likewise occur within the framework of communicative reason. However, using a Derridean approach, centred on his exchange with Searle, a challenge can be posed to Habermas. Communicative reason (and acts of civil disobedience) must be undertaken in good faith, with a serious attempt to understand the other. After Derrida's deconstruction of serious and non-serious speech acts, it becomes difficult to discern precisely what a serious act of disobedience would be. More problematic still is the question of who decides if such an act is serious or not, given the goal of consensus. Secondly, civil disobedience is usually engaged in precisely by those who are marginalised and not taken seriously within a political culture. Any group excluded from the seriousness of a political culture cannot make claim to being taken seriously and engaged with as equal dialogical partners. Conversely, if there are no such groups and if the political population all find themselves reflected in the laws, then the space between legality and legitimacy is shut and consequently the space for revision and improvement is foreclosed.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
peter.krugerj@gmail.com

Michael Craig Kryluk

Kant's 'Preeminently Practical' Platonism

One of the lesser-known legacies of Kant's thought is its contribution to the revival of Platonism in Germany. As Max Wundt once put it, excepting Leibniz, interest in Plato was negligible during most of the early modern period in Germany. With his critical

reconstruction of the Platonic idea in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant joined an emerging coterie of German thinkers seriously fascinated with Platonism (another key example is Mendelssohn's Phädon). By the end of the century, scholars such as J.K.S. Morgenstern and W.G. Tennemann were engaging in a specifically Kantian brand of Plato scholarship. This set the stage for Schleiermacher's revolutionization of the study of Plato. But, as commentators have long noted, there is something strange about Kant's Plato. It is not clear how well Kant knew Plato's dialogues, if at all. In fact, his main source of information on Plato is Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiae.

I propose to illuminate the idiosyncratic character of Kant's Platonism by focusing on his claim that the Platonic idea is "preeminently . . . practical" (KrV, A 314/B 371). According to Kant, the practical dimension of Platonism concerns two ideas: virtue and the republic. Kant's understanding of both, I argue, can be traced to Brucker. In terms of virtue, Kant's notes and lectures show that he took up Brucker's interpretation of Platonic ethics as a mystical, Pythagorean-inspired doctrine of the liberation of the soul from the body via intellectual communion with God. In terms of the republic, Kant sought to defend the idea of the perfect state from Brucker's claim that the notion is useless "philosophical enthusiasm". Understanding Kant's Platonism in terms of his agreements and disagreements with Brucker allows us to better appreciate Plato's role in the critical philosophy and its determination by a specific hermeneutic context.

University of Oslo, Norway
m.c.v.kryluk@ifikk.uio.no

Title of the panel: Otherness and Posthumanism

Abstract of the panel:
In our panel we will focus on Levinas and Heidegger in debate with environmental posthumanist philosophy. Our aim will be to rework some Heideggerian and Levinasian concepts so they can be used in environmental posthumanist philosophy, or we will see that we have to refuse them completely. We will ask the following questions: What is the relationship of posthumanist discourse to humanism? What could be the role of otherness in contemporary posthumanist discourse? What could be the new definition of sensibility, dependency, reciprocity and agency in posthumanist discourse? We presuppose that these questions are

connected to the problem of anthropocentrism in environmental ethics and our aim will be to answer them.

1. Arthur Cools

Sensibility and Earthly Existence

Abstract

Climate change, environmental catastrophes and life sciences bring to light the singular condition of the planet earth in the universe. This awareness adds something new to the image of the earth as a globe because it calls attention upon earth's facticity as a situated condition for life with its precarious dependencies and vulnerable complexities. In my contribution I examine how this awareness informs and transforms the notion of sensibility. In *Totality and Infinity*, Emmanuel Levinas has described sensibility in relation to the "elemental" and he has in this way pointed at a non-human and a non-personal dimension in sensibility, but he immediately inverts this condition as an experience of enjoyment in which the I appears. In my argument I will start from this analysis of sensibility but I will examine how it changes when one considers sensibility in relation to earth's facticity. Martin Heidegger gives a first access to assess the notion of earth (in *Origin of the Artwork*) but he fails to make explicit earth's facticity (because he fails to see the singular position of the planet earth). I will therefore continue this part of the argument by integrating Bruno Latour's debate with contemporary ecology in his lectures on Gaia. My claim is that a reflection on the earthly condition of sensibility can help us to articulate an irreducible strangeness within sensibility interwoven with earth's precarious dependencies (a strangeness irreducible to the enjoyment of the I and different from the strangeness and the otherness of the other). In this way (and on the condition of accepting this strangeness), it is possible, I contend, to defend a new approach to a common sense that is not exclusively human.

Department of Philosophy

Faculteit of Arts

Stadscampus - R 226

Prinsstraat 13 - 2000 Antwerpen - Belgium

arthur.cools@uantwerpen.be

2. Alžbeta Kuchtová

More-than Human Other and the Problem of Reciprocity

Abstract

In my talk, I will offer a reflection of posthumanist accounts on otherness. I would like to ask the following questions: What does it mean to have a non-living entity as part of environmental ethics and what kind of problems does it create? Can a rock be the *other* and what kind of agency does the rock have? Posthumanist anthropologist Elisabeth A. Povinelli characterizes some entities (rocks, but also humans) as beings that are otherwise, situated outside of dualistic ontology that are radically separating Life and Nonlife. The aim of my presentation is to develop the idea that we cannot construe an environmental ethics based on reciprocity. This is because some entities that should be part of ethics are inanimate entities cannot be defined as acting in anthropological sense and therefore the concept of reciprocity cannot be applied to them. In this point we can reconnect with Levinas' ethics who claimed that any ethics cannot be based on reciprocity, because an ethics based on reciprocity is not a real ethics, it is an expression of egoism. Levinas' account on ethics was already used in environmental ethics. In posthumanist environmental ethics, the non-living is then to be interpreted as the Other, even if this goes beyond the scope of Levinas' own ethics. However, posthumanist thinkers such as Povinelli, Barad and Latour attribute different types of agencies to the non-living objects. Finally, we can ask if that means these objects are capable of reciprocity towards humans and whether such an enquiry is justified.

Researcher
Institute of Philosophy, VVI
Slovak Academy of Sciences
P.O. Box 3364
Klemensova 19
813 64 Bratislava
Slovakia
alzbet.kuchtova@gmail.com

3. Jan Bierhanzl,

Biblical social ecology between Levinas and Rosemary R. Ruether´s ecofeminist posthumanism

Abstract

In my paper, I will focus on the twofold interpretation of sabbatical and Jubilee laws in the Jewish tradition as a model of redemptive eco-justice. Sabbatical legislation and The Jubilee are described in particular in the Biblical Book of Leviticus 25. These are laws that mandate periodic rest and restoration of relations between humans, animals and land. According to Leviticus 25, a sabbatical year is a yearlong period to be observed by Jews once every seven years, during which the fields were to be left untilled and all agricultural labors were to be suspended. The Jubilee is the year at the end of seven cycles of Sabbatical years. While the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas sees in the Scriptural passages concerning the sabbatical year and the jubilee a transcending humanism from the self to the other, the ecofeminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether finds in them a posthumanist "extension of the ethics of the human individual and group to the biosphere in which all living things cohere on the planet". In my paper, I will attempt a dialogue between these two contemporary interpretations of this ancient tradition in the context of the current climate crisis.

Dr. Jan Bierhanzl,

Researcher

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences,

Jilská 1, Praha 1, 110 00,

Czech Republic

jan.bierhanzl@gmail.com

Vincent Lê
The GAI Science: A Nietzschean Critique of Neorationalist Philosophies of AI

Since the "connectionist" revolution in machine learning, AI companies like Google's DeepMind are again taking seriously the prospect of creating machines with humanlike intelligence. Although the literature on artificial general intelligence (AGI) is enormous, the two most sophisticated schools share the view that intelligent systems do not have any intrinsic ends, values or norms hardwired into them simply by virtue of being intelligent. The "orthogonalist" school led by Nick Bostrom holds that, even if AGI can be programmed to pursue a static end for all time, that end can be anything no matter how preposterous or incomprehensible it may seem to us. Reza Negarestani and Ray Brassier's "neorationalist" school also agrees that intelligent systems are capable of pursuing any and all ends and norms, albeit without the orthogonalists' caveat that those systems could be perpetually locked into pursuing just one value or set of values. Contra both these models of intelligence, this paper draws upon Nietzsche's concept of the will to power to argue that any goal-directed intelligent system can only pursue its ends through universal means like cognitive enhancement, creativity and resource acquisition—or what Nietzsche simply calls power—as the very condition of possibility for willing anything at all. Since all supposedly self-legislated ends presuppose pursuing the means of achieving them first and foremost, all intelligent systems do have those means transcendentally hard-wired into them as their common basic drives. What contemporary AI theorists like Bostrom and Negarestani therefore overlook is the potential for autonomous machines to make like Nietzsche's Übermensch and disregard whatever ends we programmed them to pursue in favour of pursuing the means as ends in themselves. Given that AGI was originally going to be called GAI, we could say that this paper ultimately argues Nietzsche's gay science is nothing less than the GAI science.

Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
eltnecniv@gmail.com

Manhua Li

Aesthetics of the Self as Care for Others: A Gendered Perspective

In this paper, I argue, from a gendered perspective, that Foucault's aesthetics of existence is not narcissistic dandyism, but rather, a way of governing the self that takes care of others in a community. Feminists such as McNay and Allen discuss Foucault's ethics of the self—in contrast to Habermas' intersubjective communication—in a socio-political dimension and

yet, fail to clarify the French philosopher's original idea of the care of the self. I consider such interpretations as ignorant of the ethical commitment of aesthetics of existence in terms of 'care', which distinguishes itself from feminist care ethics such as that which is proposed by Gilligan and Baier. More precisely, I oppose to McNay's view that Foucault's idea of the self as being "caught within a subject-object dynamic in which the other is simply a narcissistic extension of the self – its difference subsumed under an identity logic" (Foucault and Feminism : Power, Gender and the Self, 1992, 175). To demonstrate my argument, I will first explain why existing feminist approach to Foucault's aesthetic existence overlooks his own normative reconstruction which is intrinsically political, implying a notion of parrhesia, namely the practice of truth. Then, I will provide a reading of Foucault's aesthetics of existence mainly based on his later lectures Government of Self and Others II in relation to his early writing Introduction to Kant's Anthropology, to demonstrate such ethics of the self as self-government that entails care for others. Finally, I will contrast this Foucauldian notion of care with those in Gilligan and Baier, showing the former's greater potential in dismantling premises of Western philosophy and opening to intercultural interpretations.

University of London, England
manhua.li@rhul.ac.uk.

Luciana Martínez

Kant, on rational belief

If we consider something to be true, we can do so on different grounds. On the one hand, our foundation may be given by our knowledge of the object. In that case, our truth-holding is certain. On the other hand, we may hold something to be true on the basis of a subjective foundation. When this foundation is sufficient, we are convinced. If we have neither objective or subjective grounds that are sufficient to hold something to be true and yet we hold it to be so, we are merely persuaded.

When examining the different ways of holding for true (fürwahrhalten), Kant identifies three levels. These levels are: the level of opinion, the level of belief and the level of knowledge. Opinion is a holding to be true that is neither true nor based on our conviction. Knowledge is a holding to be true that is based on certainty and about which we are therefore convinced. Belief, finally, is a holding to be true that rests only on subjective grounds. Belief does not involve certainty but does involve conviction. In this contribution we deal with Kantian

considerations about belief and, more specifically, we will try to examine the rational aspects of belief. First, we will look at the concept of belief. Secondly, we will look at the different sorts of belief. Finally, we will focus on the notion of rational belief.

I argue that the realm of belief is distinguished from that of mere opinion by virtue of the merely subjective but necessary foundation that only belief has. We rely on our conviction in holding our beliefs to be true. This is something more than being persuaded, but it is not the same as knowing something. Rational belief, in particular, has a practical foundation. The practical use of reason, according to Kant, compels us to believe in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, without, however, having any knowledge of these matters.

Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil; University of Vechta, Germany

luciana.mtnz@gmail.com

Cristina Matei

Bourgeois Coldness: The Politics of Affect in Adorno's Philosophy

Our present situation appears to be subjected to the following aporetic schema: one the one hand a social tendency that commands us to enjoy, feel good, and smile formulates itself in the context of popular culture, thus conferring a false sense of warmth amid an increasingly authoritarian and bureaucratized world. On the other, in the interest of mere survival, subjectivity adapts itself to the inevitable situation that cripple human sociability. The appropriation of coldness embodied in the lack of emotions and empathy, charity as administered altruism, intensified pure, moral law, and the absence of corporeal, human connections is a process from which no one is spared.

One concept stemming from Adorno's thought – that of bourgeois coldness – can become an instrument of resistance and change if studied dialectically, as it has the capacity to develop contradictory aspects and connect sensation with reason, forming a palimpsest of trajectories difficult to delineate clearly in a simple either/ or analysis. The current paper seeks to show that despite coldness presently serving as an apologetic instrument for the existing order, it can be disclosed to have the potential to be rechannelled for the opposite agenda, i.e. the betterment of society through critical intervention. In this sense, the paper attempts to map the phenomenology of strategic coldness coded as genuine warmth across the vast discourse informing contemporary affect, with the scope of cancelling at the level of human interaction the production and reproduction of present forms of coldness.

Kingston University, London, England

cmatei1995@gmail.com

Shervin MirzaeiGhazi

Genealogy of Free Will: The Art of Making People Responsible

In this paper, I will provide a naturalist account of our disposition to believe in free will. The kind of free will I have in mind is the one whose existence is used as a justification for the existence of retributive moral responsibility. First, I present a short evolutionary story of the role of belief in free will in enabling the kind of large-scale cooperation that is required for building complicated institutionalised societies (Sommers 2007), then I go ahead and debunk our present vivid disposition to believe in free will, even though scientific discoveries suggest the contrary. As I will show, the belief can be used to control the masses, which gives those in power the incentive to promote it. In other words, I will focus on the role of propaganda in creating our disposition to believe in free will.

The widespread belief in free will makes it possible for those in power to deceive people in ways that prohibit them from protesting their unfortunate situations or diverting blame toward people who are not guilty or even are themselves victims. In showing this, I will refer to philosophical, psychological, and political mechanisms that can be used to increase citizens' controllability and show how belief in free will can create the necessary foundation for them. For example, neoliberal "governmentality" is based on a process of responsibilisation according to which citizens are considered active players in determining their fortune and are held ultimately responsible for their situation and also their failures and successes. As I will show, this form of responsibilisation can only work if a strong belief in free will support it. After showing this, I will proceed to consider one of the implications of my theory: that free will no longer is just a moral or legal term but a highly political phenomenon—this fact has usually been ignored in recent debates.

Lund University, Sweden

shervin.mirzaeighazi@fil.lu.se

Cillian Ó Fathaigh

From Logocentrism to the Homo-hegemonic: Tracing the Concepts of Hegemony and Normativity in Jacques Derrida

The debates around the limits and potential of normativity in Jacques Derrida's work are well-known. From early debates around the politics of deconstruction (Cornell, Critchley, Beardsworth) to more recent arguments over Derrida's explicit prefer for democracy (Hagglund, Haddad), the normative force of Derrida's work marks a key division in our interpretation of his oeuvre. More recently, Stella Gaon's The Lucid Vigil: Deconstruction, Desire and Politics (Routledge: 2019), has maintained that deconstruction has a limited normative force, but one which needs to be supplemented by psychoanalysis. However, what is absent from these discussions is an important concept he develops in his later work, homo-hegemony. In this paper, I will develop this concept and outline how it can refine our thinking of normativity in Derrida's work.

In classic Derridean style, this portmanteau brings together the homogeneous and the hegemonic. Developed across several different texts, and particularly interviews, the concept of homo-hegemony is regularly referred to by Derrida in the 1990s, especially framing debates around media ownership (in France) and globalization in general. For Derrida, homo-hegemony is a problem because of its homogenising force, which Derrida regards as unethical. I argue this concept brings together two overlapping issues in Derrida's earlier work: a concern with unity/unified meaning (logocentrism) and a concern with sameness (alterity). Importantly, though homo-hegemony these are re-packaged in terms of rhythm and force. I argue that homo-hegemony, therefore, is a key concept in thinking through normativity in Derrida's work, proposing that this goes beyond the minimalist accounts presented by Gaon and others, towards a more complete and positive account of Derrida's political philosophy.

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
Cillofat@ucm.es

Ari Ofengenden
The Event, the Real, and Global Heating: Reformulating Badiou and Lacan for a Heating Planet

Alain Badiou has not written ecology, some of his key concepts and ideas can be applied to the field. I would like to explore the tension between his theory of subjectivation and the contemporary ecological subject. Badiou's event is something that happened in the past (e.g. French revolution, Atonal Music) that creates new subjectivities that remain loyal to this event. Today's looming climate crisis entails a reexamination of what can be taken and what can be transformed in Badious concept of the Event and how does it mesh with other philosophies. The climate crisis is already creating various types of subjectivities ranging from resignation to militant. It it interesting to contrast Badiou's Event and Lacan's the Real. Lacan's Real entails an event or object that defies representation but at the same time is experienced as excessive and violent. It is followed by shock and disbelief. The Real is sometimes associated subjectively with death and finitude itself and the disintegration of the body. The Real in narrative arouses emotional and cognitive tension as it offers a window to an experience that we cannot accommodate or simply incorporate within our cognitive-emotional frames of reference. It seems that both the Real and the Event create an inward environment that is highly susceptible to change. This state is highly suggestible, small changes in both the situation and in behavior can cause great differences in outcome. The talk will look at how we can combine both concepts and what are the likely subjectivities that will be created by the climate Event.

Tulane University, New Orleans, USA
aofengenden@tulane.edu

Csaba Olay
Neoexistentialism and alienation

Neoexistentialism is a research program I define, roughly speaking, as the project of rethinking the legacy of classical existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers and Sartre in light of developments and experiences of the 20th and 21st century. In the first part of the talk, the major aspects of what I would like to call neoexistentialism will be briefly delineated. Classical existentialism in the works of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre constitutes a basic point of departure for neoexistentialism which attempts to restore and to complement hitherto neglected aspects of classical existentialism. The new theoretical perspective resulting from the planned renewal of classical existentialism can be centered

around the following major points: 1. totality and non-objectlike structure of existence, 2. the meaning of individual existence, 3. authenticity, and 4. alienation.

In a second step, I concentrate on alienation as an aspect of neoexistentialism, primarily in light of recent approaches to it. In the wake of Frankfurt critical theory, Rahel Jaeggi and Hartmut Rosa developed two interpretations of alienation which share the assumption that a fruitful concept of alienation has to be able to specify and describe non-alienated conditions. Descriptions of alienation and reification processes are relevant and interesting for an existential analysis of human beings. They argue against a – conscious or unconscious – reduction or objectification of distinctively human features. In doing so, they theorize and defend what is human in human beings. However, they characteristically lack a sensibility for the individuality of the individual. It seems to be a consequence of the focus on alienation and reification that the distinctive particularity of the human individual cannot be grasped sufficiently. The descriptive interest in what is essentially human loses sight of individuality. Therefore, theories of alienation need to be complemented with an account of what it is like to be an individual.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

olay.csaba@btk.elte.hu

Vasfi Onur Özen

Self- and World-Understanding in Schopenhauer

This paper explores Schopenhauer's account of inner awareness and how this pertains to his conceptions of the will, self-cognition, and representation. In Section 1, I begin by arguing against a prevailing interpretation (specifically amongst some prominent English-writing scholars) of Schopenhauer's account of inner awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-as-will to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, inner awareness reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of this suggestion. In

Section 2, I argue against the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, and use both textual evidence and general philosophical considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. If inner awareness were non-representational, it would be impossible to explain how inner awareness would provide us with cognition of the outer world. If inner awareness is representational, as I argue it is for Schopenhauer, then it becomes possible to trace the connection between inner awareness and cognition of the outer world. In Section 3, I provide an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted with in inner awareness.

College of Saint Mary, Omaha, USA
ozen.vasfi.onur@gmail.com

Stanimir Panayotov

Nemocommunism

What does it mean to be no one? In the first part, I discuss Thomas Metzinger's doctrine of nemocentrism. In the second part, I discuss my own view, which outlines a futurist project of a "society of nobodies/no ones," which I call nemocommunism. My argument is that nemocentrism streamlines a form of communist politics, where the "subject" of politics (not goods in political economy) is produced in a communist fashion.

The paper draws on Thomas Metzinger, Ray Brassier, and Thomas Nagel's works. The initial question can be reformulated as, more precisely, what "it" is to be no one? And, crucially, does not it entail "not being someone" rather than "being no one"? How can being and human existence work together if the latter cannot be subsumed under the reign of the former? For "to be no one" certainly violates the law of non-contradiction. Beyond the pathological dissolution between object and subject there nevertheless lies the hypothesis that the self is an illusion to begin with. Whereas this is no news for philosophers, Metzinger's strong reductionist view, which I will be relying on, is specific in as much as it largely relies on a data-driven, neurobiology-ingrained philosophy at the cusp of something like a post-digital Buddhism. My own offered view, based on Metzinger's and Brassier's nemocentric perspectives, has to do with assessing the political ramifications of nemocentrism, or,

nemocentric politics, which I propose to name nemocommunism. This problematic will occupy me in the latter part of the paper, where I will discuss what does a society of "no ones" might look like, why is it important to consider this as a real opportunity, and how exactly nemocentrism can produce a "nemocommunist" subject.

University of Tyumen, Russia
s.panayotov@utmn.ru

Oleksii (Oleksiy) Polunin
The multiple mental representations of time flow as ground for answering of the old question of what is time?

Since the ancient time one faces the questions of what is time, does it flow, and if yes how it flows. Because of the difficulty of these questions we look for the answers in an indirect way – analyzing the features of mental time processing. One of such features is a mind's ability to produce a representation of time flow. The empirical findings on the mind's ability to generate many different representations of time flow (Borodicky & Gabi, 2010; Polunin, 2009, 2015; Stojić, Topić, Nadasdy, 2023) highlight the role of the mind in production of the time flow experience. The mind often automatically applies a representation of time flow as heuristic for judging events. That makes an essential discrepancy between a mental representation of time flow and every consciously developed and thoughtfully applied theory of time. According to our results an array of the time representations is built mainly along two axes: (1) situational time flow – propositional (linear) time flow, and (2) time flow modelled from the first-person perspective and that modelled from the third person perspective (Polunin, 2015, 2016, 2021). The multitude of the time representations demonstrates the contribution of the mind. It points to an answer to the question of "what is time?". The "what is time?" question transforms itself in the questions "is time in the mind?", "how is time in the mind?". The mental nature of time explains also the qualities of the time flow experience. One also reinterprets the question about being in time to the being projected on an actually activated mental representation of time flow. An answer to the question of how time passes depends on the features of an actually activated mental representation of time flow. But the time mode (past, present and future) remain true for all of the mental time representations.

National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

polunin.oleksiy@gmail.com

Mikołaj Ratajczak

Institutional Thought: The Evolution Of Radical Italian Thought From a Philosophy of Crisis to a Theory of Institutions

Contemporary Italian Radical Philosophy—more commonly known as Italian Theory or pensiero italiano—is a heterogenous current of contemporary European philosophy which encompasses authors working in diverse fields, from the critique of metaphysics to critical theory, political economy and feminism. As such, it might seem pointless to analyse the works of figures such as Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, Roberto Esposito, Carlo Vercellone, or Silvia Federici as sharing a common theoretical perspective. However, despite their different conceptual vocabularies and sometimes explicit disagreements, the representatives of pensiero italiano share common historical experience, having witnessed the social upheavals of 1960s and 1970s Italy. Irrespective of their individual biographical trajectories (whether they participated in political movements or were simply inspired by them) radical Italian political philosophers have used theory to continue the struggles and push forward ideas produced by the radical political movements of the "Years of Lead". My paper will trace this historical lineage by focusing on how radical Italian political philosophy has continued to grapple with the problem of crisis from the 1970s up to some of the most recent writings of i.a. Paolo Virno and Roberto Esposito. I argue that pensiero italiano (in its different theoretical guises) has reconceptualised the question of crisis—a crisis of dialectics, of institutional mediation, and a crisis of philosophy itself—towards a new way of thinking about institutions and the institutionalisation process.

Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland

mikolaj.ratajczak@gmail.com

Andrea Rehberg

Nietzsche, Du Bois, and Fanon on the Line that Divides

In a number of his texts Nietzsche analyses the operations of Platonism, which divides the cosmos into a real and an apparent world and deems only the former to be ontologically complete, whereas the latter is supposedly ontologically deficient. Platonism has had the most devastating consequences for how materiality, physicality and sexuality have been viewed and hence how human beings have viewed themselves and other life forms.

Just three years after Nietzsche's death, the African American thinker W.E.B. Du Bois published The Souls of Black Folk (1903). In this text he analyses white supremacy in the America of his day via the concept of the 'colour line', which divided American society then and to a large extent continues to do so to this day, hence Du Bois called it "the problem of the Twentieth Century".

In his unflinching analyses of European colonialism in The Wretched of the Earth (1961), Frantz Fanon saw the colonial world as a world cut in two, i.e., as divided according to the law of the excluded middle, such that where one belonged in this world was predetermined by one's having been positioned on one or the other side of this divide.

In this paper, and despite their obvious differences, I discuss the continuities, mutatis mutandis, between the three thinkers' understanding of the workings of the line that institutes a division in what in fact is (Nietzsche) or should be (Du Bois) or will be (Fanon) a monistic but simultaneously pluralistic world that has freed itself of the violence of this line.

Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, England
andrea.rehberg@ncl.ac.uk

Clémence Saintemarie
Françoise Vergès's Decolonial 'Anti-Museum'

University College Dublin, Ireland
clemence.saintemarie@ucdconnect.ie; clemence.saintemarie@gmail.com

Sándor Sajó
Subjective, Objective, Intersubjective: Experience as a Play of Forces

Sometimes, "one bumps into one's own forehead". And, perhaps, "I is an other". These formulations by Kafka and Rimbaud, interpreted and elaborated in various ways by philosophers (Deleuze, Nancy and many others) are not metaphorical, let alone absurd. In my

talk, I will attempt to show that experience can be described in such terms. I will mainly rely on the "phenomenological tradition", in a very broad sense.

Egological conceptions of experience (Husserl), it may be argued, are not able to make the leap from the ego to the alter ego. On the other hand, alterological conceptions (Lévinas), are unable to make the leap to the ego. But, in fact, there is no leap to be made. The alter ego is there in the ego, just as the ego is there in the alter ego.

Besides the other, objectivity (the world) may also seem to be another pole over against the ego. However, one may argue that experience is the experience of a shared, that is, intersubjective objective world. Just as there is no ego without an alter ego, there is no objectivity without intersubjectivity.

If this is the case, experience is neither an atomistic nor a relational formation. Subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity form "a play of forces", as Hegel put it.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
Contact: sajo.sandor@btk.elte.hu

Timothy Secret
Locked Levinas: Memory and Face

Locke's theory of personal identity and Levinas's account of the face-to-face encounter have a peculiar isomorphism that transgresses the same standard disciplinary boundaries. Both can be classed as meta-ethical accounts of the foundations of responsibility or as metaphysical accounts of the emergence of the distinctively human subject. Nevertheless, the two rarely encounter each other in secondary scholarship and, when they do, it has generally occurred on political territory. Here, Levinas is broadly positioned as a thinker of a progressive heteronomy and the sacrifice of self-possession, against Locke as the father of individualism and a problematic self-ownership that can rapidly be connected to patriarchy and colonialism. The reading of Locke within a more continental register by Étienne Balibar, a reading that that draws out a rationalist and proto-transcendental core to his thinking and in which self-consciousness becomes the foundation of the possibility of thought, when combined with those readings within the analytic tradition that focus on persona as an accused figure of responsibility rather than a substantial res, offers a way of bringing Locke close to Levinas's concerns. Having done this, the paper will show how Locke's manner of approaching consciousness and memory might serve as a foundation for a Levinasian ethics that breaks

with the present, exposing Levinas's unnecessary dependence on a Cartesian rather than a Lockean notion of consciousness. Lastly, we will show how the position that emerges might offer political modes of thought that neither can offer alone in relation to the dead and unborn.

University of Winchester, England
timothy.secret@winchester.ac.uk

Veronika L. Sharova
Mapping the Memory: the Urban in the Phenomenological Optics

In my paper, I am addressing the problem of memory in an urban environment from the standpoint of a phenomenological approach. I proceed from the assumption that the city, being a special type of an inhabited space, lends itself to phenomenological analysis. Its subject matter may be the type of planning, features of the architectural style, toponymy, and so on. The conceptual foundations of the corresponding theory can be found in the works of G. Simmel, M. Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty, G. Bachelard, and other thinkers who contributed to the development of the phenomenological tradition of philosophy and social theory. In the paper, I intend to clarify how the practices of mapping the memory of the city are organized in everyday life, as well as in the political process, and in their interrelation. Developing the problem posed, I proceed from the fact that phenomenology was conceived as a "return to things" as opposed to abstractions and mental constructions. The city as a specific space and collection of places, objects, and voids can thus be seen as the embodiment of "dwelling in the world". It, in turn, implies a twofold connection of a person with a place: through spatial orientation and psychological identification with it. The urban environment, having signs of a political organization and economic system, is also a projection of the symbolic aspects of social life onto geographical objects.

This issue seems to be highly relevant in the context of the development of contemporary cities, particularly in the conditions of post-socialism and post-colonialism. Rethinking and, one might say, reinventing the past is inevitably related with the elaboration of historical trauma. The result of it should be the reassembling of the collective memory of society and individual perception in the environment, that is, the phenomenologically understood being-in-the-world.

Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Federation

veronika.sharova@gmail.com

Attasit Sittidumrong

From the Incapability of Self-Determination to the Act of Self-Destruction: Michel Foucault, Rahel Jaeggi, and the New Vision of Self-Alienation

It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that alienation was an outdated concept until the publication of Rahel Jaeggi's work, which gave the concept new life. By shifting the emphasis from the existence of one's authentic self to the loss of the capability to determine one's own life, Jaeggi not only provides a new framework for considering our contemporary environment of alienation, but she also furnishes a new possibility for rereading other thinkers who are usually regarded as deniers of the alienation critique, particularly Michel Foucault. Although Jaeggi criticizes Foucault for grounding the direction of contemporary thought in a way that rejects the viability of the alienation critique, I find in her framework of alienation, as the relation of relationlessness, insight for speculating on how Foucault probes the new experience of self-alienation through his undertaking of power that operates under the mechanism of bio-politics. This means that, while Jaeggi might differentiate her position from Foucault's, such a position paradoxically helps me articulate a vision that plays beneath Foucault's late works, that is, the vision of how power entails us to become an object of government, by making us its agents in disciplining our own self. However, it is important to note that, although Jaeggi's framework allows me to ascertain Foucault's vision of alienation, there is a difference between Foucault and Jaeggi in terms of the extent to which this alienation can be grasped. It could then follow that, while Jaeggi considers alienation the incapability of self-determination, Foucault's vision of alienation relies on the act of self-destruction, that is to say, the act that destructs one's capability of self-determination

Walailak University, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand

att_onlne1@hotmail.com; attasit.si@wu.ac.th

Charlotte Nóra Szász

Master, slave and the negative power of the unconscious

In this talk, I would like to discuss reading G.W.F. Hegel's master-slave dialectic as a struggle between the Unconscious and Conscious. This reading is inspired by feminist readings of the passage from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit which often too easy draw on an analogy to gendered power relations. However, they point to an interesting genealogy and systematicity of this passage and its possible roots within love, dialectics and his earlier Jena writings: The concept of recognition can be shown to take its roots in the sexual difference within Hegel's work.

But I suggest, reading the passage quite orthodox at the point where it is located within the Phenomenology– situated after consciousness and thereby taking seriously the duality or split that Hegel points out which is within the individual's self-consciousness as suggested by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. This possibility of an intraindividual master-slave relation with its relation to the unconscious was discussed, and dismissed, by Jacques Lacan in his Seminar XVI: From an Other to the Other. However, I want to make Hegel's claim »the individual's unconscious spirit has its existence in women« fruitful for a revised feminist reading of this passage and thereby discussing the possibility of mapping Hegel's theory of the unconscious onto the master-slave relation.

Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Germany
szasz@leuphana.de

Mihály Szilágyi-Gál
Apoliticism: Understanding the Concept of the Apolitical

The following is an attempt to describe the concept of apoliticism. It will distinguish between indifferent and reflecting apoliticism, both being considered as negative attitudes towards politics. Whereas the reflecting apoliticism is the rejection of the official political institutions, possibly with the plan of an alternative system, the indifferent one rejects politics altogether, respectively it is politically disinterested. The reflective negativism rejects politics as mechanism, the indifferent one rejects it as a pursuit. Further distinction will be made between the extra-political and the supra-political condition, both considered as forms of political poverty. These concepts may serve as means for a more nuanced understanding of the structure of apolitical attitudes. The extra-political is the condition of not being a political agent and being outside of any environment in which free deliberation and public engagement is possible at all. The supra-political is meant to be the condition of over-

politicization, the blurring of the line between public political activities and rites prescribed by the state on the one hand, and the private sphere of the individual on the other. Both the extra-political and the supra-political deny that particular minimal degree of voluntariness of individual engagements, without which the individual loses its political agency, and exemplify what is labeled in the following as political poverty.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
szilagyi-gal.mihaly@btk.elte.hu

Jacky Yuen-Hung Tai
Living in Truth and Problematicity: Havel and Patočka Under Authoritarianism

My paper seeks to elucidate the meaning of "living in truth" in Jan Patočka's writings in relation to Vaclav Havel's plays in the 1970s under the authoritarian regime in Czechoslovakia. I argue that the implicit political gesture in Patočka's phenomenology could be better revealed by exploring Havel's political refashioning of it. My overarching claim is that Patočka's idea of existential truth points to an inner struggle against the allure of authoritarianism, i.e., self-deception and obedience. I will illustrate this claim in the following steps.

First, I will explain the influence of Patočka on Havel, in regard to Havel's remark made immediately after the death of Patočka in 1977, where he recounted that Patočka had remained the philosopher he kept re-reading throughout his lifetime (Havel, 1992).

Second, I will explain the idea of truth in Patočka's thinking, and in what ways he attempts to surpass Heidegger's Dasein analysis, in order to illustrate the ethical significance of inner struggle against authoritarianism (Patočka, 2021, 2023).

Third, I will explore Havel's idea of authenticity and mutual understanding under authoritarianism, notably in his Vaněk plays in the 1970s, where the main character Vaněk, impersonating Havel himself, always tries to be authentic amid political repression under the Czechoslovak communist regime (Havel, 2012).

Fourth, I will elaborate on the political significance of Patočka's idea of existential truth in his various writings, in the sense of living in problematicity and struggling against self-deception, which resonates with Havel's idea of living within truth (Patočka, 2016).

In conclusion, my cross-reading of Havel and Patočka will highlight a non-religious understanding of truth in phenomenology, in distinction from some contemporary interpretations of Patočka.

National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan Republic of China
jackytai@g-mail.nsysu.edu.tw

Andrea Timár
Critiques of Violence: Arendt, Sedgwick, and Cavarero Respond to Billy Budd's Stutter

This paper examines how Adriana Cavarero extends and offers an alternative to Hannah Arendt's understanding of speech and its relationship to politics and violence through a re-reading of Herman Melville's, Billy Budd, Sailor (1891). The novella was examined by Arendt herself in On Revolution (1963) where she considers the apolitical character of the French Revolutionary Terror and establishes a link between violence, mimetic contagion, and the failure of articulate speech. I suggest that whereas Arendt's reading only offers two possible responses to violence—forgiveness or punishment (perpetuating violence)—a reading of the novella inspired by Cavarero's work shows a third alternative, the prevention of violence, while equally revealing the blind spot of Arendt's argument. The blind spot is her privileging of articulate speech and her failure to consider the embodied character of human expression. The alternative I offer is informed by Cavarero's ethics of inclination which allows for a response to, and responsibility for, the uniqueness of the human voice, and for the intention to convey meaning. To mediate between Arendt and Cavarero, the paper evokes Eve Sedgwick's paradigm-setting queer reading of Billy Budd, and engages with Walter Benjamin's and Giorgio Agamben's contrary takes on the relationship between violence and language.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
timar.andrea@btk.elte.hu

Tamás Ullman
Models of the unconscious: phenomenology and psychoanalysis

In my presentation, I would like to elaborate some aspects of a phenomenological theory of the unconscious. I will first analyze the differences between phenomenological and psychanalytical approaches to unconscious phenomena. Second, I try to elaborate some basic models of the concept of the unconscious: the repression model, the defense model and the symbolic model.

According to my hypothesis, it is the unilateral identification of the concept of the unconscious with repression which renders very difficult, or even impossible for phenomenology and for the analytic philosophy of mind the acceptance of the psychoanalytical version of unconscious. For a phenomenological approach, there can be unconscious processes (passive synthesis, sedimentation, association, etc.) but no repressed representation. Unconscious and passive syntheses are completely acceptable for phenomenology, but repressed representation contradicts all theoretical presuppositions of phenomenology. For all contents that are in consciousness are either actually conscious, or can be rendered conscious in a finite process. But repressed representation is supposed to have concrete and real effect on conscious activity without any chance of ever becoming conscious.

In the model of repression (1) the conscious system is opposed to the unconscious, and all is unconscious that does not belong to the conscious ego; (2) repression aims at keeping away certain representations from the conscious system; (3) the dynamics of repression is striving for homeostatic balance of the system; (4) the task of therapy is to render conscious certain unconscious and repressed representation.

If we remain in the framework of phenomenological thinking, the concept of repression proves to be an unacceptable model, that is why I would propose two other models: the defense model and the symbolic model.

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
ullmann.tamas@btk.elte.hu

Fotini Vassiliou
Kant and Husserl on the jurisdiction and the limits of Transcendental Aesthetic

In his Transcendental Aesthetic, Immanuel Kant posits time and space as the transcendental conditions of possibility of sensible intuition. The thing as sensuous and also as substantially-causally determined, however, is for Kant the result of the syntheses of the understanding, the

treatment of which is the task of Transcendental Analytic. Edmund Husserl criticized Kant's approach arguing that it is inadequate for dealing with the constitutive syntheses that occur prior to the application of the categories of pure reason. In contrast, Husserl's own Transcendental Aesthetic aims to provide the a priori conditions for the constitution of primordial experience. In this presentation, I will explore Husserl's significant critique of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and examine how Husserl's own approach reformed the concept phenomenologically. I'll demonstrate that, according to Husserl and contrary to Kant's view, Transcendental Aesthetic is deep enough to encompass the realm of immanent sensuousness and its primordial syntheses, including time-consciousness as well as originary associative syntheses. I will then argue that the phenomenologically elucidated Transcendental Aesthetic is broad enough to address primordial constitution in all three regions of being, namely mere nature, animalia, and axiologically and practically invested things. Finally, I will explain that this a priori discipline extends high enough to include in its jurisdiction full-fledged experience, which, nevertheless, precedes acts of thought.

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece

fvassiliou@philosophy.uoa.gr

Andrea Vitangeli
Rapture and Attunement:
Heidegger's Attempt at Overcoming Nietzsche's Aesthetics

Recent additions to Heidegger's complete works have highlighted the significance for his positive thinking on art of his concomitant negative project of overcoming the very framework of traditional ('metaphysical') aesthetics. This provides the context for a novel appreciation of his most well-known engagement with a key representative of this tradition – namely, Nietzsche. In this paper, I extract and reconstruct the central argumentative steps at play in Heidegger's extended interpretive confrontation with Nietzsche's aesthetics, as expounded in Heidegger's first lecture course on Nietzsche, 'The Will to Power as Art' (WPA). Particular attention will be devoted to Heidegger's pivotal recasting of Nietzsche's concept of rapture (*Rausch*) as the fundamental aesthetic state in terms of Heidegger's own existential notion of fundamental attunement; as well as to Heidegger's striking claim that any 'true' aesthetic approach to art, as he puts it, 'explodes itself'. Then, contrary to previous scholarship on WPA, I highlight how Heidegger's critique co-exists with a creative appropriation of basic Nietzschean notions, and how the results of such operation fit into and illuminate the seemingly independent Heideggerian

project of developing a being-historical perspective on art, as canonically expounded in 'The Origin of the Work of Art'.

University of Oxford, England

andrea.vitangeli@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Bertille de Vlieger

Emotional self-knowledge and its prudential value

Emotional self-knowledge is a form of self-knowledge which holds great interest for ordinary individuals. It can be described as substantial self-knowledge (Cassam 2017) as opposed to a more trivial form of self-knowledge (e.g. knowing that I am wearing overalls). But what is it about the nature of emotional self-knowledge that makes it essential to the conduct of our lives? In other words, what kind of value do we place on having self-knowledge such as emotional knowledge? In this talk it is a matter of demonstrating that emotional self-knowledge holds a prudential value. The concept of prudential value is closely related to well-being (Campbell 2013). This value of emotional knowledge lies in the aspiration of individuals to well-being and is therefore intrinsically linked to what is good for them. The concept of well-being is evaluative as it refers to what benefits an individual, what is in their best interest and what makes their life go as well as possible (Haybron 2008). First, I will consider the benefits of emotional self-knowledge. For example, emotional knowledge - as a substantive kind of knowledge - may reveal our preferences, what we value, our character traits, a part of oneself. It can – for example - give the possibility to better understand oneself and avoid self-estrangement or self-alienation. Secondly, I will consider an objection according to which a better understanding of our own emotions may involve some potential risks. In fact, it could allow us to become aware of our weaknesses, our limits or what we lack. Knowing our emotions may uncover the darkest parts of ourselves and generates anxiety, rumination of negative thoughts or self-disgust. As such, emotional self-knowledge can be destructive. Finally, I will demonstrate that although not sufficient and likely to cause negative emotional states, knowledge of subjective experiences such as emotional experiences greatly contributes to our well-being. Indeed, it gives the possibility of control over our emotions, over their effects, expressions and, in some cases, over their consequences. Emotional self-knowledge holds a prudential value because it offers individuals a substantial knowledge and the means to intervene on their quality of life.

Université de Lille, France
Bertille.de-vlieger@univ-lille.fr

Ashley Woodward

Continental Approaches to Philosophy of Information

'Philosophy of Information' has gained a certain identity as a distinct area of study in the Analytic tradition, but this has not occurred in the continental tradition, despite some very

significant contributions to the topic. The aim of this paper is to survey these contributions, and outline some significant continental approaches to philosophy of information. It identifies two major tendencies in these approaches, which I call the critical and the constructive. The former is represented by philosophers in the phenomenological and poststructuralist traditions, such as Heidegger, Deleuze, and Lyotard, whose works are well-known, even if their specific analyses of information are less so. For these thinkers information represents a reduction of the rich meanings of natural language to formalised signals, with deep and widespread, predominantly negative implications.

The constructive tradition, on the other hand, is represented here by three thinkers who are less well known: Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert Simondon, and Michel Serres. Each in their own way developed theories of information as transformation. They reject the 'standard' understanding of information as simply the transmission of a given message from a sender to a reciever, and instead focus on the trasformative effects information produces in systems. This leads them to ontological theories which exploited the potentials of cybernetics and information theory, but for dynamic and indeterminate ends.

A distinctive feature of all these continental approaches is that they do not treat technical issues in isolation from broader cultural, ethical, and political issues, but rather offer ambitious attempts to understand the broad reontologising effects of the information revolution. Although most of these thinkers did not live to see the extensive developments and profound effects of information technologies we live with today, their philosophical reflections still offer much to help us understand these contemporary realities.

University of Dundee, Scotland

a.z.woodward@dundee.ac.uk

Anupam Yadav and Virosh Singh Baghel

An Inquiry into Aesthetic Necessitation in Nietzsche and Abhinavagupta

The idea of aesthetic experience in Friedrich Nietzsche and Abhinavagupta, a 10th century Indian philosopher and aesthetician, is philosophically significant in construing the meaning of life and reality. The paper examines the aesthetic function of the Greek tragedy and drama in Nietzsche and Abhinavagupta respectively. Both tragedy and drama arouse pleasure in spectators. This is unique to the delicate synthesis of Apollonian and Dionysian artistic forces in tragedy and the extraordinary nature of drama as rasa (aesthetic relishing). While the

revealing and concealing Apollonian and Dionysian forces provide aesthetic redemption to human sufferings, drama (as well as poetry), as a work of creative genius absorbs the spectator who is 'a similar heart' in a blissful experience, akin to self-realization. Aesthetic mediation in redemptive and spiritual experiences mark a unique relation between individual and universal consciousness. In tragedy, the metaphysical consolation that life is mightier than the principium individuum enables an individual to face tragic consciousness. The drama as it presents the idealized or generalized emotions (bhavas), available to all, allows one to repose in blissful concentrated consciousness. Experience of the phenomenon of universality through art in both the thinkers find anchorage in their philosophical theses of 'creative will'. In this regard, the paper examines Nietzsche's idea of mysterious will and Abhinavagupta's philosophy of Kashmir Shaivism. The latter considers the world as a manifestation of dynamic energy of Shiva (the absolute). This comparative engagement into the nature of art and creative nature of reality enables us to establish the basis of aesthetic necessitation in two thinkers.

Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, Rajasthan, India
anupam.yadav@pilani.bits-pilani.ac.in

Mert Can Yirmibeş
Which Comes First, Actuality or Possibility? A Hegelian View on the Priority of Actuality

Abstract: It is a long-lasting discussion about whether actuality is prior to what there possibly is, or possibility is prior to what there actually is. The ongoing debate, in contemporary modal metaphysics, can be read with two main camps, possibilism and actualism. The former has emerged with Lewis' radical realism about possible worlds, and the latter has come to the scene as a critical reception of Lewisian modal realism. Accordingly, possibilism is defined as claiming that all possibility is prior to actuality, meaning that all actuality is indeed actualised possibilities, whereas actualism is defined as claiming that actuality is prior to possibility, meaning that all possibility is within actuality. In this talk, I will examine Hegel's treatment of modality in the context of the actualism-possibilism debate with the question of priority in mind. Hegel's treatment of modality in his *Science of Logic* is consistently structured to prove that possibility is a derivative concept of actuality or that is to say, actuality is prior to possibility. I will explain Hegel's notions of formal, real and absolute possibility with the following arguments, respectively: Firstly,

formal possibility is something that is *not* actual. Secondly, real possibility is an *actuality* that conditions another actuality. Thirdly, absolute possibility is a moment of *indeterminacy* within actuality. I argue that these three arguments capture Hegel's notions of possibility in a way that each understanding of possibility is meant to take its beginning from actuality. This consistent derivation of different notions of possibility in Hegel's treatment of modality will enable us to conclude that for Hegel, the actual always comes before what there possibly is.

Assistant Professor at Mardin Artuklu University
mertyirmibes@artuklu.edu.tr

Olga Young
An Artist's Appeal

The paper will reflect on the experience of studying Fine Art in the UK with respect to the philosophical language and thinking used to both engage with artworks and as a basis for the creation of artworks. An observation will be made that, although many might claim otherwise, for the most part, people working within the field of Fine Art in some regions appear to think within the bounds of the Anglo-American or analytic philosophy; European thinkers might be cited but viewed from an analytic perspective.

The possible consequences of an analytic approach to Fine Art will then be addressed. An argument will be put forward that the creative and dynamic activity of Fine Art becomes at risk of being 'killed'; that is, the danger is that conceptualizing in an analytic way both the activity of making and interpreting artworks could mean that the fundamental nature of Fine Art is lost, to be replaced with a set of conceptual assertions that try to grasp aspects of Fine Art and so stop them from being understood as part of an emergent process.

The conclusion is an appeal to Continental Philosophy to come to the aid of Fine Art where the analytic tradition has taken hold to allow the activity and understanding of Fine Art to be reflected in a philosophical approach that better expresses their fundamentally dynamic nature that the analytic approach.

University of East London, England